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Abstract 
 
The  empirical  motivation  of  this  dissertation  is  the  increasing  importance  of  financial 
market’s regulation pursuant of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). There is currently 
incomplete  knowledge  on  the  relationship  between  insider  trading  and  earnings 
management on the one hand and earnings management and firm performance on the other 
in light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Moreover, the relevance of political 
regulation of financial markets has not yet been thoroughly investigated.  
 
The research aims of the dissertation are: 1) To evaluate the effectiveness of financial 
market regulation (SOX) on Insider trading and Earnings management 2) To empirically 
examine how the different techniques used to manage earnings influence firm performance 
in light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Both tests suggest ways in which 
investors can examine and unravel a comprehensive set of earnings management signals 
and their impact on either insider trading or future firm performance.  
 
The thesis is divided into two main empirical chapters: The first main empirical chapter 
(chapter  4)  discusses  insider  trading  and  earnings  management  in  light  of  the  recent 
regulatory intervention mandated by the SOX. The second main empirical chapter (Chapter 
5) discuss changes in earnings management and firm performance relationship in light of 
the  recent  regulatory  intervention  as  prescribed  by  SOX.  In  an  attempt  to  obtain  a 
comprehensive understanding of several conceptual issues, the different techniques used to 
manage earnings are employed including, discretionary accruals techniques, real earnings 
management  and  the  probability  of  financial  statements  distortion  as  measured  by  the 
Beneish M Score. Overall, the focus is on managers of S&P 500 companies, holders of 
private information about the firm’s prospects, preparers and senders of financial reports 
and investors and analysts as receivers and users of these financial statements.  
 
Findings on the relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light of 
the  recent  regulatory  intervention  suggest  that  after  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  of  2002, 
managers are less likely to time their trade and boast earnings to benefit at the expense of 
outside investors. Furthermore, under stricter regulations, market participants detect and 
react to insider trading and earnings management practices.  
 
Findings on the relationship between a comprehensive set of earnings management signals 
and  firm  performance  suggest  that  there  have  been  greater  monitoring  of  financial  
III  
statements in the Post SOX era. When firms attempt to manage earnings during periods of 
intense  market  regulation,  investors  discount  this  through  disappointing  stock  returns. 
Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  there  should  be  broad  based  approach  in  analysing 
financial statements.  
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1.0: Introduction of the Dissertation. 
In the first part of chapter 1, the main issues addressed in the thesis and the motivations 
behind  them  are  discussed.  The  second  section  presents  the  research  questions  to  be 
answered  and  the  third  section  specifies  the  overall  structure  of  the  thesis.  The  fourth 
section analyses the research results. Section five discusses the contributions of the thesis. 
This chapter ends with a final section that present an outline of the thesis.  
  
1.1: Issues Addressed in the Thesis and Motivation. 
This  first  part  of  the  thesis  discusses  the  relationship  between  managers’  insider 
transactions and their strategic earnings management behaviour. The second part of the 
thesis evaluates the strategic behaviour of earnings management by managers and their 
impact on future firm performance
1. In both cases, the thesis extends the capital market 
literature using a regulatory approach. It does so by investigating these constructs in light 
of the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
(hereafter SOX).  
 
As earnings management is a generic term that is customarily used to define all issues 
relating to financial statements distortions, to investigate changes in earnings management 
during  the  Pre  and  Post  Sarbanes  Oxley  period,  the  thesis  utilize  two  proxies  to 
operationalise the notion of earnings management. The two main dimensions of earnings 
management discussed in the thesis are: 
 
1)  The discretionary accruals model, which is a benchmarking model that separates 
accruals into its normal and discretionary component. The normal portion is the 
portion that can be explained by the firm’s business activities and past accounting 
transactions and the discretionary component is the component that is driven by 
managers’ intention to manage earnings
2 or is at least an apparent deviation from 
the implied benchmark level. As discussed in prior literature (e.g. Dechow et al., 
1996, Becker et al., 1998, Balsam et al., 2003), researchers have often used the 
                                                 
1 In this Thesis, a firm is equivalent to the term group and/or corporation, and refers to firms listed in the 
S&P 500 companies at any one time of the study period. 
2 The overall component of accruals is normally observable, while the discretionary component is 
unobservable and reflects the manipulated component of earnings.  
2   
magnitude of discretionary accruals to indicate the flexibility in reporting earnings 
from business transactions.  
2)  Earnings  management  through  real  operating decisions  that  customarily involve 
practices that are legal and most often viewed as being within business rules but 
dubious, e.g. asset sales to book gains in bad years, changes in R&D expenditures, 
sales pull forwards through quantity discounts, fraudulent recognition of accounts 
receivables and payables, overproduction to spread unit production costs etc (e.g., 
Gunny,  2006  and  Roychowdhury,  2006).  It  is  important  to  note  that,  strategic 
changes in accounting policy e.g. LIFO/FIFO switch, goodwill write ups can be 
used to boast/depress earnings over time. 
 
The tendencies of both real and discretionary earnings management have always been to 
influence  reported  earnings,  where  financial  reports  reflects  the  hopes  and  desires  of 
management as opposed to the company’s underlying financial performance (Healy and 
Whalen, 1999). The rationale for differentiating the two techniques is to provide clarity as 
to  which  combination  of  techniques  management  employ  to  manage  earnings  during 
periods of strict market regulations. 
 
There have been many definitions of earnings management as discussed in section 2.3. 
However, this research employs the Healy and Wahlen, (1999, p. 368) definition that has 
become popular in the literature and defines earnings management as: 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring  transactions  to  alter  financial  reports  to  either  mislead  some  stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”  
 
According  to  Ronen  and  Yaari  (2009,  p.  27),  this  definition  captures  both  the  costly 
contracting  approach  (suggesting  that  earnings  management  is  used  to  influence 
contractual  outcomes)  and  the  informational  approach  (which  suggest  that  earnings 
management  is  used  to  mislead  investors).  The  precision  is  that  the  prerequisite  for 
earnings  management  is  to  mislead  external  stakeholders;  however  whether  this  is 
opportunistic is not totally clear. The Thesis employs this definition because the sample  
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does not include only firms that are being accused for having managed earnings according 
to  the  Security  and  Exchange  Commission  Accounting  and  Auditing  Enforcement 
Releases.  As  in  Dechow  and  Skinner  (2000),  the  focus  is  on  earnings  management 
activities that falls within GAAP. Firms that are accused of outright fraud fall under the 
classification of earnings manipulation (Beneish, 1997, 1999).  
 
Both real and discretionary earnings management involve changing accounting methods, 
deferring expenses or accelerating revenues, and recognizing one time items (e.g. asset 
sales/purchases and R&D expenditures or cuts). Nevertheless, firms differ as to the extent 
to  which  they  manage  earnings.  It  is  important  to  recognise  that  all  firms  do  manage 
earnings influenced by different motivations. However, the extent of earnings management 
is  what  has  guided  the  contrasting  definitions.  Beneish  (1997,  1997)  categorised firms 
going through enforcement releases by the Securities and Exchange Commission as having 
manipulated (not managed) earnings. These are normally firms that have managed earnings 
to  an  egregious  level  (e.g.  Enron  and  WorldCom),  the  type  customarily  described  as 
accounting  fraud  that  caught  the  attention  of  policy  makers,  investors  and  other 
stakeholders. Considering the steep decline in share prices when earnings manipulation is 
unravelled,  one  can  safely  argue  that  investors  do  consider  the  extent  of  earnings 
management when making investment decisions (Spohr, 2005).  
 
 
The  1934  Securities  and  Exchange  Act  defines  insiders  as  Officers,  Directors, 
corporation’s Vice Presidents and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporation’s 
stock
3. There has been no shortage of evidence that top level executives have the ability to 
influence reported earnings as they are directly involved in the day to day management of 
the company and its earnings (Ke et al., 2003). Recent empirical research (Ke et al., 2003 
and Beneish and Vargus, 2004) has investigated ways in which corporate insiders (salaried 
by the firm), trade with information that is price sensitive and has not yet been put into the 
public domain (Insider trading) and their strategic Earnings Management behaviour. This 
is especially so since the introduction of Regulation FD (“Fair Disclosure”) in the United 
                                                 
3 Though the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act defined a top level executive as officers, directors, 
corporation’s vice presidents and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporation’s stock, extant research 
on insider trading and earnings management eliminates the 10 percent owners as they are not directly 
involved in the day to day management of the company.  
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States enacted in October 2000. Although researchers have often attributed trading profits 
to insiders’ informational advantage through their ability to understand market mispricing 
as well as their superior knowledge of future earnings outcomes (See for example: Jaffe 
(1974), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishney 
(1994)  and  Rozeff  and  Zaman,  (1998)  Ke  et  al,  (2003)),  the  predominance  of  insider 
trading  informational  advantage  has  been  linked  to  their  ability  to  influence  reported 
earnings (e.g., Bolton et al., 2002, Beneish et al., 2004, Weber, 2005).  
 
In the popular market based accounting and finance literature, the evidence indicates that 
insiders’  purchases  (sales)  on  current  (future)  bad  (good)  news  is  habitually  linked  to 
upward (downward) earnings management (Beneish and Vargus, 2004). These suggest that 
insiders  are  not  passive  traders  in  that  they  often  appear  to  use  their  informational 
advantage to influence market prices (through real and accruals accounting techniques). In 
recent times, there has been increased attention on the extent to which firms employ a 
combination of real and accrual based earning management strategies (e.g., Gunny 2006 
and Roychowdhury 2006). Accruals earnings management is accomplished through the 
choice  of  accounting  methods  used  while  real  earnings  management  is  customarily 
accomplished through changes in the firm’s underlying operations (Gunny, 2006). Total 
accruals (which is the difference between net income and cash flow from operations) are 
observable  like  non discretionary  accruals  and  usually,  are  not  exposed  to  earnings 
management  techniques.  The  discretionary  accruals,  which  are  not  observable,  are 
employed as an instrument to manage or manipulate earnings (Beneish, 1998)
4. Recent 
techniques in selecting earnings based on survey evidence suggest that managers habitually 
employ but the use real earnings management techniques that seem costly, especially with 
regards to its effect on the financial operations of the firm in the long run (Graham et al., 
2004, Cohen et al., 2007). While investigating the impact of real earnings management 
techniques,  Roychowdhury  (2006)  suggested  that  managers  provide  price  discounts  to 
temporarily  boost  sales,  reduce  discretionary  expenditures  in  order  to  improve  profit 
margins and overproduce to lower the cost of goods sold.  
 
                                                 
4 In this thesis, earnings management is defined as the management of earnings possibly within GAAP and 
fall within the white and gray classification according to Ronen and Yaari (2007, p. 25), while earnings 
manipulation  is  aspects  of  financial  management  fraud  involving  cases  like  the  Enron  and  WorldCom 
scandals and fall within the black classification according to Ronen and Yaari (2007, p. 25). This is clearly 
differentiated in section 2.4.   
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The impact of financial reporting regulations to improve earnings quality has also been 
investigated  in  the  academic  literature.  After  the  accounting  scandals  at  Enron  and 
WorldCom  and  the  certification  requirements  imposed  by  the  Sarbanes–Oxley  Act, 
managers’  preferences  for  the  mix  between  accruals  accounting  versus  real  actions  to 
manage earnings may have changed (Graham et al., 2005). The basis for the Act was 
fuelled  by  concerns  relating  to  the  integrity  of  financial  statements,  which  caught  the 
attention  of  investors  and  policy  makers  charged  with  protecting  the  investment 
community  (Jenkins  et  al.,  2006).  Since  real  earnings  management  activities  are  often 
difficult to interpret, when managers are faced with stricter financial reporting regulations 
like  the  SOX  of  2002,  they  are  more  likely  to  substitute  accruals  with  real  earnings 
management.  Quite  recently,  a  host  of  research  papers  have  provided  evidence  that  is 
consistent with the expectation that SOX has made accrual based earnings management 
more costly, with managers substituting from accrual to real earnings management (Cohen 
et  al.,  (2007),  Cohen  and  Zarowin  (2008)).  The  arguments  above  suggest  that,  under 
stricter  regulations  and  with  managers  exposed  to  different  techniques  that  can  be 
substituted under  competing  circumstances,  the  ability  of  investors to  unravel  earnings 
management is questionable. To provide additional evidence, this study also looks at the 
different techniques used to manage earnings. 
 
In the US, the SEC has the mandate to regulate information motivated trading by insiders 
(not necessarily illegal trades) and aspects of earnings management. Specifically, the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act and their subsequent amendments have consistently imposed 
different  restrictions  on  insider  trading  and  earnings  management  relationship.  After 
several  consultative  meetings,  the  Sarbanes Oxley  Act  was  enacted  in  October  2002, 
aimed at improving the integrity of financial statements and to suppress insider trading 
based upon foreknowledge of price sensitive information. Section 302 of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 requires insiders to accept responsibility for the integrity of financial 
statements and they are obliged to certify that financial statements are not misleading and 
fairly represent the company’s operations. Additionally, section 16b of the Securities and 
Exchange Act requires all insiders to return to their corporation any capital gains made 
from a purchase or sale of their company’s stock if both transactions occur within a six 
month  period  (habitually  termed  short  swings  profits).  The  short  swing  rule  was 
implemented  to  prevent  insiders,  who  have  greater  access  to  material  non public  
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information, from taking advantage of such information for the purpose of making short 
term profits. Apart from institutional regulations by the SEC, a significant number of US 
firms do impose extra legal (company policy) trading restrictions on insiders (Bettis et al., 
2000). In general, the restrictions on the US system on insider trading surrounds the fact 
that, insiders must either abstain from trading on undisclosed information or release this 
information to the public before they execute their trades (Hu and Noe, 1997).  
 
As  discussed  above,  firms  subject  to  regulatory  scrutiny  might  employ  measures  that 
cannot be easily interpreted by regulators. In contrast to accrual earnings management, 
earnings manipulation through real operating decisions, such as reductions in discretionary 
expenses (primarily R&D, advertisement, selling, general and administrative expenses), 
asset sales, price discounts to improve sales, mostly occur during the course of the year 
(Roychowdhury, (2006)). Such strategic choices regarding allocation of corporate cash 
flows are not easily challenged in the Court’s since the “Business Judgement Rule
5” means 
a regulator or Judge cannot just assume control of the company’s competitive strategy 
themselves. Moreover, accruals customarily mean revert and overstatements in the current 
period must be matched by an understatement in the future.  
 
The often easily detectable nature of accruals subject firms that report high accruals more 
likely to SEC enforcement actions (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996, Bradshaw et al., 2001) than 
those that directly employ real earnings management. SEC enforcements and prior year 
accruals might thus limit a firm’s ability to manage earnings. Since regulators habitually 
focus on the easy to detect discretionary accruals technique, not real earning management, 
accrual based earnings management is expected to reduce as a result of the passage of 
regulations aimed at improving earnings quality. Moreover, the business judgement rule 
(discussed in the paragraph above) makes it very hard for legislators/investigators to say 
they know better than the manager who make real investment decisions. In light of this, it 
might be difficult to evaluate insider trading that are linked to future earnings disclosure, 
especially  when  real  earnings  management  have  been  used  to  boost  earnings.  As 
                                                 
5 The business judgement rule (An American case law) is a judicial acknowledgement that directors manage 
the company. It’s a presumption that in making a business decision the directors normally act on an informed 
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief their action is for the best interest of the company. The rule 
acknowledges that the daily operation of a business can be risky and controversial. The directors should 
therefore be allowed to make decisions without fear of being prosecuted. The business judgment rule further 
assumes that it is unfair to expect those managing a company to make perfect decisions all the time.  
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highlighted  above,  the  use  of  accruals  to  temporarily  boast  or  reduce  income  is  one 
mechanism  for  earnings  management.  Accruals  are  components  of  earnings  that  are 
customarily  not  reflected  in  current  cash  flows,  making  it  susceptible  to  managerial 
discretion in its construction (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2004) 
 
The theoretical implications that have originated from the discussions above suggests that 
with  strict  regulations  on  earnings  management  and  under  different  circumstances, 
managers might even switch and mix and match techniques to make it harder for investors 
and regulators to be able to differentiate manipulated from non manipulated earnings. This 
even makes the relationship between insider trading and earnings management using these 
different techniques even harder to assess.  
 
This  research  includes  studies  of  stock  market  performance  and  financial  markets 
regulations and therefore has potential relevance on the field of financial economics and 
financial markets regulations. Broadly, finance theories are used in this research in three 
ways 1) the statistical studies investigating price performance after private information 
(proxy  by  insider  trades),  2)  the  theoretical  framework  that  evaluates  how  private 
information  motivates  earnings  management  and  how  in  light  of  the  recent  regulatory 
intervention, this relationship can be assessed and 3) the attempt to develop models for 
investigating  the  different  empirical  anomalies  in  light  of  the  regulation  of  financial 
markets. Unlike in Ball and Brown (1968), the research does not imply that investors can 
earn abnormal returns from exploiting financial markets anomalies. Rather it concludes 
that while some stakeholders can exploit public and private information to generate profits 
at the expense of other stakeholders as documented in prior research, in light of recent 
regulatory  intervention,  the  circumstances  under  which  this  is  possible  need  to  be 
evaluated differently.  
 
1.2: Research Questions. 
In  this  section,  the  research  questions  are  discussed  and  the  gaps  in  the  theory  that 
motivates this research are pointed out. However, since this is motivated in relation to 
previous research and their implications for the regulation of financial markets as required 
by Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, they are outlined only briefly here. A more comprehensive  
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summary of the essays, their scope, aims and contributions are provided at the end of the 
thesis in the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations chapter.  
 
1.2.1: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Insider Trading and Earnings Management. 
A commonly held belief postulates that directors, who are more familiar with the day to day 
operation of the company they manage trade on valuable information that is not incorporated 
into security prices at the time of their trade (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). In summary, their trade is 
frequently based on forecasts of earnings reflecting the private information that they have a 
fiduciary duty not to exploit for private gain. Such changes in earnings might be influenced 
by a specific event
6 that is reflected later in security prices. Though investors often focus 
upon changes in earnings in predicting future share price movements (Ball and Brown 1968), 
firms customarily release other types of information that relate to future earnings outcomes 
like  changes  in  sales,  research  and  development  expenditures,  inventories,  capital 
expenditures, etc. The commonly held believe is that insider trading signals future price 
changes and their trades might act as an incentive for managers to manipulate earnings to 
either  benefit  themselves  at  the  expense  of  outside  investors  or  alternatively,  distance 
themselves from prior insider trading (Beneish and Vargus, 2004). Nonetheless, there is 
conflicting evidence on the relationship between insider trading and company earnings. The 
evidence we have can be summarised as follows: 
 
A: The earliest reported evidence suggest that, there is no clear relationship between insider 
trading and future earnings (Elliot et al., (1994)) or there is no correlation between insider 
trading with foreknowledge of any price relevant information (see Penman (1992), Givoly 
and Palmon (1985), Sivakumar and Waymire (1994), Noe (1999)) 
 
B:  The  second  group  of  studies  argue  that  earnings  news  and  stock  price  changes  are 
positively correlated (Ball and Brown, 1968).  Insiders buying (selling) frequently follow 
stock  price  increases  (decreases)  (Seyhun  (1988),  Rozeff  and  Zaman  (1988),  Ke  et  al., 
(2003), managers who sell shares following the announcement of an earnings surprise are 
able to earn abnormal profits (Markarian, 2005); insiders sell shares after managing earnings 
(pump and dump), implying a negative correlation between insider trading and this year’s 
                                                 
6 Significant price relevant events that insiders frequently use may include, Takeover bids, Seasoned Equity 
Offerings, Dividend, Stock Repurchase, Bankruptcy, Mergers and Acquisitions, Initial Public Offerings, etc. 
This relate to what is frequently viewed for litigation purposes directly as a major corporate event that have a 
direct effect on prices (Seyhun, 1992).  
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earnings surprise (Beneish (1999), Hamill et al., (2002), Bolton et al., (2003)), or trade with 
information pertaining to a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases (Ke et al., 
(2003)). Of course the profitability of insider trading, based on foreknowledge of earnings 
may depend on whether earnings are “selected” as the term is used by Daniel et al (1998). 
When earnings are “selected” as a fore shadow of the difference between price and value, 
then and only then will we expect some price response according to this view.    
 
C: A third group of studies reject some of the suggestions above and suggest an apparently 
different hypothesis that is contrary to standard economic theory. Their argument originates 
from the fact that, since securities law forbids trades whose incentive might be based on 
private  information,  an  insider  trade  that  follows  potentially  value relevant  earnings 
disclosures gives the impression that the trade is based on foreknowledge of soon to be 
disclosed earnings information (Weber, 2005). Following this, Beneish and Vargus (2004) 
suggested  the  litigation  avoidance  hypothesis,  where  insiders  sell  shares  and  manage 
earnings to distance themselves from the trade. Additionally, Weber (2005) suggested that, 
insiders  manage  earnings  in  order  to  distance  their  trades  from  negative  earnings  news, 
consistent with the avoidance of the appearance of illegal insider trades. 
 
Following the three sets of conflicting findings above, certain conclusions pertaining to the 
relationship between insider trading and company earnings might be misleading and should 
be re evaluated. Changes in securities laws and earnings management regulations may have 
an impact on the way insiders disguise their trading history. Quite recently, SOX legislation 
was enacted to improve investor’s confidence in the market.  
 
As earnings news and stock prices are positively related (Ball and Brown, 1968), insiders 
ought in the absence of regulatory or institutional constraints; buy (sell) more shares in 
periods  where  they  expect  to  influence  reported  earnings  through  the  use  of  positive 
(negative) discretionary accruals. However, strict insider trading rules may have an impact 
on  the  way  managers  exercise  their  knowledge  of  private  information  about  future 
prospects.  The  fact  that  they  might  employ  discretionary  accounting  techniques  to 
influence reported earnings after prior insider trading may raise serious concerns about 
their firm’s earnings quality. A string of recent articles have examined the impact of the  
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Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 on earnings management
7, but to the best of my knowledge, 
none of these articles have linked earnings management to open market insider trading
8.  
 
To accommodate the influence of strict regulatory regimes as a result of recent corporate 
insider trading scandals on the earnings management process, managers might change the 
timing of their trades relative to the use of discretionary accrual techniques. This can be 
investigated empirically by examining the relationship between discretionary accruals (a 
discretionary decision by management) and net insider trades, to regulatory changes (a 
public event that is not discretionary by management).  
 
The main research question posed in part 1 of the thesis is: how can we explain the 
relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light of the recent 
regulatory intervention as prescribed by the SOX of 2002? How has the relationship 
changed since SOX was introduced?  In other words, the thesis aims to investigate if: The 
regulatory intervention (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) has provided the desired effect; which is: 
      1-To suppress earnings manipulation thereby improving the quality of earnings. 
2-To suppress earnings manipulation conditional on prior insider trades. 
 
Suppression  here  means  reducing  overall  earnings  management.  Owing  to  substantial 
evidence, the incentive to either buy or sell shares may be remote and not necessarily 
related to earnings management incentives. Apart from liquidity concerns that are often 
regarded  as  incentives  behind  sell  trades  (Lakonishok  and  Lee,  2001),  the  signalling 
literature occasionally addresses the valuation implication of insider trading. Such authors 
(e.g. Givoly & Palmon, 1985, Rozeff & Zaman, 1988, Seyhun, 1998) argue that if an 
insider  believes  that  their  shares  have  been  overvalued,  they  would  sell  them.  If  they 
believe that their shares have been undervalued and are risk averse, they will choose not to 
                                                 
7 Cohen et al. (2004) find evidence that there is a decrease of earnings management after the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002. 
8 Indeed, insiders can trade either stock options or in the open market and manage earnings too. For example, 
executives at firms like Xerox, Tyco, Enron appear to have manipulated reported income during the 1990s, 
while trading in the open market or exercising large amounts of stock options. In April 2002 the SEC sued 
Xerox for manipulating reported earnings and revenues, and as part of the settlement with the SEC Xerox 
was forced to restate reported revenues for the period 1997 to 2001. The forced restatement reduced reported 
revenue by $2.1 billion and reducing reported net income by $1.4 billion (Bergstressera and Philippon, 
2004).  
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sell their shares and instead acquire more shares, since they may expect the share price to 
rise in the future.  
 
If trading by corporate insiders is informative about future earnings (e.g. on firms growth and 
future prospects), there should be no association between discretionary accruals and insider 
trading (Park and Park, 2004). Insiders might have superior knowledge relative to other 
market participants; and their buying (selling) will be based on the expectations of a positive 
(negative)  earnings  outcome  without  usage  of  discretionary  accruals.  This  has  been 
supported  by  recent  research  by  Ke  et  al.  (2003),  who  reported  that  insider  trading  is 
associated with post transaction stock returns. The thesis examine if insider transactions 
influence post transactions performance as measured by the firm’s stock returns. The thesis 
therefore tests the third research question of Essay 1 that links insider trading to future 
earnings performance as follows: 
       3-Are managerial dealings informative about future earnings performance? 
 
1.2.2: Earnings Quality and Firm Performance: Examining the Changes in the 
Post Sarbanes- Oxley Era. 
Some  events  like  regulatory  changes  that  are  not  determined  by  the  discretion  of 
management might influence the relationship between earnings management and future firm 
performance.  Since  investors  and  other  stakeholders  normally  fixate  on  earnings 
management through discretionary accruals and discount their impact in the valuation of 
companies (Rajgopal et al., 2007), managers might still be cutting the corners using other 
less detectable techniques. Some techniques like real earnings management
9 that is not easily 
detected by auditors and regulators might become more popular, especially after the recent 
corporate  scandals.  As  predicted  by  Zhang  (2003),  when  firms  manage  earnings  to  an 
egregious  level  in  the  prior  periods,  they  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  real  earnings 
management relative to accruals in the future. Under normal circumstances, stakeholders 
might fixate on some forms of earnings management than others.  
 
The self reversing nature of accruals makes it impossible to sometimes manage its shortfall 
and if they have to rely on discretionary techniques alone, they might sometimes be forced to 
                                                 
9 Real Earnings management techniques involving asset sales, changes research and development 
expenditures, sales pulls forward, price discounts, etc is introduced and defined in section 2.3.1.2 and the 
methodology used to estimate it is discussed in section 3.3.2.6 and 3.3.2.7.  
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miss earnings target. Thus it is possible that managers might focus attention on real earnings 
management to cover the residual shortfall in cases where they are limited by their inability 
to  utilize  accruals  techniques.  Legislative  actions  might  thus  have  an  influence  on  the 
techniques they apply. Cohen et al. (2006) find support for these arguments by documenting 
that after the passage of the SOX, accruals earnings management has been reduced and 
replaced by an increase in earnings management via real operating decisions. 
 
Current  literature  is  replete  with  articles  that  suggest  that  investors  normally  fixate  on 
reported  accounting  earnings  to  evaluate  future  performance.  Recent  arguments  have 
suggested that a majority of investors can unravel earnings management especially earnings 
managed to an egregious level leaving potential damages to shareholder value through share 
price  declines  (Rajgopal  et  al.,  2007).  Operating  performance  has  been  associated  with 
aspects of real earnings management like discretionary changes in R&D, selling, general and 
administrative  expense,  overproduction  to  improve  sales  through  improved  credit  terms, 
selling  of  fixed  assets  and  firms  with  high  accruals  in  the  current  period  customarily 
experiences future earnings problems (Gunny, 2006). Investors are however not customarily 
fooled by earnings management practices (Rajgopal et al., 2007). They look for warning 
signs from the financial statements and discount the stocks of firms that manage earnings. If 
more firms manage earnings, there might be market wide effects through a decline in the 
value  of  many  companies.  Regulatory  control  leading  to  higher  earnings  quality  would 
therefore be a rational response to investor’s demands for favourable financial reporting. One 
reason for examining the benefit of legislative control on firm performance is to investigate 
stock price responses following the SOX. If the Act actually improves earnings quality, the 
information might be more certain and investors can respond to it by trading on the stocks of 
those  companies  with  greater  confidence  regarding  the  value  relevance  of  information 
contained in their set of financial accounts. 
 
Although the above arguments have suggested that the capital market can unravel the extent 
of  earnings  management,  the  predictive  ability  of  the  different  techniques  on  firm’s 
performance  has  not  been  thoroughly  investigated.  The  various  components  of  accruals 
(notably accounts receivables, accounts payable and changes in inventory) have different  
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predictive powers
10 and investors might discount their impact on future returns differently 
(Chan et al., 2006). These components of accruals are the most popular tools that can be 
improperly used to fraudulently improve the company’s revenues and earnings. Many re 
statements arise from misinterpretation of rules on recognition since revenue are such a huge 
number in financial statements and accounts to start with.  Most forced restatements and 
enforcement  actions  have  been  directed  against  impropriety  connected  to  revenue 
recognition (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  
 
Accounts receivable is one component of accruals that is customarily employed to overstate 
the earnings of most corporations. But firms might genuinely offer sales discounts leading to 
sales  growth  in  a  bid  to  avoid  product  obsolence  in  periods  where  they  might  have 
mistakenly overproduced. Customers can also be genuinely experiencing financial distress 
leading to rising accounts receivables. Increases in accounts payable too can be associated 
with managerial intent to lower current accruals, thereby shifting current earnings to the 
future. Investors can either interpret it as current shock in earnings (bad news) or recognize 
its impact on future earnings. In this case, despite a reduction in earnings through accounts 
payable increases, future stock price performance can still be better. Another accounting 
component whose predictive power is uncertain is changes in inventory. Managers might 
manage earnings through the reporting of inventory changes by not writing off obsolete 
items completely or they might be allocating more overhead expenses to inventory than to 
cost of goods sold. Overproduction can also reflect an intention to improve sales through the 
provision of favourable credit terms and/or to reduce cost of goods sold. When companies 
overproduce,  they  might  technically  spread  fixed  overhead  cost  leading  to  an  overall 
reduction in per unit production costs as long as inventory holding costs are not increased 
over the period (Gunny, 2006; Thomas and Zhang 2002).  
 
As supported by Chan et al. (2006), some items might be more susceptible to earnings 
manipulation than others and their changes might influence future returns in diverse ways. 
This is because investors would have competing interpretations of their effect. Stock return 
evidence  also  suggests  that  investors  discount  “abnormal”  accruals  relative  to  “normal” 
accruals, which suggests that they view abnormal accruals as more likely to reflect earnings 
                                                 
10 The presumed differences in predictive powers are because some techniques can easily be used than the 
others. Abnormal receivables for example, that influences sales income is a technique that is customarily 
used to manage revenues and is very popular in the earnings management literature (e.g Dechow et al. 1995).  
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management (Healy and Whalen, 1999). There is further evidence of significant negative 
stock market responses to allegations of earnings management by the financial press or the 
SEC,  which  is  an  indication  that  investors  do  not  always  investigate  financial  reporting 
impropriety.  According  to  Dechow  et  al.  (1996),  firms  subject  to  SEC  investigation  for 
earnings  management  showed  an  average  stock  price  decline  of  9%  at  the  day  of  the 
announcement of the earnings management.  Assuming there was a large decline in earnings 
quality before the enactment of the SOX, one significant question might relate to how SOX 
can constrain earnings management practices and how investors can avoid huge loses if 
earnings management is discovered and must be unravelled.  
 
In light of the discussions above, the research question to be addressed in the second part 
of the thesis relates to how we can explain the relationship between earnings quality and 
firm performance in light of the recent regulatory intervention. Specifically, the research 
model categorises firms into suspect versus non suspect firms (See 5.4.7) and investigates 
if: After the Sarbanes Oxley legislation, stocks of suspect firms (firms with low earnings 
quality  as  measured  by  the  Probability  of  manipulation,  abnormal  changes  in  the 
various  accruals  and  real  earnings  management  items)  exhibit  negative  stock  price 
performance while those of non-suspect firms (firms with high earnings quality) exhibit 
positive stock price performance. 
 
1.3: Basic Structure of The Thesis And Research Objectives. 
Overall, the thesis consists of two parts. One part encompasses the introduction, literature 
review  and  the  methodology.  The  other  consists  of  the  core  of  the  thesis:  the  two 
independent but related empirical chapters. Both relate to the relationship between insider 
trading and earnings management and earnings quality and firm performance in light of 
SOX regulations. Each empirical chapter provides an overview of the thesis around several 
characteristics  that  includes  1)  aim  2)  dependent  and  independent  variables  3)  control 
variables 4) statistical method employed 4) sample of firms in the study and time period 
covered  by  study  and  5)  main  empirical  findings  and  finally  6)  conclusion.  Both  are 
summarised  below.  The  summary  and  conclusions  chapter  summarises  the  two 
independent  empirical  chapters,  it  discusses  the  results,  presents  their  contribution  and 
limitations,  highlights  main  implications  and  notes  suggestions  for  future  research.  
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Summarising the empirical findings and the overall thesis in this way helps structure the 
overall thesis and provides an overview of its contribution.  
 
This  first  empirical  chapter  of  this  thesis  evaluates  the  changes  of  the  insider  trading 
relationship to earnings management post the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Specifically, the 
chapter  tests  if  the  regulatory  intervention  (Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  of  2002)  provided  the 
desired  effect?  The  stated  aim  of  the  regulation  was  to  suppress  earnings  manipulation 
thereby improving the quality of earnings, and to suppress earnings manipulation conditional 
on prior insider trading.  To further test the informativeness of earnings following prior 
insider trading and the impact of discretionary accruals on earnings changes, the chapter 
additionally tests if insider trades are informative regarding future earnings (regardless of 
earnings manipulation) and finally, if analyst’s earnings forecast errors are associated with 
earnings management. That is, I ask if earnings expectations can be adjusted to control for 
earnings management or simply magnify the initial distortion.  
 
The  second  empirical  chapter  of  this  thesis  looks  at  the  relationship  between  firm 
performance and earnings management practices in light of SOX regulations. Given that 
SOX was designed to improve the quality of financial reporting, investors and analysts need 
to be more vigilant and recognise material weaknesses in financial reports. SOX need to 
provide more credibility to financial reporting and provide investors with more confidence. 
If companies still manage their earnings, analysts and investors need to be more cautious and 
should be able to factor out their perceived cost of remediation through adjustment of the 
stock prices of suspect firms. The market response (stock returns) and managerial earnings 
management  should  be  a  measure  of  how  analysts  and  managers  respond  to  disclosure 
practices. The purpose of the chapter is to empirically assess the relationship between a 
comprehensive set of earnings management signals and future firm performance. Its prime 
purpose is to verify whether there have been substantial benefits to investors from recent 
legislation  enacted  as  a  response  to  the  corporate  scandals  through  (i)  improvements  in 
earnings quality as a result of the SOX (ii) if investors are able to discount the level of 
earnings management in the financial statements. 
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1.4: Scope of the Analysis. 
Following the formulation and specifications of research issues and aims, this section covers 
the scope of the analysis. The scope of the thesis can be explained around the theoretical 
constructs underlying the research objectives and gaps in current research and the research 
design choices adopted to provide answers to the research questions. Firstly, with respect to 
the main objective of the research, the study builds the theory on existing literature in the 
area. In evaluating the various theoretical constructs, the researcher found that there was an 
absence of consistency in the findings of prior research, though the sample is of different 
time periods. This in itself alerts us to the presence of a shallow theorisation of the topic 
being discussed.  
 
From  the  standpoint  of  the  policy  implications,  the  researcher  therefore  employs  the 
approach of implementing a “truth race” in evaluating different relationships. This performs 
best with my dataset of S&P 500 firms in the last decade or so. From the testing approach, 
the thesis tested several existing theories to reconcile gaps in the literature. The study further 
uses gaps in the existing literature review to identify relevant factors that cause variations in 
research results in the area. Secondly, the analyses are limited to S&P 500 firms listed in the 
US stock exchange. Though in most cases a cross sectional time series analysis is done, 
reported  results  are  aggregated  for  the  overall  S&P  500  companies  and  the  unique 
characteristics of individual firms and industry classification are not evaluated. Quantitative 
methods using regression and descriptive statistics are employed to analyse the panel data 
set. From the arguments presented in the theory, the relationship between insider trading and 
earnings management are assumed to be jointly determined, with insider trading influencing 
earnings management and vice versa. This suggests a simultaneous equation problem. The 
Hausman specification error test is therefore employed to test for this problem. Based on 
results confirming the joint determination between insider trading and earnings management, 
a two stage least square estimation method is employed to confirm the robust nature of the 
primary results. 
 
The choices above set the scope for the thesis and the empirical analysis and results that can 
be drawn. Collectively, the results provide an overall approach to different market based 
relationships for US listed firms. Nonetheless, the results can only be attributed to the S&P 
500 firms and not more widely across smaller firms in the US or other (EU or G7 countries).  
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It can therefore not be applicable to unlisted firms and firms in other countries without 
similar regulatory restrictions.   
 
1.5: Contribution of the Thesis. 
The Thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it investigates whether firm’s 
trade off  accrual based  against  real  earnings  management  around  insider  transactions. 
Second,  consistent  with  the  expectation  that  the  SOX  has  made  accrual based  earnings 
management more costly, the thesis investigates whether managers substitute techniques in 
their bid to mislead regulators and other users of firm information after the enactment of 
SOX of 2002. Third, the research investigates the tendency for firms to trade off real versus 
accrual based earnings management activities and whether investors discount high levels of 
earnings management (using both real and accruals based earnings management) post SOX. 
Finally,  the  research  employs  the  2  stage  least  squares  approach  to  evaluate  the  joint 
determination  between  insider  trading  and  earnings  management  in  the  light  of  the 
regulatory intervention
11. Prior research has failed to clearly address this causality issue. 
Details of the contributions of this research are discussed in section 6.3.1 as a sub section of 
the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendation chapter.  
 
1.6: Outline of the Thesis. 
In this section, an outline of the remainder of the dissertation is provided. Overall, the 
thesis is organised as follows: Chapter Two provides some of the theories of insider trading 
and earnings management; Chapter Three presents the research design and develops the 
hypotheses.  Chapter  Four  and  Five  present  the  key  empirical  findings  of  the  research. 
Specifically,  Chapter  Four  presents  the  first  main  empirical  analysis,  relating  insider 
trading to earnings management. Its approach involves an explanation of the impact of 
regulatory  dynamics  as  prescribed  by  SOX  on  insider  trading  earnings  management 
relationship. Chapter 5 presents the second main empirical analysis. The Chapter looks at 
the  relationship  between  a  comprehensive  set  of  earnings  management  techniques  and 
future stock returns. In Chapter 6 the two main empirical findings are tied together as a 
summary  of  findings,  conclusions,  recommendations  and  limitations  of  the  study. 
                                                 
11 Due to stricter regulations, managers might be adopting a passive and opportunistic strategy that cannot be 
easily detected by regulators, investors and other stakeholders.  
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2.0: Prior Research and Theoretical Framework. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to critically review the recent theoretical advances in the 
area and evaluate the contribution of this particular study to the existing literature in these 
areas. It is important to clarify that this section discusses the literatures that are general to 
the overall thesis and is not restricted to the context of the independent empirical essays. 
The review here is given to show the present state of knowledge about this topic that is 
addressed in the two empirical essays and to clarify the broad contribution of this thesis to 
the general state of knowledge in this area. It is important to note that, there is a vast array 
of literatures on insider trading, earnings management and related constructs like financial 
markets regulation and firm performance. Out of this vast array of literatures, this chapter 
delimits what is actually important for the current thesis.  
 
2.1: Theoretical Framework. 
This study has two main aims: First, it examines the relationship between insider trading 
and  earnings  management.  Secondly  the  study  investigates  earnings  quality  and  firm 
performance within US S&P 500 firms. The study builds upon three streams of research 
ideas that are: 1) opportunistic insider trading, 2) techniques used to manage earnings and 
3) the policy implications of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002
12.  
 
This chapter reviews prior literature in the area. The first section of chapter 2 introduces 
the broad objective of this particular chapter. This is followed by an attempt to provide a 
legal  definition  of  insider  trading.  It  is  important  to  note  that  several  factors  have 
influenced the trading behaviour of several stakeholders over the past decades, affecting 
the  received  wisdom  regarding  who  is  an  insider.    One  way  that  the  Securities  and 
Exchange Commission has responded to this is to establish a clear definition of insider 
trading.  In Section 2.2, the definition is presented and the dynamics that influenced this 
definition over the years outlined. Following that a discussion of insider trading, which the 
proceeding  section  has  defined,  broad  issues  relating  to  earnings  management  are 
introduced. In the final section, broad issues relating to the regulation of insider trading and 
                                                 
12 The implication here was that whether the market really required regulations like SOX to boost investor 
confidence and promote the market's integrity.  
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earnings management are discussed. This material sets the regulatory and policymaking 
context in which my results, presented in the two empirical essays, should be discussed.  
 
2.2: Trading By Corporate Insiders/Directors of a Company. 
“Our markets are a success precisely because Americans enjoy the world’s highest level of 
confidence.  (…)  Investors  trust  that  the  marketplace  is  honest.  They  know  that  our 
securities laws require free, fair and open transactions.”  
 
A. Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, Address to the “SEC Speaks” Conference, February 1998. 
 
Trading  by  corporate  insiders  otherwise  termed  insider  trading
13  (company  directors, 
officers, and employees) refers to the buying and selling of shares of one’s own company 
or that of one’s employing corporation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
which regulates such trading in the United States under the powers granted to it by the 
1934 Securities and Exchange Act define an insider as:  
 Any officer with the authority to influence the entire company, in other words, makes 
policies for the company, 
 A director,   
 An owner of more than 10 percent of any equity class of stock (This includes not only 
executives working for a corporation, but also other entities such as mutual funds, hedge 
funds  or  institutions  who  hold  an  amount  equal  to  or  greater  than  10%  of  issued  and 
outstanding shares). 
 
Academic research in this area has focussed on evaluating the sources and consequences of 
an  insider’s  informational  advantage.  Therefore,  the  various  strands  of  research  have 
investigated whether insiders earn abnormal profits from their trades at the expense of 
outside investors. Prior studies have examined the types of information that insiders are 
privy to, the sources of the informational advantages that they enjoy and the extent of the 
advantages and disadvantages to the market of any regulation of their privileged position. 
Frequently, insiders sell (buy) after an increase (decrease) in prices and their trades are 
                                                 
13 For the purpose of my research, I will limit my interpretation of an insider to employees of a company with 
the exception of the 10 % owners, as they do not possess executive powers to influence several managerial 
decisions and company earnings.    
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frequently followed by a partial price reversal (Ke et al., 2003). It is a generally held belief 
in security markets that when insiders are buying their own stock, they do so because they 
believe the stock is set to rise in value. However, when they sell, they could be doing so for 
a number of reasons and not simply because they believe the value of the firm’s share price 
may drop. This suggests that insider buying may be a good signal regarding corporate 
prospects, but insider selling motive may be a more difficult portent to interpret. Insider 
trading has been a term that most investors associate with illegal conduct as it may involve 
short term market timing. Researchers and regulators have often differentiated aspects of 
the trade that may be considered illegal. The SEC defines illegal insider trading as being 
the buying and selling of securities involving a breach of fiduciary duty, or some other 
relationship of trust and confidence. Such breach involves trading while in possession of 
material non public information about a security.  
 
Generally,  possession  of  information  might  not  be  a  crime  as  mandated  by  the  SEC, 
especially  when  the  information  is  not  a  factor  in  the  decision  of  the  trade.    If  the 
information is material, then it is the fiduciary responsibility of Insiders to report to other 
investors rather than engage in trading based on such knowledge. In most class litigation 
actions, the type of insider trading frequently discussed is the illegal insider trading that 
involves material non public information. It relates to trading in securities that takes place 
when insiders are privileged to confidential information about important events affecting 
the firm and use the information to reap profits, or to avoid losses, on the stock market. 
This is done to the detriment of other investors who buy or sell their stock without the 
advantage of knowing the information the insider possesses.  
 
Legal prohibition of UK insider trading was recently adopted in securities regulation, as it 
did not become a criminal offence to trade while in possession of firm specific information 
until sometime in the 1980’s. This was followed by the Criminal Justice Act (1993) and the 
Financial Services and Market Act of 2001 that prohibits insider trading in the UK.   The 
Act stipulates that it is a criminal offence to deal or encourage another person to trade or 
disclose inside information. Though insider trading was not specifically forbidden by the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, amendments of US security laws dating back to the 
1960’s have identified aspects of insider trades that can be considered a criminal offence.  
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The type of Insider dealings that this study investigates is the legal aspect of insider trading 
(especially at the time of the trade).  This involves publicly disclosed filings with the SEC. 
The results of this research may shed light on the behaviour of different stakeholders after 
the  recent  enactment  of securities  laws  as  prescribed  by  SOX  2002.  There  will be  no 
classification of any trade as illegal or immoral at this point. What is relevant here is the 
argument that in certain transactions there should be strict rules (adopted either for moral, 
or less plausibly, for efficiency reasons) which determines who has the right to trade, what 
information is to be available and who has the right to the profits that arise from success in 
such deals (Barry, 1996). 
 
It has been very difficult to provide any evidence linking insider trades to particular types 
of private information as some Insiders trade approximately 2 years prior to the disclosure 
of  economically  significant  and  price  sensitive  information  (Ke  et  al.,  2002).  This, 
presumably,  may  be  to  avoid  class  action  litigation  that  might  be  brought  forward  by 
investors, or regulators, for breach of fiduciary duties by management. It might also just be 
that Insiders have a pretty good idea about the medium term prospects of the firm which is 
not traceable to any specific piece of news, but may rather reflect a general feeling of 
corporate well being. In their litigation avoidance hypothesis, Beneish and Vargus (2004) 
presented  evidence  of  how  insiders  can  avoid  litigation  while  trading  on  non public 
information. This has been a potential weakness of previous research as it has been very 
difficult  to  accuse  insiders  of  trading  while  in  possession  of  significant  price relevant 
information if their trades are investigated over a very short window. Intensive insider 
trading  activities  (purchases  or  sales)  may  be  of  interest  as  they  are  likely  to  be 
information motivated (Lin and Howe, 1990). When some “Outsiders” (investors) mimic 
insider trades, they may also earn abnormal profits like insiders (Gelband, 2005).  
 
Other researchers have presented arguments contradicting the idea that an Insider trade can 
be based on knowledge of subsequent earnings disclosure. Elliot et al. (1994) found no 
relationship between insider trading and foreknowledge of future earnings in their trading 
decisions, as they were able to see less selling by insiders before periods of good and bad 
earnings  announcements.  Others  have  documented  insider trading  activities  before 
earnings announcements but find no correlation with foreknowledge of any price  relevant 
information.  (See;  Penman,  1982,  Givoly  and  Palmon,  1985,  Sivakumar  and  Waymire  
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1994, Noe,
14 1999). One potential weakness of most of this research is that it has looked at 
trading by corporate insiders over a relatively short window. Insider trading decisions are 
presumably based on forecasts of earnings a year or more into the future rather than the 
underlying earnings to be announced in the next quarter (Ke et al., 2003). These authors 
hypothesised that to identify the relationship between insider trading and foreknowledge of 
price sensitive information, it is necessary to study trading over a long window. It is very 
important  to  understand  here  that,  often  Insiders  are  wise  enough  to  get  their  wives, 
cousins and friends to trade on price sensitive information but this is a very rare situation. 
Strictly speaking, most research published and litigation cases have investigated whether 
insider  trades  are  correlated  with  unanticipated  movements  in  share  prices  or  earnings 
news leading to high forecast errors.  
 
2.2.1: Regulation and Restriction of Insider Trading. 
The first and most important US regulation on insider trading was the Securities Act of 
1933. The law of insider trading has evolved through a series of judicial opinions in a 
process  that  closely  resembles  common  law  adjudication  rather  than  the  statutory 
interpretation of the law (Bainbridge, 2005). This was swiftly followed and amended by 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Both acts were enacted after the collapse of the 
stock  market  in  1929.  This  regulation  (like  successive  regulations)  was  intended  to 
promote market integrity and level the playing field among market participants, company 
officers and institutional investors, and more especially the small investors who had largely 
been wiped out by the 1929 Crash (Markarian, 2005).  
 
After the 1987 stock market crash in the US, the SEC responded to the violation of its 
existing insider trading regulation by imposing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 1988 that raised the penalty of illegal insider trading to 1 
Million dollars and 10 years imprisonment (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). This act re codified the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 as Section 21A of the Exchange Act. The Act 
amended the language of the 1984 Act by providing that a penalty can be imposed against 
                                                 
14 Noe (1999) for example found out that increases in insider trading in the 20 days prior to disclosure are not 
specifically correlated to management earnings forecast errors or other corporate events.  But after a 
management earnings forecast, Noe realised that there happens to be a significant positive association 
between net insider purchases made within 20 days and a significant growth in earnings expanding over a 
period of between 3 5 years. Noe’s, (1999) result relates to the type of insider trading that we frequently 
consider illegal and can easily be linked to significant price sensitive information due to the direct price 
movement after the transaction.  
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a  person  not  only  for  trading  in  a  security  while  in  possession  of  material  non public 
information,  but  also  that  a  person  can  be  thought  of  having  violated  this  Act  by 
communicating such information. The most recent regulation is the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 enacted after the Enron, WorldCom, and other high profile corporate scandals. This 
Act mostly involves an amendment and the strengthening of previous insider trading laws. 
 
The most important requirements to these successive regulations can be summarised as 
follows: 
1)  Filing requirement: they are now required to file the amount of shares they own in 
their corporation. 
2)  Online reporting requirement: To report their trades to the SEC online within two 
business days
15. 
3)  Profit recovery requirement: Required all insiders to return to their corporation any 
capital  gains  made  from  the  purchase  or  sale  of  their  company’s  stock  if  both 
transactions  occur  within  a  six month  period  (habitually  termed  short  swings 
profits).  
The regulations also provided clear cut definitions of several contextual issues that have 
been subject to ambiguity and hence regulatory arbitrage. The most important definitions 
to these regulations can be summarised as follows:  
·  Definition of an insider: Definition of an insider: Definition of an insider: Definition of an insider: The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
defined an insider as either officers, directors, corporation’s vice presidents 
and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporations stock, 
·  Insider Trading Liability: Insider Trading Liability: Insider Trading Liability: Insider Trading Liability: Rule 10b5 1 addresses the issue of when 
an  insider  trading  liability  arises  in  connection  with  a  trader's  "use"  or 
"knowledge"  of  material  non public  information.  The  rule  posits  that  a 
trader trades on material non public information when they purchase or sell 
securities  while  aware  of  such  information.  The  rule  further  sets  certain 
affirmative defences that protect individuals and entities in situations where 
material  non public  information  was  not  a  factor  in the trading decision 
                                                 
15 The requirement before the SOX of 2002 was that they report the sales and purchases of such stock to the 
SEC by the 10th of the following month. This requirement gave them up to 40 business days for some trades. 
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since  the  trade  was  presumably  carried  out  pursuant  of  a  pre existing 
contract, situation or a plan. 
·   Misappropriation  Theory Misappropriation  Theory Misappropriation  Theory Misappropriation  Theory
16 16 16 16: : : :  Rule  10b5 2  addresses  the  issue  of 
when a breach of a family or other non business relationship may give rise 
to a liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. 
 
2.2.2: Arguments for and Against Insider Trading. 
Quotable Quotes:  
"Stock Exchange persons who are Inside traders would make the rules against insider 
trading and this would be a sham".  
“It would be foolish to place too much faith in mechanical or procedural devices, where 
these are not backed up by a strong ethical culture within the organisations and within the 
profession  itself”  Tomasic,  R.,  (1992),  “Self regulation,  Business  Ethics  and  Insider 
Trading”  Published  in:  Casino  capitalism?  Insider  trading  in  Australia 
/Canberra:Australian Institute of Criminology. 
 
Differences exist in relation to the arguments for and against insider trading regulations. 
The strand of argument that favours strict regulations argues that insider trading is unfair 
and  the  failure  to  penalize  violators  of  securities  regulations  can  seriously  undermine 
public confidence in capital markets (Wisniewski, 2004). However, such policies are often 
flawed because they tend to outlaw some forms of insider trading that are beneficial to the 
economy  and  are  in  reality  not  at  all  unethical  in  nature.  Tomasic  (1992)  argued  that 
although the failure of the regulatory authorities to enforce insider trading regulations is 
serious enough, the persistence of insider trading as a phenomenon is also influenced by 
the fact that it is tolerated within the securities industry at large. A number of economists 
and  researchers  have  pointed  out  some  beneficial  effects  of  insider  trading  and  legal 
theorists have written dissertations discussing when insider trading is illegal and when it is 
not (McGee, 2008). 
 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the prohibitory nature of insider trading laws only 
serves to make provision of this crime very monopolistic in nature. Making insider trading 
                                                 
16  The  misappropriation  theory  states  that  anyone  who  misappropriates  (steals)  information  from  their 
employer and trades on that information in any stock (not just the employer's stock) is guilty of insider 
trading.  An  individual  might  be  the  private  secretary  of  company  A,  though  not  directly  employed  by 
company A, company A might be planning a takeover of company B and whilst working as the private 
secretary, might acquire information that company A wishes to takeover company B and trade on the shares 
of company B. even though by implication the secretary have not violated the fiduciary duty of company A 
shareholders, they have violated those of company B shareholders.  
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more risky rather than preventing it may just pass huge profits to those with the know how 
and audacity to undertake it (see Bris 2005). When alcohol was outlawed in the US it did 
not stop Americans drinking it simply forced the provision of alcohol underground into 
Mob controlled speakeasies. In a similar way Bris (2005) argues that tightening Insider 
trading laws simply sharpens the peak of the distribution of profits paid to effective insider 
traders.    
 
Those in favour of deregulation contend that the exploitation of non public information by 
insiders  could  be  an  efficient  way  to  compensate  managers  for  their  innovations  (See 
Manne, 1966, and Carlton and Fischel, 1983) and that insider trading could potentially 
benefit society through promoting a more accurate pricing of a firm’s asset (Udpa, 1996 
and Roulstone, 2003). Deregulatory arguments are premised on the claims that trading by 
corporate insiders do promote market efficiency and do assign property rights on inside 
information to managers which seems like an efficient compensation scheme (Bainbridge, 
2002).  Additionally,  Leland  (1992)  argues  that  when  insider  trading  is  allowed,  stock 
prices incorporate more information and are higher, as opposed to when it is not allowed. 
This  argument  suggests  that  insider  trading  incorporates  superior  information  to  that 
provided by external shareholders. The implication here is that stock markets are to some 
degree informationally efficient (in the strong form sense) and that share prices do rapidly 
adjust  to  insider  trades  (Fidrmuc  et  al.,  2006).  Moreover,  laws  that  prosecute  insider 
trading  fail  to  eliminate  or  completely  recoup  the  profits  made  by  insiders,  and  make 
acquisitions more expensive. This suggests that, by increasing the market reaction to an 
acquisition, insider trading laws make it profitable to violate the regulations (Bris, 2000). 
 
At first glance, insider trading is a difficult issue to understand as perfectly legitimate 
transactions takes place in the market where information is asymmetric and not equally 
available  to  all  market  participants  (Barry,  1996).  Different  models  discussing  insider 
trading based on material non public information assumes that an Insider is informed in 
every period and thus trades with the desire to profit from this information about the firm’s 
future  prospects.  Nonetheless,  research  has  discovered  that  their  trades  are  habitually 
infrequent, meaning they might not possess any informational advantage most of the time 
and might be exposed to regulatory frictions that discourage trading at all (Huddart and Ke, 
2006). Kelly et al., (1987) argued that the $100 million fine levied by the Securities and  
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Exchange Commission (SEC) against Wall Street trader Ivan Boesky was the earliest most 
spectacular development in the crackdown on insider trading and provided a new era in 
insider trading regulatory enforcement. This and other penalties signal the determination of 
the SEC to significantly curtail illegal insider trading.  
 
It is important to note that, though many market participants would not trade on insider 
information due to its illegality or immorality, many would still want to buy a stock if the 
tip  from  the  insider  is  judged  to  be  reliable  (Kelly  et  al.,  1987).  Those  who  support 
deregulation of insider trading argue that it contributes to market efficiency by encouraging 
the flow of information unto the market thereby facilitating the price formation process 
(Manne  1966).  Moreover,  few  firms  do  restrict  insider  trading  beyond  habitual  SEC 
regulations (Easterbrook, 1981). However, Bettis et al. (2000) argued that recently, over 90 
% of S&P firms do impose trading restrictions on insiders. These facts make the argument 
that shareholders of firms are harmed by the trading of executives difficult to reconcile due 
to the absence of widespread private restrictions on insider trading actions. As Manne 
(1966) documented, allowing insider trading might be an effective way of compensating 
entrepreneurs. On grounds of market efficiency, since insider trading moves stock market 
prices in the direction of true/fundamental values, there is no need for regulation (Kelly et 
al., (1987)). As Barry (1996) suggested, the fewer restrictions relating to insider trading, 
the faster the information will flow into the market and profits of such dealings will be 
lower  as  the  information  about  such  dealings  is  transmitted  to  the  market.  Unless  the 
practice is considered unfair, there would apparently be no justification for regulation. 
Even when investors want to justify the unfairness of insider trading, the application of the 
rules  might  be  a  problem.  This  is  because;  insiders  with  potential  access  to  inside 
information on certain stocks might adjust their portfolios so as to be in position to gain at 
the expense of other investors. 
 
Several arguments have also been presented in favour of insider trading regulations. Laws 
enacted by regulatory bodies in financial markets have deterred insiders from trading with 
foreknowledge of next earnings announcement especially when future news is expected to 
be  bad  (e.g.  Weber,  2005).  Since  the  SEC  for  example  enacted  the  Insider  Trading 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (IFSFEA) there has been limited insider trading 
prior  to  an  earnings  announcement  as  this  law  specifically  holds  top  management  
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responsible for employees illegal trading (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). The argument that insider 
trading should be regulated has emerged largely from its reliance upon private information 
that  customarily  leads to  an  expropriation  of  uninformed  investors  (Bainbridge,  2002). 
This  is  regarded  as  a  form  of  self dealing  by  senior  management  in  breach  of  their 
fiduciary duties to their shareholders, who may stand at the other end of the trades they 
make while being less well informed than they are. On the grounds of fairness, arguments 
can be made that inefficiencies may arise due to the withholding of information leading to 
moral hazard. Moreover, those who possess insider information have an unfair advantage 
over other market participants. If other investors think that Insiders of specific corporations 
do have an unfair advantage over other market participants, they might not be interested in 
investing in that corporation (Kelly et al., 1987). This then results in deadweight losses 
because gains from trade in financial markets are eroded because investors hold back for 
fear of being fleeced by senior executives in the company whose stock they aim to deal in. 
 
Gains from insider trading can originate from different kinds of information. These range 
from ordinary insider information about a company and its operations to more complex 
information like those relating to rumoured mergers and acquisitions. Customarily, the 
type of insider trading information that habitually leads to a lot of public attention involves 
information of the “bombshell” variety that includes mergers and acquisitions, mineral 
discoveries, IPO, high assets sales or purchases and so on (Carlton and Fischel; 1983). 
Despite the fact that most discussions have focused on trading gains, an insider might trade 
on inside information by just holding shares they had once wished to sell. For example, a 
corporate executive who might have wanted to sell shares in a trading period might act on 
inside information maybe relating to a takeover and hold on to the shares. When the share 
price rises, he might reap significant profits at the expense of other investors (Kelly et al., 
1987). Non trading based on insider information is seemingly an abuse similar to active 
insider trading based on inside information. But it is difficult to attach criminal sanctions to 
acts  of  omission.  In  accordance  with  the  arguments  above,  visible  insider  trading  that 
habitually attracts widespread criticism are just tips of the iceberg. There are millions of 
trades based on inside information that may not be known by other market participants. It 
is important to note that, all trading is based on different valuations that ultimately imply 
either different information or different interpretations of the same information. 
  
29   
In an effort to limit non trading, recent rules like the SOX have introduced guidance on 
pre planned  trading  regulated  through  rule  10b5 1.  While  SOX  does  not  change  the 
primary definition of who an insider is, the Act reduces the filing dates of SEC forms 4 
from approximately 40 to two business days. Insiders are required to report their trades 
from the 10
th of the month following the trade to two business days after the reported 
transactions. SOX also give the SEC new executive powers to seek any equitable relief that 
might be appropriate for the benefit of investors and all stakeholders (Huddart and Ke, 
2007).   
 
The SEC has previously regulated insider trading based on different rules. Regime changes 
have  created  different  opportunities  for  new  regulations.  Although  in  theory  different 
regulations  have  been  based  on  the  violation  of  insider  trading  legislation  relating  to 
material non public information, in practice enforcement has been limited to “bombshell” 
information cases. Corporate mergers and acquisitions and large earnings manipulations 
like the Enron and WorldCom cases have caused significant concerns and have been the 
principal area of investigation and enforcement by SEC regulators. Regulation of insider 
trading must therefore not be regarded as an attempt to eliminate all or even most of the 
gains  made  by  insiders  with  material  non public  information.  It  should  nonetheless  be 
regarded as aiming to reduce or perhaps eliminate one particular type of insider trading 
presumably  relating to  the  use  of  “bombshell” information  that  may  cause  widespread 
public outcry (Kelly et al., 1987). As most insider income from equities is arguably legal, 
the issue involved in the regulation of insider trading is not whether to allow insiders to 
profit from their information. It relates specifically to whether regulatory authorities should 
seek to outlaw gains from particular types of information, especially those that relate to 
advanced knowledge that should have been disclosed to other investors to create a level 
playing field. 
 
In an effort to understand how to effectively regulate insider trading, researchers have 
sought  different  pieces  of  evidence  on  circumstances  where  profitable  insider  trading 
might  be  possible.  Additionally,  they  have  looked  at  the  association  between  different 
types  of  insider  trades  (purchases  or  sale)  and  subsequent  abnormal  returns.  To  my 
knowledge, insiders of small firms are found to be on average net purchasers while insiders 
at large firms are on  average net sellers (Seyhun, 1986); insider trades of small firms  
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predict future returns better than trades at large firms and when insiders buy stocks with 
poor  past  performance  (Lakonishok  and  Lee,  2001),  and  R&D  expenditures;  they  do 
thereby increase the informational asymmetry between Insiders and other investors. These 
allow Insiders at firms with high R&D expenditures to reap higher profits from their trades 
than insiders at other firms. These characteristics relating to the cross sectional differences 
in insider trading and of firms where Insider trades might be most profitable may prove 
useful to regulators and other stakeholders who might be interested in limiting an Insider’s 
unfair advantage over other investors (Huddart and Ke, 2006).  
 
Trade quantity and value can be other characteristics that should be watched closely in an 
effort  to  regulate  insider  trading.  This  is  because  previous  research  has  provided 
inconsistent results on how market assumptions about these are related to expected price 
adjustments. As in Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1976) price taking models, individuals believe 
that they can trade any amount without necessarily altering the market price, rendering 
them “price takers” in trading the asset. On the other hand, models relating to imperfect 
competition assume that insiders choose the quantities they trade with the assumption that 
these might have an impact on future price adjustments (Kyle, 1985). As in Park and Park 
(2004), in an effort to regulate insider trading, authorities should monitor trading amounts 
as this might influence future stock returns especially when “bombshell” information items 
are concerned. Several business media reported that Enron Corp. had a high volume of 
insider sales transactions in 2001. There were a total of 9.5 million shares sold at a value of 
$131 million compared to only 10.000 purchases at a value of $0.37 million.  
 
Despite these arguments, it is important to recognise that, in the vast majority of countries, 
insider trading has been difficult to regulate because of the complications in defining an 
Insider and price sensitive information. Insider trading is a “victimless crime” in that the 
outsider counterparty to the trade enters the transaction willingly, although he may regret 
having done so later. Also, separating trading based on private information and trading 
based on portfolio rebalancing, or liquidity needs has been very difficult (Korczak and 
Lasfer, 2008). Enron is a classic example of the difficulty of discerning a state of mind, 
where for example Ken Lay claimed that as CEO, he believed everything was fine. Could 
someone with a PhD in Economics really be that naive? Perhaps only the accused really  
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knows their state of mind and until they disclose what they know, it is difficult to really 
understand what was going on.  
 
2.2:3: US, UK and EU Regulation of Insider Trading.  
The insider trading laws in the United States are rooted in the common law tradition of 
England,  on  which  the  US  legal  system  is  based  (Newkirk  and  Robertson,  1998).  As 
suggested by Fidrmuc et al., (2006), like most EU countries, there are major differences 
between regulation of insider trading in the US and UK in relation to (1), the primary 
definition of (illegal) insider trading, (2) the essence of the regulation and (3) the length of 
time before which insiders must report their trades and (4) the level of the enforcement of 
the regulations. These differences of regulation explain how informative a director’s trades 
are likely to be.  
The table below summarises some of the basic differences in the two sets of regulations. 
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2.3: Earnings Management-Introduction and Definitions: 
There have been various ways in which the concept of “Earnings Management” has been 
defined.  This  section  summarises  the  different  definitions  that  best  describe  earnings 
management and that have been used in the popular accounting and finance literature. One 
of the most prominent definitions has been Healy and Wahlen, (1999, p. 368) who defined 
earnings management as: 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in 
structuring  transactions  to  alter  financial  reports  to  either  mislead  some  stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”  
 
The definition above identifies the impact of judgement in the construction of earnings. As 
discussed by Healy and Wahlen (1999), judgement can be exercised through numerous 
future economic events like the expected lives and salvage values of long term assets, 
employer’s obligations for pension benefits and other post employment benefits, deferred 
taxes, and losses from bad debts and asset impairments. Managers also have the choice to 
decide upon suitable accounting methods within GAAP that are recommended by standard 
setters  to  report  the  same  economic  transactions,  such  as  the  straight line  method, 
accelerated depreciation methods, or LIFO, FIFO, or weighted average inventory valuation 
methods. Rules on revenue recognition or the straightforward manufacture of false revenue 
are an easier way to forge accounts as they give more room for judgement in financial 
reporting. They can also exercise judgment in the management of working capital, for 
example  the  management  of  inventory  levels,  the  timing  of  inventory  shipments  or 
purchases, and receivable policies. They can also exercise discretion over different issues 
relating to company expenditures like research and development (R&D), advertising and 
reported cost of good sold customarily referred to as real earnings management. Apart 
from  the  transactions  cited  above,  there  are  many  hundreds  of  standards  that  provide 
managers with the opportunity to exercise judgement in financial reporting.  
 
In  another  definition,  Schipper  (1989,  p.  92),  limiting  her  discussion  to  the  external 
financial reporting function, defines earnings management as: 
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“A purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gains.” 
 
This definition, though slightly different from the frequently cited Healy and Wahlen’s 
(1999)  definition,  is  interesting  as  it  specifically  suggest  that  accounting  numbers  are 
frequently a source of information about a firm’s value. It is important to note that the 
Schipper (1989) definition is the first to include real earnings management as the definition 
discusses the timing of financing decisions to alter the reported earnings of the corporation.  
 
Beneish  (1999,  p.  3)  defined  earnings  manipulation  as  opposed  to  legitimate  earnings 
management as: 
 
“An  instance  where  management  violates  GAAP  in  order  to  beneficially  represent  the 
firm’s financial performance.” 
 
The third definition by Beneish primarily presents a distinction between what might be 
termed  earnings  manipulation  (GAAP  violation)  and  earnings  management  (within 
GAAP).  
 
One of the starkest observations from the definitions above is the suggestion that financial 
reports habitually reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying economic 
performance  of  the  company.  The  underlying  motivations  and  influences  of  earnings 
management have not been clearly identified in the literature. Accounting standards are 
thought to add value and to enable financial statements to effectively portray differences in 
firms’ economic positions and performance over time and in a credible manner. Standards 
will  be  exposed  to  contrasting  opinions  of  the  degree  of  relevance  and  reliability  of 
accounting information. For example, standards that emphasise the credibility of financial 
reports usually provide room for less judgement and definitely provide less accounting 
information. On the other hand, standards that stress relevance at the expense of reliability 
may  provide  accounting  information  that  is  viewed  by  users  as  containing  more 
unconvincing information (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Nonetheless, fraudulent accounting 
and  accruals  management  are  not  accomplished  through  changes  in  the  underlying 
economic activities of the firm but through the choice of the accounting methods that has 
been  used  to  represent  those  underlying  economic  activities.  On  the  other  hand,  real 
earnings management involves changes in the firm’s underlying operations like changing  
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R&D expenditures, acceleration of sales through potential price reductions, assets sales to 
influence gains or looses, etc (Gunny, 2005).   
 
Judging  by  the  evidence  presented  by  different  researchers,  earnings  management  is 
difficult to define. In an attempt to discuss this issue, many authors have distinguished 
between earnings management, earnings manipulation and outright financial fraud. They 
have ventured that, managing earnings is possibly permissible within GAAP. They use 
opportunities  offered  by  the  accounting  system  (for  example  accounting  discretion  or 
judgement) and selection of income increasing (decreasing) accruals to report a favourable 
earnings figure. The manager chooses discretionary accruals from an opportunity set of 
generally  accepted  procedures  defined  by  accounting  standard  setting  bodies  (Healy; 
1984).  When  managers  manage  earnings  to  an  egregious  level  as  in  the  Enron  and 
WorldCom  cases,  it  is  frequently  viewed  as  earnings  manipulation
18.  These  are  cases 
where managers were thought of as having committed fraud on a very large scale. The 
SEC  normally  takes  enforcement  actions  against  firms  that  have  violated  the  financial 
reporting process as defined by the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. Since April 1982, 
the Security and Exchange Commission has been publishing details of its enforcement 
actions in a series of accounting, auditing and enforcement releases (Dechow et al., 1996). 
 
The former SEC chairman, Steve Levitt (1998) differentiated earnings management from 
earnings manipulation (probably earnings managed to an egregious level) by arguing that 
in recent times, managing earnings is giving way to manipulation. His objection was that, 
financial  markets  in  the  1990’s  were  witnessing  an  erosion  of  the  quality  of  earnings 
because of a reduction of financial reporting quality. In this regard, earnings manipulation 
can be viewed as an “extreme management” of earnings almost in a mockery of GAAP 
despite maintaining some vestigial accord with standards. This may be the case where a 
firm  has  publicly  restated  their  earnings;  been  found  guilty  following  litigation,  or  is 
undergoing a regulatory body’s (for example the SEC) anti fraud enforcement actions. For 
example; the cases brought against Enron, WorldCom, Arhold, Parmalat etc., are beyond 
doubt situations where management are subject to a high degree of culpability and hence 
can be thought of as representing earnings manipulation. Studies of earnings management 
based on stock returns also suggests that investors discount “abnormal” accruals relative to 
                                                 
18 Beneish (1997, 1999) differentiated earnings management from earnings manipulation and described high 
level earnings management like the Enron and WorldCom case as earnings manipulation.  
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“normal” accruals, indicating that they view abnormal accruals as more likely to reflect 
earnings management (Healy and Whalen, 1999). 
 
Financial regulators and standard setters have been concerned about how much discretion 
to allow management to exercise in financial reporting. GAAP provides managers with 
substantial discretion in managing aggregate, or specific, accruals and management employ 
such discretion to manage earnings around certain earnings targets. Accounting earnings 
generally  involves  cash  flows  from  operations,  non discretionary  accruals  and 
discretionary  accruals.  Within  the  bounds  of  GAAP,  management  have  considerable 
flexibility  in  the  choice  of  inventory  methods,  allowance  for  bad  debt,  expensing  of 
research  and  development,  recognition  of  sales  not  yet  shipped,  estimation  of  pension 
liabilities,  capitalisation  of  leases  and  marketing  expenses,  delays  in  maintenance 
expenditures, and so on (Degeorge et al, 1999). In summary, those managing earnings 
usually accelerate revenues, or delay expenses, in order to aggressively generate income.  
 
A basic prediction of previous research has been that management should try to exploit the 
specific  behaviour  of  discretionary  accruals  to  engage  in  earnings  management 
(McNichols, 2000). This line of thinking has become even more important after the Enron 
scandal  as  researchers  argued  that  the  company  was  able  to  exploit  the  unobservable 
features of specific accrual. In this regard, the US SEC and other regulatory authorities 
have been committed to a vigorous investigation of earnings manipulation and director’s 
dealings during the 1990’s. This is because recent corporate scandals have been related to 
both  insider  trading  relationships  and  earnings  manipulation.  This  was  echoed  by  the 
famous  speech  in  1998,  by  the  then  SEC  chairman  Arthur  Levitt  where  he  expressed 
concern  over  the  level  of  earnings  management  and  its  effect  on  resource  allocation. 
Schipper  (1989)  argues  that  excess  management  of  earnings  may  lead  to  earnings  un 
informativeness.  As in the Daniel et al., (1998) model, positive (negative) discretionary 
accounting might be employed to signal the undervaluation (overvaluation) of a company 
relative to its true/fundamental value. 
 
Changes  in  the  use  of  accounting  discretion  can  influence  the  informativeness  of 
accounting earnings. Therefore the higher the precision of managerial information relating 
to the undervaluation (overvaluation) of their company relative to economic fundamentals,  
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the higher the certainty of the degree of accounting discretion to be employed. The primary 
focus of most earnings management research has mostly been on detecting whether and 
when earnings management takes place. Though this might be difficult to achieve, as a 
starting  point,  researchers  have  been  looking  at  the  incentives  that  influence  earnings 
management and how patterns of unexpected accruals are aligned to incentives (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999).  If we knew the objective of earnings management it might be simplier to 
detect the pattern it follows.  
 
In  a  survey  on  earnings  management  definitions,  Ronen  and  Yaari  (2007,  p.  25) 
differentiated the various forms of earnings management as: 
 
1) Beneficial (White) when earnings management enhances the transparency of reports by 
taking  advantage  of  the flexibility  on  the  choice  of  accounting  treatment  to  signal  the 
managers private information on future cash flows.  
2) Opportunistic or efficiency enhancing (Gray) that involves the manipulation of reports 
within the boundaries of compliance with bright line standards. In such circumstances, 
earnings  management  involves  choosing  an  accounting  treatment  that  is  either 
opportunistic or economically efficient.  
3)  The  pernicious  (Black)  involves  outright  misrepresentation  and  fraud.  In  this  case, 
earnings management is the practice of using tricks to misrepresent or reduce transparency 
of financial reports.  
 
The following quotation from the SEC litigation releases relating to the Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Releases may explain how the SEC views earnings management (or 
manipulation) and further carries out its enforcement actions. 
Litigation release No. 18514/December 18, 2003, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release No. 1928/December 18, 2003 states; 
 
“ On December 18, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against Charles D. 
Erwin, the former Chief Operating Officer of Hanover Compressor Company (“Hanover”) 
and against Michael J. McGhan, It’s former chief Executive officer, alleging that they 
orchestrated a managed earnings scheme to inflate the company’s reported pre tax Income 
and  meet  Hanover’s  earnings  goals  and  estimates  during  2000  and  2001………….” 
Further,  the  releases  writes,  “As  a  result,  according  to  the  SEC,  Hanover  recognised 
revenues for this deals in contravention of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles...”  
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This case involves earnings overstatement to meet the company’s earnings goals.  
In some cases, earnings management may have a different incentive for example, to “meet 
or  beat” analyst’s  expectations,  benefit  from  previous trades, or  understate  earnings  to 
avoid tax or other regulatory concerns, and so on and there may be a breach of fiduciary 
duties by management involved.  
 
This quotation from the SEC AAER’s No. 1912 may also open up some understanding: 
“The Securities and Exchange Commission announces today the filing of fraud charges 
against the former chief executive officer, Chief Financial Officer, and Controller of the 
San  Diego Based  Gateway,  Inc.,  for  engaging  in  a  fraudulent  earnings  manipulation 
scheme to meet Wall Street analyst’s expectations and for making false statements and 
concealing from the investing public important information about the success of...”  
 
The defence here seeks to prove that manager did not manipulate/manage earnings, in 
breach of their duty to other stakeholders through concealing material information
19.  
       
2.3.1: Classification of Earnings Management. 
Earnings management is habitually classified into three categories: fraudulent accounting 
that involves the violation of GAAP through accounting discretion, accruals management 
involving  earnings  management  within  the  bounds  of  GAAP,  and  real  earnings 
management  where  managers  try  to  influence  reported  earnings  through  actions  that 
substantially changes the underlying cash flows thereby influencing reported earnings. One 
specific  difference  between  real  earnings  management  and  other  forms  of  earnings 
management is that fraudulent accounting and accruals management are not accomplished 
by changing the underlying economic activities of the firm but through changes in the 
accounting method  that  has  been employed  to  report the underlying activities  (Gunny, 
2005). It is usually difficult to evaluate real earnings management as being in violation of 
common law because of the business judgement rule. The business judgement rule is an 
American case law acknowledging that directors manage the company. It’s a presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors normally act on an informed basis, in good 
                                                 
19 For details, you can look through the SEC website for other ways the SEC litigates individuals who have 
violated securities laws. Note that, it may not only be company management involved in the litigation 
process, the auditors either external or internal, management, creditors, debtors and so on may decide to 
assist in managing earnings for different motives. 
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faith, and in the honest belief their action is for the best interest of the company. The rule 
recognises  that  the  daily  operation  of  a  business  involves  managing  several  risky  and 
controversial  decisions.  The  directors  should  therefore  be  allowed  to  make  decisions 
without fear of being prosecuted. The business judgment rule further assumes that it is 
unfair to expect those managing a company to make perfect decisions all the time. 
 
In extant earnings management research, much of the discussions have been focused on the 
management of abnormal accruals using models that fail to distinguish the pure accruals 
manipulation from manipulation of real activities. Contributions that focus on earnings 
management through real activities have been concentrated on investment performance 
(Roychowdhury,  2003).  In  the  spirit  of  Graham  et  al.  (2005),  real  operating  decisions 
customarily involve the timing of investments, cash flows and financing decisions like 
changing R&D (Bushee, 1988), capital expenditures or sometimes unexpected asset sales 
or purchases by the corporation (Bartov, 1993).  
 
2.3.1.1: Accrual-Based Earnings Management. 
Accrual Accounting is the preparation of accounts such that expenses and revenues are 
recognised at the time that they are incurred and earned respectively, irrespective of when 
the  firm  paid  out  or  received  the  money.  Accrual  earnings  is  regarded  as  a  superior 
measure of firm performance than cash flows because it mitigates timing and mismatching 
problems  inherent  in  measuring  cash  flows  over  short  intervals  (Dechow,1994). 
Accounting  principles  (IAS  and  IFRS)  customarily  provide  for  the  use  of  accrual 
accounting  in  financial  reporting,  providing  flexibility  in  the  preparation  of  financial 
reports.  This  flexibility  is  subject  to  managerial  discretion,  which  could  enhance  the 
informativeness  of  earnings  by  allowing  communication  of  private  information 
(Holthausen,  1990)  or  induce  managers  to  manage  income  opportunistically  thereby 
creating distortions in reported earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
 
One of the most prominent ways managers may manage earnings is by the managing of 
accruals with no direct cash flow consequence. Examples include unjustifiable bad debts 
provisions, delaying of assets write offs, and opportunistic selection of accounting methods 
(Roychowdhury, 2003). Several researchers have attempted to decompose total accruals 
into  two  components,  which  include  the  discretionary  and  non discretionary  accrual  
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components. These accrual components affect earnings differently as the non discretionary 
accrual component are adjustments to cash flows customarily authorised by accounting 
standards while discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash flows selected by managers 
to report a favourable earnings figure. This discretionary component of accruals creates a 
loophole  for  managers  to  manipulate  the  accrual  component  of  earnings.  Due  to  the 
flexibility  accorded  by  Generally  Accepted  Accounting  Principles  (GAAP),  accrual 
earnings  management  is  subject  to  managerial  discretion  (Subramanyam,  1996).  The 
managerial discretion could be informative; in which case,  managers present the financial 
statements such that they are more informative to users. In the torrent of research papers 
discussing earnings management, the choice of the so called discretionary component of 
accruals  as  a  proxy  for  earnings  management  has  been  extensively  justified.  Earnings 
management  is  a  routine  business  that  has  been  subject  to  a  great  deal  of  managerial 
discretion  and  consequently  earnings  manipulation  (Kang  et  al.,  2006).  Arguably, 
managers tend to adjust up (down) earnings by inflating (deflating) current period accruals. 
 
In  linking  the  accruals  anomaly  to  other  firm  based  expectations  relating  to  future 
performances  like  stock  returns,  researchers  have  employed  either  the  behavioural 
approach  or  the  risk  based  approach.  The  behavioural  approach  suggests  that  higher 
accruals lead to lower future stock returns and lower accruals are followed by higher future 
stock returns argue that investors do recognize the low persistence of accruals and tend to 
overprice it (See Sloan, 1996; Collins and Hribar, 2000; and Xie, 2001). The argument 
here is that investors over extrapolate current earnings, seemingly ignoring the transitory 
nature of earnings boosted by a comparatively high proportion of accruals. The risk based 
argument suggests that the accruals return relationship is a manifestation of the presumed 
growth value anomaly, which Fama and French argued has a liquidation risk explanation 
(Zhang, 2006). One of the weaknesses of accruals based models is their heavy reliance on 
the chosen metric for accruals. In the extant literature, the assumptions invoked have been 
rather piecemeal in nature; for example in the Jones models, revenue is not discretionary 
while the modified Jones model assumes that it might be discretionary (Chen et al., 2005). 
Moreover, it does not capture earnings management through cash flows and discretionary 
changes in different items like R&D, selling, general and administrative expenses, capital 
expenditures, etc (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).  As in Dechow et al., (2005), these models 
generate tests of low power.  
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2.3.1.2: Real Earnings Management. 
Discussing  earnings  management  based  on  accruals  alone,  they  customarily  understate 
earnings  management.  Recent  research  has  provided  evidence  that  earnings  might  be 
managed  through  changing  real  activities.  Managers  might  take  real  actions  to  meet 
earnings target that influences shareholder value in both the short and long run. They are 
less  likely  to  be  challenged  by  regulators  on  purely  business  decisions  when  they  for 
example sell a plant or reduce R&D expenditures. For example, companies that want to 
sell their assets to influence reported earnings might have found a buyer by the end of the 
year. They have the choice to either report the transaction close to the end of the year or 
delay the finalisation of the transaction to the next year (Bartov, 1993). However, this 
might depend on whether the acquiring management team is also interested in using the 
purchase or sale of this item to influence reported earnings in the current year. Apart from 
timing decisions that influence reported earnings, managers might take variables that are 
free from the effects of pure accrual manipulation to an abnormally high level. In extant 
research  it  is  found  that  managers  usually  report  abnormally  low  cash  flow  from 
operations,  abnormally  high  production  cost,  and  reduce  discretionary  expenses  to 
influence reported earnings (see Dechow et al., 1998, Roychowdhury, 2003).  
 
2.3.1.3: Cost and Benefit of Real and Accruals Earnings Management.  
Several  reasons  might  motivate  managers  to  employ  real  earnings  management  at  the 
expense  of  accruals  manipulation.  Firstly,  real  earnings  management  has  a  far  lower 
likelihood  of  auditor  or  regulatory  (SEC)  enquiry  compared  accrual  manipulations. 
Secondly, the decisions to manipulate earnings through accruals are limited to year end 
periods  when  companies  prepare  their  annual  reports  (though  companies  might  still 
manage earnings through quarterly reported earnings). On the other hand, real earnings 
management  can  still  take  place  during  the  whole  accounting  period.  Real  earnings 
management  on  the  other  hand  can  generate  its  own  problems.  Firstly,  the  techniques 
employed customarily involve some cost to future cash flows. For example, a company 
might institute price discounts at the current accounting period to boast reported earnings, 
but this might be a short term objective to meet a current earnings target that might have a 
longer term repercussion especially on future cash flows. Customers in the long term might 
expect future price discounts that might also lead to lower cash flows from sales in the 
future  (Roychowdhury,  2003).  Real  earnings  management  might  negate  the  value  of  
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companies. Jensen (1993) presents evidence that excessive R&D and capital investment 
during the1980s destroyed at least $10 billion each at such companies as General Motors, 
Ford, British Petroleum, Chevron, and DuPont. 
 
2.3.1.4: GAAP Earnings Management. 
It is generally thought that GAAP defines earnings and when managers follow GAAP, 
earnings are not being misrepresented. However, research shows that this is not true as 
earnings  can  still  be  managed  within  GAAP.  GAAP  earnings  management  involves 
managing  GAAP  to  influence  reported  earnings.  Roychowdhury  (2003)  argued  that 
managers, for example, might take advantage of the absorption costing system requirement 
of GAAP to report lower cost of goods sold (COGS). To be able to do this, they might 
produce more than the quantity required to meet sales and normal target inventory levels. 
This over production might give them the opportunity to allocate fixed cost to higher than 
normal end of period inventories and this will nonetheless reduce the resulting cost of 
goods sold. GAAP rules generally permit many accounting choices that facilitate creative 
reporting that lead to earnings management. 
 
2.4: Earnings Manipulation or Management? 
As  in  Beneish  (1999) earnings  manipulation  refers  to instances  in  which  a  company’s 
managers may violate Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to favourably 
represent  the  company’s  financial  performance.  In  this  case,  firms  subject  to  SEC 
enforcement  through  the  Accounting  and  Auditing  Enforcement  Releases  might  be 
regarded as likely practitioners of earnings manipulation. According to Dye, (1988), and 
Evans and Sridhar, (1996), opportunities for such manipulations of earnings arise because 
of the flexibility permitted by GAAP, and also because it may be costly to require and 
enforce less flexible financial reporting rules.  
 
In terms of the discussions presented here, managing earnings is possibly within GAAP, 
while  earnings  manipulation  is  in  complete  violation  of  GAAP.  The  degree  of  un 
informativeness of earnings is higher in manipulated than on managed earnings leading to 
outsiders repudiating manipulated earnings, which may not be the case when earnings are 
managed within GAAP. This does not preclude companies with earnings managed within  
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GAAP becoming subject to action class litigation. Table 2 below presents some points of 
distinction between earnings management and earnings manipulation. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation. 
  Earnings  Earnings  Earnings  Earnings 
Management. Management. Management. Management.       
Earnings  Earnings  Earnings  Earnings 
Manipulation. Manipulation. Manipulation. Manipulation.       
GAAP  Within GAAP  Violate GAAP. 
Informativeness. Informativeness. Informativeness. Informativeness.        Fairly misleading.  Totally  Misleading 
(Uninformative) 
Regulatory/Outsiders  Regulatory/Outsiders  Regulatory/Outsiders  Regulatory/Outsiders 
View. View. View. View.       
May repudiate  Repudiate. 
 
2.5: Insider Trading Relationship to Earnings Management. 
This  section  discusses  briefly  the  relationship  between  insider  trading  and  earnings 
management. However, since this forms the core of my main empirical investigations, this 
is discussed in more detail and conclusions drawn in Chapter 4.  
 
There is much evidence in academic literature and in the popular press that managers use 
their  discretion  over  accounting  numbers  to  achieve  some  private  gain.  One  method 
through which researchers have investigated this private gain has been through managerial 
self dealing in their corporations stock while managing earnings.  In some circumstances 
managers  have  still  been  able  to  manage  earnings  and  prolong  consecutive  earnings 
increases while coordinating personal stock trades (Ke et al., 2003). Beneish and Vargus 
(2002) documented that tradable strategies that jointly exploit earnings management and 
insider trading signals earn economically significant one year ahead returns and that these 
returns dominate strategies based on either accruals or insider trading individually. They 
concluded that signals contained in insiders’ trading behaviour are useful in distinguishing 
opportunistic from informative earnings management, and in making refined assessments 
of earnings quality. Insiders are thought to manage earnings upwards before selling their 
shares at inflated prices (Bolton et al., 2002, Bar Gill and Bebchuk 2003, Park and Park, 
2004) thereby acquiring significant profits from such trades.  
 
These studies provide a theoretical framework on how a firm’s accounting decision is 
associated  with  insider  trading  and  offer  empirically  testable  propositions  for  earnings  
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management (Park and Park, 2004). The pump and dump hypothesis have been explained 
in different ways and documented in different markets. In the Bar Gill and Bebchuk (2003) 
model  that  addressed  the  causes  and  consequences  of  mis representing  a  firms’ 
performance, the authors argue that when managers intend to sell some of their holdings in 
the  short term,  the  incentive  to  misreport  and  the  occurrence  of  misreporting  (e.g., 
engaging  in  earnings  management)  increases.  Trueman  (1990)  suggests  that  managers 
would have an incentive to manipulate their firms’ current period earnings in order to 
influence the post announcement stock prices, esspecially when they intend to sell their 
ownership in the subsequent accounting period. In Hong Kong, Bikki and Judy (2007) 
documented a positive association between earnings management and insider selling after 
the fiscal year end. This positive association is especially evident before the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis where managers sold shares after managing earnings upwards prior to the 
crises.  
 
Another  group  of  study  argue  that  insiders  trade  with  information  pertaining  to  future 
earnings  changes.  While  not  testing  the  abnormal  accruals  surrounding  insider  trading 
specifically, Noe (1999) reported that managers tend to sell their shares primarily after 
their firms report good earnings performance, and that they also tend to purchase their 
firms’ common shares after their firms report bad earnings performance. This is in line 
with  recent  work  by  Ke  et  al.,  (2003)  who  argued  that  insiders  sometimes  trade  with 
information pertaining to a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases, without 
necessarily using discretionary accruals. Their buying (selling) frequently preceeds stock 
price increases (decreases) (Seyhun, 1986, Rozeff and Zaman, 1998, Ke et al., 2003). The 
finding in this paragraph is in line with Seyhun (1986) who reported that insiders are more 
knowledgeable about their firm’s future prospects and thus can predict future stock price 
changes.  
 
 
Beneish  et  al.,  (2004)  investigated  two  hypotheses  about  the  relation  between  insider 
selling and earnings management in periods preceding poor corporate performance in their 
litigation avoidance hypothesis. This was through a sample of 462 firms that experience 
technical default in 1983 1997. They documented that managers manage earnings upwards 
after they have engaged in abnormally high levels of insider selling. According to the  
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authors,  the  findings  indicate  insider  trading  provides  managers  with  incentives  to 
subsequently manage earnings upward, to distance their selling from the revelation of bad 
news  and  reduce  the  likelihood  of  reputation,  employment,  and  litigation  losses.  The 
implications are that investors and those with oversight authority (e.g., boards of directors, 
auditors, and regulators) should consider monitoring prior rather than contemporaneous 
insider trading activity as a part of their corporate governance practices. This has been 
supported  by  recent  evidence  (e.g.  Weber,  2005)  who  suggested  that  insiders  manage 
earnings in order to distance their sales from negative earnings news hence avoiding the 
appearance of undertaking an illegal insider trade. Also, most well known financial market 
fraud and litigation cases associated with earnings management have frequently had close 
links to prior Insider dealings
20.  
 
2.6: Motivations for Earnings Management. 
The  objective  of  this  section  is  to  identify  the  various  theories/motives  for  managing 
earnings that have been tested by prior research. This will help the reader understand the 
theoretical advances in the area and the specific research issues to be tested. Research on 
earnings management has proposed different theories of why companies manage earnings. 
The decision to manage earnings emanates from specific economic, financial, political or 
social interest. Such interest may be important to the corporation or the managers in a 
precise period. For example, using income decreasing earnings management techniques, 
management of a corporation may benefit from tax reductions, price control reductions and 
increases, and while using income increasing techniques for example, management may 
get increased bonuses and fulfil their stewardship responsibilities.  
 
In some circumstances, management may be faced with circumstances where the influence 
of regulatory bodies may force them to report an unmanaged earnings figure without the 
use  of  uninformative  discretionary  management  techniques.  The  various  papers  listed 
below discuss some of the motivations of managing earnings on the part of stakeholders in 
a  corporation.  However  not  all  earnings  management  is  opportunistic.  As  reported  by 
                                                 
20 To view details of this relationship, see some of the cases involving earnings manipulation in the 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases in the SEC website. In most of these cases, managers are 
being sued for guiding accounting earnings while conducting personal stock trade.  
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Holthausen (1990), Aria et al (1998), earnings management can remarkably not be tied to 
any incentive to manage earnings
21.  
 
Before we proceed with some of the constructs that may have a significant relationship to 
the level of earnings management, it will be interesting to cite a speech by the former SEC 
chairman to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants on the 24
th of October 
2000 
 
“Like never before, companies are under increasing pressure to "make their numbers" or 
risk losing millions of dollars in their stock value, simply because they are a penny or two 
shy of Wall Street earnings expectations. Auditors are sometimes encouraged to "go easy" 
on a judgment call, or "look the other way" when it comes to accounting sleight of hand, 
all  in  the  name  of  boosting  revenues.  In  this  environment  of  conflicting  interests,  the 
investing public relies on the accountant to stay true to his or her fiduciary duty, to never 
lose sight of the precious franchise that is theirs to guard so vigilantly”. 
 
2.6.1: Income Increasing Earnings Motivations. 
This section discusses the various alternative motivations for income increasing earnings 
management and the pattern that would be consistent with that motivation. 
 
2.6.1.1:  Earnings  Based  Compensation  And  Bonus  Schemes  (Implications 
for Corporate Governance). 
Prior studies present evidence of a relation between managers’ contractual agreements and 
earnings  patterns.  These  patterns  are  often  consistent  with  earnings  being  reported  to 
benefit  managers  through  increased  bonuses  (Healy  (1985),  Gaver,  et  al.,  (1995)  and 
Hothausen, et al., (1995)).Managers are occasionally remunerated with bonuses and other 
kinds  of  compensation  if  certain  company  earnings  targets  are  met.  Some  of  the 
compensation schemes depend explicitly on accounting earnings especially bonus schemes 
and performance plans (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Performance plans, for example, 
award managers the value of performance units or shares in cash or stock if a certain long 
term (3 5 years) earnings target is met.  Bonus plans are similar except that they stipulate 
annual rather than long term earnings goals (Healy, 1985). Compensation schemes and 
others  (particularly  performance  plans)  have  been  viewed  as  creating  an  incentive  for 
                                                 
21 There is the valuation implication where managers might manage earnings when they think the stock price 
of their company have been undervalued (or overvalued) and they want to portray the true value of the 
company.  
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managers to select accounting and accruals to maximize the value of their bonus awards 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  The schemes appear to be an effective way of influencing 
managerial  accrual  and  accounting  procedure  decisions.  Other  popular  forms  of 
compensation that may entice management to manage earnings may include, stock options, 
insurance plans, stock appreciation, and restricted stock grants, etc. In most corporations, 
compensation plans may depend on such policies like a fixed bonus for attaining a reported 
earnings  target,  a  linear  variable  bonus  for  exceeding  the  target  and  a  linear  variable 
penalty for reporting income below the target (Koch and Wall, 2000). Koch and Wall 
(2000)  studying  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  use  of  accruals  in  two  companies 
Sumbeam  (1996 1997)  and  Citicorp  (1987)  found  the  respective  firms  management  of 
earnings was motivated by compensation policies adopted for CEO’S. Managers might 
therefore  manipulate  earnings  upwards  either  in  order  to  avoid  adverse  contractual 
consequences to their bonus schemes and employment situations or to conceal a firm’s 
actual performance to other stakeholders. 
 
Financial reporting in general and earnings management in particular is a key subject for 
corporate governance because; it conveys information regarding firm value and thus the 
quality of the management. However the way corporate governance relates to earnings 
management  is  not  always  obvious  since  investors  and  researchers  find  it  tricky  to 
unambiguously  determine  the  actual  motive  for  earnings  management.  Recall  that, 
Holthausen (1990) and Aria et al. (1998) remarked that earnings management might not 
necessarily be opportunistic. There is no doubt that, incentives can be devised so as to 
encourage managers to attain  or at least report  a high degree of target accomplishment, 
but the means used are not always those intended or desired. Such schemes may perhaps 
encourage competition among managers where co operation would have been preferable 
from the shareholders perspective, and may encourage the manipulation of actions and 
reports so that senior managers become increasingly misinformed about what is in reality 
happening whilst being lulled into a false sense of security that all is well. In Japanese 
management style for example,  members assist and encourage each other in achieving 
corporate objectives and there is a link from substantial monetary rewards to overall target 
achievements. But in the United States, target achievement and related rewards are most 
prevalent and assessed at senior management level and are customarily linked to incentives 
like  bonus  schemes,  pension  bonuses,  stock  options,  etc.  Within  Enron  brutal  
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“Performance  Review  Committees”  allowed  colleagues  to  rank  each  other  with  those 
getting  the  lowest  ranking  being  fired.  This  effectively  set  colleagues  in  direct  open 
competition for survival.  
 
The case of WorldCom is a typical example. Managers had bonuses that were based on 
revenue growth. Their salaries, bonuses and options were also tied to the stock price of the 
company. For example, top level managers like Ebbers and Sullivan were receiving about 
$10m of retention bonuses and several loans from the company that were repayable on 
termination  (Ball,  2007).  This  made  the  incentive  to  engage  in  higher  earnings 
management.  
 
2.6.1.2: Stewardship Value of Accounting. 
Several  studies  have  shown  that  reported  accounting  information  is  used  to  value 
companies  and  earnings  management  influences  stock  prices  (see  Sloan  (1996),  Xie 
(1999)).  Despite  the  theoretical  popularity  of  cash  flow  valuation  models,  accounting 
earnings is still widely used in share valuation and to measure performance in management 
and  debt  contracts  (Dechow  et  al.,  1998).  As  a  means  of  fulfilling  their  contractual 
obligations  to  other  stakeholders,  managers  or  shareholders  might  be  interested  in 
influencing earnings management (Dye, 1988). Graham et al. (2005) surveyed CFO’s and 
they indicated that they manage earnings to maintain or increase the stock prices of the 
firms  they  are  managing.  Nor  is  it  normal  to  find  analysts  forecasting  dividends,  as 
opposed to earnings. Several empirical work have also argued that a firm’s propensity to 
increase  abnormal  accruals  depends  on  the  relative  stock  price  premiums  that  can  be 
achieved from reporting positive or negative earnings surprises (Rajgopal et al., 2007).  
 
Shareholders, for example, may wish to satisfy prospective investors or lenders especially 
when the firm requires additional support to survive and may sometimes think that the only 
way  to  do  this  is  for  management  to  manage  (manipulate)  their  earnings  figure.  The 
stewardship  value  of  accounting  information  itself  may  drive  management  to  manage 
earnings (manipulate) frequently. The stewardship view documented by Dye (1988) is also 
linked to the compensation contract in place for the senior management team. As long as 
compensation  contracts  are  linked  to  accounting  data,  managers  can  always  manage 
earnings to benefit from such contracts.   
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Recent  issues  for  earnings  management  research  have  been  the  impact  of  agency 
relationships between owners and managers (Shackleford and Shevlin, 2003). Dhaliwal et 
al. (1982) studying the association between the ownership control status of the firm and the 
accounting  methods  they  adopt,  found  out  that,  in  large  companies  (for  example 
multinationals), where there is a strong separation of ownership and control, there is a 
tendency for management to adopt accounting methods that boost reported earnings. They 
believe  managers  always  have  an  incentive  to  control  information  thereby  releasing 
favourable  results  that  may  satisfy  current  shareholders.  They  are  therefore  obliged  to 
choose accounting methods that may result in higher reported earnings leading to higher 
equity. Management may favour favourable earnings for fear of a backlash from investors 
calling for their replacement or to avoid various kinds of litigation. This may lead to the 
adoption of accounting policies that inflate earning figures. Historically too, few investors 
will accept some kind of explanation for a persistent fall in profits influencing shareholders 
to push for positive discretionary accruals which may frequently be uncritically welcomed 
by investors. 
 
2.6.1.3: Debt Covenants and Related Liquidity Implications
22. 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) found out that firms that violate debt covenants could incur 
re contracting  costs  and  in  order  to  avoid  this  cost,  they  frequently  overstate  reported 
earnings.  When  investors  are  not  bound  by  debt  covenant  obligations,  if  they  want  to 
borrow  money,  they  must  report  earnings  with  covenant  related  variables  that  may  be 
favourable to creditors. In conclusion, liquidity needs and credit engagements act as an 
incentive for management to manage earnings along specific earnings target.  
 
2.6.2: Income Decreasing Earnings Motivations. 
This section discusses the various alternative motivations for income decreasing earnings 
management and the pattern that would be consistent with that motivation. 
 
                                                 
22 The level of compensation and Bonus schemes, stewardship value of accounting and debt covenants and 
liquidity implications generally influences management to rather overstate earnings.  
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2.6.2.1: Price Control/Tax Implications
23 
Bowman  and  Navissi  (2001)  examining  the  relationship  between  price  controls  and 
income decreasing discretionary accruals found out that firms will be more aggressive in 
decreasing income using various income decreasing earnings management techniques to 
lower  profits  to  increase  the  probability  that  their  price increase  application  should  be 
approved. Also if a firm reduces its earnings figure, they pay less tax than when earnings 
are increased. Private firms in developing or transition economies have the incentive to 
underreport sales and profits to avoid taxes, predatory behaviour by government officials, 
or escape extortion by criminal gangs (see Johnson et al 2001).  
 
Addressing the tax implications on earnings management from the perspective of Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, recent research has suggested that the relationship 
between ownership and control may have an implication for how companies try to avoid 
taxes.  When  firms,  for  example,  want  to  provide  high  quality  financial  information  to 
external stakeholders, they are constrained into managing earnings. Public companies are 
furthermore found to be less interested in earnings management than private companies 
(Goncharov and Zimmerman, 2005). 
 
2.6.2.2: Import Relief and Other Subsidies. 
Management is sometimes motivated to report a loss to benefit from import relieve and 
other state subsidies. Provisions of an import relieve and other state subsidies will provide 
managers with an opportunity to increase the generosity of state subsidies for supposed 
harm done to national producers. (Jones, 1991). Local and national governments usually 
give subsidies to some important loss making companies to improve their performance so 
as to meet some capital market requirements. Many small companies also have incentives 
to  reclassify  selling,  promotional,  advertisement  and  other  expenses  to  lower  their  tax 
expense  (Noronha  et  al.,  2008).  The  implications  are  that  some  firms  might  manage 
earnings downwards to give the impression that they are not doing well.  
 
                                                 
23 Most of the studies relating to earnings management emphasize mostly situations where earnings are 
overstated using positive discretionary accruals. In other circumstances, management may be motivated to 
understate earnings to benefit from import relieve and other state subsidies, pay low taxes, etc using negative 
discretionary accruals.  
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2.6.2.3: Audit Firm/Quality
24. 
The level of audit quality and listing requirements may influence management’s decision 
to manage, or manipulate earnings, and affects their opportunities to do so. It has been 
observed that an effective
25 audit acts as an incentive for company management to report 
meaningful earnings figures short of accruals and other manipulations. Despite the auditing 
profession, managers are often judges in their own case regarding their performance in 
serving shareholders. Historically, companies in countries with a strict audit quality regime 
have tended to engage less in earnings management (manipulation) than those in countries 
with less audit quality compliance procedures (e.g. Francis et al. 1999). Previous studies 
have documented the influence of a high quality audit on earnings management (Becker et 
al., 1998; Francis et al. 1999) and that a quality auditor (i.e.: a big 4 auditor, DeAngelo, 
1981) tends to reduce the level of discretionary accruals employed to manage earnings. De 
fond and Jiambalvo (1991) further found out that the audit quality is frequently influenced 
by the audit firm in question as firms audited by the big 4 audit firms are less likely to have 
errors or irregularities which can be considered to be proxy for earnings management than 
firms audited by the Non Big 5. The specific irony here is that, the big 4 managed Enron 
and WorldCom.   
 
In Germany and the Netherlands for example, due to their flexible audit quality regimes, 
companies there report more discretionary accruals management than companies in France 
and UK with stricter audit quality regimes. As noted in several studies of about earnings 
management, what is frequently managed is a subset of the manager’s financial report that 
requires  some  discretion.  GAAP,  auditors,  audit  committees  and  legal  rules  constrain 
reporting  especially  in  areas  that  are  specifically  discretionary  (Schipper,  1989)  and  if 
properly interpreted, there would be less earnings management. 
 
2.6.2.4: Listing Requirements and Stock Market Pressures. 
Also, if a company is listed in a foreign stock market, thereby relying on international 
capital  markets  with  a  different  audit  and  accounting  procedures,  there  may  be  some 
variations in its reporting and compliance procedures that may constrain manipulation or 
                                                 
24 The quality of audit and the listing requirements by the major exchanges influences management to report 
proper accounting earnings figure short of accrual manipulation and management techniques. 
25 Effectiveness is defined here as an audit that is not influenced by conflicts of interest.  
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management of earnings even when opportunities exist to do so. It is generally believed 
that managers may be constrained by the reporting requirements despite other incentives 
that may be available for them. Furthermore, regulator and other stakeholders are always 
of  the  presumption  that  companies  audited  by  the  big  4  and  listed  in  a  foreign  stock 
exchange, are less likely to manage earnings than companies not audited by the big 4 and 
listed on national market. However, since foreign listings are usually motivated by the 
liquidity needs of a corporation, this may instead act as an incentive to manage earnings 
using income increasing techniques. The quality of information is of interest to the capital 
market  when  they  are  listed  on  the  stock  market,  as  different  stakeholders  may  be 
interested in the accounting information. When firms are listed in the stock market, they 
are required to provide high quality financial information to the investing public. In this 
regard,  accounting  regulations  normally  limit  their  ability  to  pursue  blatant  forms  of 
earnings manipulation (Goncharov and Zimmerman, 2005). 
 
When a firm is missing an earnings target by a mere cent, they may see their stock price 
decline precipitously. On the contrary, when a firm beats a target by a few cents, there may 
be a boost to its stock price. These are surely the reason why it is more popular for firms to 
miss their targets by a cent and less likely to see that firms exactly making or exceeding 
their target by a cent (see DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999), Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), Mohanram, 2003) When firms are extremely close to a target, the incentives to 
take earnings just over the target becomes exceedingly strong. In these cases, the firms will 
try and use some form of upwards earnings management to “bump up” earnings over the 
target. Additionally, when firms are way below their targets, they have an incentive to 
make things look even worse. These are for two reasons: Firstly, it is highly unlikely that 
any  amount  of  earnings  management  will  get  them  over  the  target  or  meet  analyst’s 
expectations. Secondly, if the firm is way below the target, the costs of being even worse 
are typically minimal (Mohanram, 2003). This point was supported by Arthur Levitt (1998, 
p. 1), former head of the SEC. In a speech describing the big bath restructuring in his 
famous the “numbers game” speech, he argued that: 
“Companies remain competitive by regularly assessing the efficiency and profitability of 
their operations. Problems arise, however, when we see large charges associated with 
companies restructuring. These charges help companies "clean up" their balance sheet     
giving them a so called "big bath. Why are companies tempted to overstate these charges?  
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When earnings take a major hit, the theory goes Wall Street will look beyond a one time 
loss and focus only on future earnings. And if these charges are conservatively estimated 
with a little extra cushioning, that so called conservative estimate is miraculously reborn 
as income when estimates change or future earnings fall short.” 
  
2.6.2.5: Trading by Corporate Insiders. 
Insider  trading  relationship  to  earnings  management  is  mostly  discussed  from  the 
opportunism hypothesis, where insider trading is partly due to the willingness to benefit 
from  private  information  and  from  other  equity  related  incentives.  The  most  direct 
evidence of insider trades acting as an incentive to manage future earnings have been 
raised by Beneish (1999), although other research has concluded that insider trading can be 
informative about future earnings changes or management due to a specific event that may 
be price sensitive. From prior theoretical findings, insider trading motivates Executives to 
take actions to increase firm earnings (See for example Jaffe (1974), Givoly and Palmon 
(1985), Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok, Schleifer and Vishney (1994) and Rozeff and Zaman, 
(1998)  Ke  et  al,  (2003)).  Secondly,  earnings  management  influences  future  firm 
performance (see Sloan (1996), Xie (2001), Penman and Zhang (2002), Richardson et al. 
(2002), Chan et al., (2006). These researchers suggest that insider’s trades are informative 
with buying and selling being followed by future price increases (decreases). I therefore 
suggest that, insiders will buy (sell) shares and manage earnings to report an increase 
(decrease) in the profit of the corporation. The details of this are captured within the results 
of my research as this is part of my hypothesis but it is in line with the suggestion of 
Beneish (1999, 2002), and Beneish and Vargus (2002), though this was not the principal 
objective of the those researchers. This motive together with the regulatory motivations for 
earnings management discussed in section 2.6.8 are the most important motives for this 
research  as  the  objective  of  this  thesis  is  to  investigate  insider  traders  motivations  for 
earnings  management.    It  is  important  to  note  that  under  this  hypothesis,  managerial 
accruals are focused on misleading outside investors and other stakeholders of the true 
nature of a company’s earnings. 
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2.6.2.6: Legal rights of outside investors. 
Leuz et al (2003) examining the extent to which Insiders overstate performance to outside 
investors found out that, when legal protection is low for outside investors, this may act as 
an  incentive  for  insiders  in  publicly traded  firms  to  overstate  performance  to  outside 
investors.  The  legal  rights  accorded  to  outside  investors  and  the  qualities  of  their 
enforcement are both associated with the properties of firms’ accounting earnings. In Ball 
et al. (2000), the argument put forward is that an improvement in the legal rights of all 
stakeholders,  politicization  of  accounting  standard  setting  and  enforcement  actions 
weakens  the  demand  for  timely  and  conservative  accounting  income,  and  conversely 
increases the demand for an income variable with low volatility. In these countries whose 
legal  system  originates  from  code law,  the  comparatively  strong  political  influence  on 
accounting occurs at national and firm levels. Governments establish and enforce national 
accounting  standards,  typically  with  representation  from  major  political  groups  and 
external  stakeholders  such  as  labour  unions,  banks  and  business  associations.  Such  a 
setting makes sure the rights of every stakeholder are respected.  
 
2.6.2.7: Regulatory Motivations for Earnings Management. 
Several  regulatory  policies  both  at  the  industry  and  national  level  have  previously 
motivated corporate managers to report either earnings decreases or increases.  As Watts 
and Zimmerman, (1978) hypothesised, managers of firms that are vulnerable to adverse 
political investigations or anti trust investigation have incentives to manage earnings to 
present  a  less  profitable  situation.  Research  by  Cahan  (1992),  provided  evidences 
supposing that, where firms are under investigation for anti trust violations they report 
income decreasing abnormal accruals in investigation years. Jones (1991) found that when 
companies apply for import relief, they reduce their income in the years in which they 
submit  their  applications.  At  the  industry  level,  financial  institutions  face  considerable 
regulatory and other pressures that are habitually linked to future accounting information. 
For example, banks are expected to satisfy certain capital adequacy requirements that are 
written in terms of accounting numbers. Such regulations generate incentives for firms to 
manage the income statement and balance sheet variables of interest to regulators (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999).  
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2.6.2.8: Other Motivations for Earnings Management
26. 
Earnings management can be motivated by peer pressure and ego, where the need of those 
in  control  of  the  company  influences  the  decision  by  managers  to  influence  reported 
earnings. Managers also manage earnings to hide accounting fraud like when they have 
stolen cash from the company and other assets. Managers sometimes have excessively 
strong belief in themselves and the company they manage and might want to influence 
reported earnings to portray the company as profitable. The temptation to deceive others is 
a  universal  human  weakness  that  influences  the  way  earnings  and  other  performance 
metrics are reported. Even in the absence of any economic motive to defraud it may be that 
a poor performance reduces the senior management team sense of self worth.   
 
2.7: Penalties for Insider Trading and Earnings Management Offences.  
This section explains ways in which managers can be penalised for managing earnings. 
Penalties range from financial penalties imposed by the regulatory authorities to personal 
penalties that are usually incurred by the individual after committing insider trading and 
earnings management offences.  
 
2.7.1: Financial Penalties. 
Financial penalties range from restitutions, recoveries, fines and seizures of the assets of 
the individuals and institutions involved in the insider trading and earnings management 
offences. At the level of the corporation, they are sometimes charged with civil penalties 
that  sometimes  run  to  millions  of  dollars.  Xerox  is  an  example  of  a  company  whose 
executives appeared to have manipulated earnings during the 1990s while concurrently 
exercising large amounts of stock options and selling large numbers of shares in the open 
market. In April 2002 the SEC sued Xerox for manipulating reported earnings, and as part 
of the settlement with the SEC, Xerox was forced to restate reported revenues for the 
period between 1997 and 2001. Due to the restatement, reported revenues were reduced by 
$2.1 billion and net income by $1.4 billion. The SEC’s lawsuit accused Xerox of using a 
variety of tricks to inflate net income, including inappropriately allocating the revenue 
stream on their equipment leases. Other firms whose executives were accused of inflating 
                                                 
26 This section was compiled from information in presentation slides and informal   communication with 
Professor Ray Ball during his visit to the University of Edinburgh as part of the Citigroup Lecture, University 
of Edinburgh, 2007.  
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earnings and exercising stock options or trading in their shares on the open market include 
Waste Management, Tyco, and Enron (Bergstressera and Philippon, 2004).  
 
Individuals charged with insider trading and other offences that led to corporate failures 
always suffer much wealth loss in the form of lost income, bonuses, shares and options and 
salaries. They are customarily requested to return any profits earned. Auditors and their 
firms involved in audit failures are habitually sanctioned with civil penalties. Andersen 
was fined $7 M as settlement for the audit failures of Enron. Financial institutions accused 
of aiding Enron’s financial manipulation were also sanctioned. Citigroup was sued for $2 
billion, J.P Morgan Chase for $2.2 billion, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce for $2.4 
billions, and so on (see table 4 and 5 below).  
 
2.7.2: Criminal Penalties
27. 
Federal legislations legally indict and convict suspects who are found guilty of criminal 
offences  relating  to  insider  trading,  earnings  management  and  other  corporate  frauds. 
Following the SEC investigations, up to 30 executives were convicted of insider trading 
and earnings management offences. Skilling received 24 years, Andy Fastow, the company 
Chief Financial Officer was convicted for 6 years imprisonment, after agreeing to supply 
evidence about other managers, Richard Causey, the company’s chief accounting officer 
was sent to prison for 5 and half years. Worldcom executives convicted include Ebbers, the 
company’s Chief Executive Officer that received life imprisonment, Scott Sullivan who 
was the company’s Chief Financial Officer who received 5 years, Myers, the company’s 
financial controller received a year, and others like Yates, Vinson and Norman received 
minor sentences. Other executives that have been convicted in recent times include John 
Rigas (15 years) of Adelphia communications, his son Timothy (20 years), and Michael 
(10 months)
28. In Rite Aid, Bergonzi (the CFO), Grass (CEO), and others were convicted. 
Computer associates Chief Executive Sanjay Kumar was convicted to 12 years and Tyco’s 
Chief Executive Kozlowski’s and Mark Swartz received long sentences also (see table 5).  
                                                 
27 Information in this section has been collected from reading through the SEC website including information 
on the accounting and auditing enforcement releases over many years. I also had the chance to attend a 
presentation by Ray Ball at Edinburgh University where several aspects relating to these criminal and other 
penalties were discussed. 
28 In 2006 The Riga’s family, which founded the now bankrupt Adelphia Communication through a 
settlement with the U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York and the SEC decided to 
forfeit 95 percent of its assets totalling more than $1.5 billion. Those assets including cable systems that were 
valued at $700 million to $900 million and bonds valued at around $567 million.  
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2.7.3: Market Penalties. 
Investor’s forecasts earnings for companies and these earnings are customarily utilised to 
value companies. When the reported earnings do exceed the forecast, the firm’s stock price 
normally increases, though it might be at a slower rate. When earnings are lower than the 
forecast, the stock prices may drop. Though this encourages earnings management, the 
stock  market  sometimes  discounts  the  effect  of  a  firm’s  earnings  management  on  the 
reported earnings and thus undervalues companies. Banks
29 involved in aiding the various 
firms in their deceptive practices were faced with lawsuits and settlements that tarnished 
their credibility. Table 3 below presents the type of shareholder wealth looses that often 
follows high accounting fraud.    
 
 
Table 3: Scary Numbers: Destruction of Shareholder Wealth. 
Company  Estimated Amount ($ US) 
Enron   $60,000,000,000. 
Cisco  $450,000,000,000. 
WorldCom   $175,000,000,000. 
Source: http://www.sox online.com/shocking.html as retrieved on 28 Apr 2008 18:24:10 GMT. 
 
2.7.4: Reputational Penalties. 
Trust and integrity are essential for the functioning of most capitalist markets and without 
trust;  most  markets  would  be  unable  to  exist  as  they  do  (Glassman,  2003).  Corporate 
scandals such as Enron and WorldCom habitually plunge the profile of previously high 
profile executives. This normally leads to a loss of reputation, prestige, peer respect and 
friends. This is because most businesses are conducted primarily on a personal level and 
companies don’t like to do business with executives whose words cannot be trusted. There 
are also implicit penalties in the managerial labour market for insider trading and earnings 
management offences. Firms that are subject to the SEC enforcement actions or have had 
their earnings restated often have a high managerial turnover and such managers often 
found  it  difficult  to  acquire  a  new  job  (Desai  et  al.,  2004).  So  the  failing  is  not  the 
manipulation so much as getting caught in the process of doing it.  
                                                 
29 Citigroup was sued for $2 billion, J.P Morgan Chase for $2.2 billion, Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce for $2.4 billions, and so on.  
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2.7.5: Personal Penalties. 
Physical and mental stress that often follows indictments and convictions for corporate 
fraud is enormous
30. This sometimes affects the family and other close relatives. Also, 
there is always a loss of one’s liberty when there is a conviction for corporate fraud. Some 
top  executives  of  firms  under  investigation  sometimes  end  up  committing  suicide  (for 
example Cliff Baxter at Enron) for several reasons that might range from their inability to 
cope with stress and looses generated from the investigations. Robert Lay was convicted 
and his conviction was annulled as a result of his death.  
                                                 
30 This often leads to suicide. Clifford Baxter, a former senior executive of the bankrupt US energy giant 
Enron, committed suicide apparently because of stress generated from the severe looses and public interest in 
the case.  
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Table 4: Summary of Recent US Earnings Management Scandals. 
Company name  Time period  
Adelphia communications corporation  1999 2001 
Bausch and Lomb inc.  1997 2000 
Bristol Myers Squibb  1999 2001 
Cendant   1997 1998 
CMS Energy  2000 2001 
Computer Associates  1999 2000 
Conseco Inc,  1999 2000 
Dynergy Inc.  2001 2002 
Enron Corporation  1997 2001 
HealthSouth Corporation  1999 2002 
K Mart corporation  2001 
Merck & Co.  2002 
Microstrategy Inc.  1998 2000 
Qwest Communications  2000 2001 
Rite Aid Corporation  1998 2000 
Sunbeam Corporation  1997 1998 
Symbol technologies  1998 2002 
Texlon Corporation  1999 
Tyco international  1997 2002 
Waste Management Inc.  1992 1997 
Worldcom Inc  1999 2002 
Xerox Corporation  1997 2001 
 
Source: Compiled by author. The list is not exhaustive as it was developed on a random search on the SEC 
website. It includes only firms alleged to have committed accounting fraud by the Accounting Auditing and 
Enforcement Releases (AAER’s). 
 
The following companies have so far been charged with financial impropriety: Adelphia, 
Arthur  Andersen,  Critical  Path,  CSFB,  Enron,  HealthSouth,  Homestore.com,  ImClone 
Systems, Kmart, Martha Stewart Living, Merrill Lynch, Qwest, Salomon Smith Barney,  
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Tyco, U.S. Technologies, WorldCom. The following companies are under investigation as 
at 22 March 2009 Arthur Andersen, Enron, Global Crossing and Kmart. The following 
cases have been settled Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, Gemstar/TV Guide, Merrill 
Lynch, Piper Jaffray and Xerox. 
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Table 5: Sarbanes-Oxley Hall of Shame: Executives Charged. 
Executive(s) Charged   Company name 
Philip Anschutz  Qwest (Founder) 
Joseph Nacchio  Qwest (former CEO 
Jonathan Beck  AA (former RVP) 
Kevin Clark  AA (former RVP) 
Timothy Ganley  AA (former VP) 
David Thatcher  AA (former CFO) 
David Duncan  Arthur  Andersen  (former  Sr.  Audit 
Partner). 
Timothy Belden  Enron 
Andrew Fastow  Enron (former CFO) 
Lea Fastow  Enron (former Asst. Treasurer) 
Kevin Howard  Enron Broadband Services (former CEO) 
Kenneth Lay  Enron (former Chairman/CEO) 
Jeffrey Skilling  Enron (former CEO) 
Franklin C. Brown  Rite Aid (former general counsel and vice 
chairman) 
Irvin Brown  Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Jacob Fekete  Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Aaron Jacobowitz  Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Herman Jacobowitz  Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Jacob Jacobowitz  Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Victor Jacobowitz  Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
Sholem Klein  Allou Healthcare, Inc 
Nachman Lichter  Allou Healthcare, Inc. 
James Brown  Adelphia  Communications  (former  VP 
Finance) 
John Rigas  Adelphia  Communications  (founder  and 
former CEO) 
Michael Rigas  Adelphia Communications (former EVP)  
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Continued from above: Executive(s) Charged   Company name 
Tim Rigas    Adelphia Communications (former CFO) 
Bernard Ebbers  WorldCom (former CEO) 
Scott Sullivan  Worldcom (former CFO) 
Stephen Garofalo  Metromedia Fiber Networks (chairman) 
Clark McLeod  McLeod USA (former CEO) 
Dennis Kozlowski  Tyco (former CEO) 
Frank Quattrone  Credit  Suisse  First  Boston  (former 
technology investment banker) 
Richard Scrushy  HealthSouth (former CEO) 
Martha Stewart  Martha  Stewart  Living  Omnimedia 
(founder and former CEO) 
A. Alfred Taubman  Sotheby's (former Chairman) 
Sam Waksal  ImClone Systems (former CEO) 
7 former senior executives  Symbol Technologies 
27 directors and officers  Royal Dutch / Shell Group 
Source: Constructed by author from data from  
http://www.sox online.com/hall_of_shame.htm 
 
2.9: Regulation of Earnings Management. 
Earnings management is customarily regulated at the national level. In the United States, 
the Security and Exchange Commission has been regulating earnings management through 
its securities laws that seek to influence the integrity of its capital markets. Specifically, the 
provisions of Section 13(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are focused on 
earnings management practices. It requires that firms whose securities are registered with 
the Security and Exchange Commission to file quarterly (form 10Q) and annual financial 
statements (forms 10K) in conformity with US GAAP. Changes in accounting standards 
and  their  regulations  are  usually  intended  to  mitigate  earnings  management,  provide 
information  for  stakeholders,  and  improve  decision making  for  different  stakeholders 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The objective of this section is to explain issues relating to the 
sources  and  consequences  of  security  market  regulations.  Specifically,  the  researcher 
presents the different theories that have motivated security market regulations.   
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In its effort to regulate earnings management, the authorities have been concerned about 
the  different  issues  that  motivate  earnings  management.  These  include  auditor 
independence,  open  market  insider  trading,  executive  bonus  schemes  and  stock  based 
compensation, etc. In the literatures; such regulations have been found to improve earnings 
quality. In an effort to defend the need for earnings management regulations, Lang et al. 
(2007)  argued  that  firms  from  countries  with  weaker  investor  protection  show  more 
evidence  of  earnings  management  than  US  firms  who  have  strong  securities  market 
regulations. In 1999, the SEC chairman Arthur Levitt spoke publicly against widespread 
earnings management and its impact on the integrity of the US financial market. This was 
followed  by  many  high  profile  corporate  scandals  and  regulatory  changes  to  improve 
financial reporting. After a series of consultative meetings and broader discourse, the SOX 
were enacted in July 2002. 
 
2.9.1: The Influence of Public Policy on Financial Markets and The Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002. 
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (officially titled the Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act) was enacted in July 2002 by the US Congress to restore 
investor’s confidence after a series of corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. 
These  scandals  impaired  the  trust  and  confidence  of  stakeholders  in  accounting 
information. The Act brought CEO’S, CFO’s and auditors under intense scrutiny.  The Act 
was named after its main architect’s Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative Michael 
Oxley. The Act applies to certain US and foreign companies that are registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. After the scandals, one of the key concerns of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and other institutional regulators was to implement 
reforms that were designed to produce more reliable financial reports. It was designed to 
reduce  fraud  and  conflicts  of  interests,  while  increasing  financial  transparency  and 
improving  confidence  and  trust  in  financial  markets.  The  Act  related  to  a  number  of 
diverse  issues  ranging  from  wide  corporate  governance  responsibilities  by  public 
institutions to enhanced criminal and civil penalties for the violation of securities laws. It 
included the threat of fines and imprisonment for senior executives from organisations that 
do not comply with specific provisions.  
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2.9.1.1: SOX Regulations Relating to Insider Trading. 
Section 403 of the SOX of 2002 provided two important changes that require earlier public 
notification  of  Insiders'  transactions  in  their  company's  securities  and  the  wider  public 
availability of information relating to those transactions.  
The two main new provisions are: 
a  the first relates to the requirement that all trades must be reported within two business 
days following the date the transactions were executed.  
b  Section 403 (a) of the SOX of 2002 requires that Insider’s file electronically all their 
transactions  and  provide  online  accessibility  of  such  reports.  To  facilitate  the 
implementation of this requirement, the Commission created a new on line filing system 
for these forms and insiders were required to report their trades on SEC forms 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Section  306  of  SOX  prohibits  any  director  or  executive  officer  of  a  company  from 
purchasing  or  selling  any  equity  security  during  a  pension  plan  blackout  period.  This 
prevents plan participants and beneficiaries from engaging in transactions involving those 
securities for the specific period when their access price sensitive information offers them 
an informational advantage. 
   
2.9.1.2:  SOX  Requirements  Relating  to  the  Containment  of  Earnings 
Management Practices. 
SOX Section 201 focuses on the services outside the scope of practice of auditors. 
Activities prohibited include amendments made to Section 10A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 on the following issues:  
1: Prohibited Activities: except with pre approval, it shall be unlawful for a registered 
public accounting firm to provide an audit client with any non audit service, including: 
(a) Bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial statements 
of the audit client; 
(b) Financial information systems design and implementation; 
(c) Appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution in kind reports; 
(d) Actuarial services; 
(e) Internal audit outsourcing services; 
(f) Management functions or human resources;  
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(g) Broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; 
(h) Legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and 
(i) Any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible. 
2:  Pre approval  for  Non Audit  Services   A  registered  public  accounting  firm  may  not 
engage in any non audit service, including tax services, that is specified as a prohibited 
activity above for an audit client, unless the activity is approved in advance by the audit 
committee of the issuer firm. 
 
SOX Section 302 focuses on corporate responsibility for financial reports. 
The section requires that, for each company filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As in Section 302, the Chief Executive 
Officer(s) and the Principal Financial Officer(s), or persons performing similar functions 
need to certify in each quarterly, or annual, report filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) that: 
1 they have reviewed the reports.   
2 the report does not contain any untrue statements of material facts, omissions, etc, under 
which such financial statements can be considered misleading. 
3  the financial statements fairly present the financial condition and results of operations 
for the reported periods, financial reports do not contain material misrepresentations and 
are fairly represented the CEO and CFO are responsible for internal control problems, the 
CEO and CFO must report any deficiencies in internal accounting controls, or any fraud 
involving the management of the Audit Committee; and finally, they must indicate any 
material changes in internal accounting controls. 
 
SOX Section 401 focuses on the disclosures in periodic reports. Section 401(a) of the SOX 
requires that each annual and quarterly financial report filed with the Commission should 
disclose all material off balance sheet transactions, arrangements and obligations. Section 
401(b)  of  the  SOX  relates  to  Non GAAP  Financial  Measures.  It  requires  that  public 
disclosures of any non GAAP financial measure by a public company (that are customarily 
referred to as "pro forma financial information") must be presented in a manner that: 
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A Does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the non GAAP financial measure, in light of the circumstances 
under which it is presented, not misleading; and 
B   Reconciles  the  Non GAAP  financial  measure  with  Generally  Accepted  Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). 
 
SOX  Section  404  focuses  on  the  management’s  assessments  of  internal  control  over 
financial reporting. The section requires that annual reports of public companies to file an 
annual internal control report as part of their annual report. It holds management directly 
responsible for internal control structures and must report any problems with this structure 
as quickly as possible. 
Section 409 of the SOX Authorises a "Real Time" Disclosure System. The Section obliges 
companies  to  disclose  “on  a  rapid  and  current  basis”  information  concerning  material 
changes in its financial condition or operations.  
 
SOX 902 focus on frauds and Conspiracies to Commit Fraud Offences. The sections affirm 
that it is a crime for any person to alter, destroy or conceal any document that might hinder 
fraud investigations or other official proceedings.  
 
2.10:  What Are  the  Government’s  Objectives  for  Creating  Security  Market 
Regulations? 
The accounting and finance research can be classified into several categories as discussed 
in prior literature (See Jonsson, 1998 for an overview). In this research, accounting and 
finance is viewed as a tool for measurement and/or the regulation of social and security 
markets regulations. In viewing accounting as a measurement tool, its goal is to convey 
information about constructs that are exogenous to the accounting system (Marton, 1998). 
Example of these constructs include when accounting is used to value companies through 
their  stock market  performance  in  a  particular  point  in  time (Jonsson,  (1998),  Beaver, 
(1989) p.104).  
  
71   
In the second dimension where accounting is viewed as an instrument for regulation of 
social relations
31 and the overall financial markets, it becomes a tool for the regulators to 
control  the  behaviour  of  different  stakeholders  of  accounting  information.  This  is 
seemingly  the  case  when  some  stakeholders  can  abuse  the  production  and  use  of 
accounting  information.  This  dissertation  assumes  accounting  can  be  used  both  as  a 
measurement tool and for social relations. The behavioural pattern of senders and receivers 
of accounting information is studied. An overview of the various choices in influencing 
earnings information made by producers of accounting information is carried out, followed 
by its impact on external users and other stakeholders.  
 
Like  prior  security  market  regulations,  the  SOX  of  2002  was  conceived  amidst  stock 
market failures that influenced the need for an evaluation of responsive regulatory policies 
(Romano, 2005). Most sections of the SOX can be traced from the 1934 Security and 
Exchange Act that was enacted after the 1929 stock market crash. This Act and its future 
amendments has been the basis of market regulation in the US. In the US, insider trading 
and earnings management are regulated by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Besides government restrictions, a large number of US firms do impose significant control 
mechanism to mitigate insider trading and earnings management practices. Institutions and 
managers with the duty to regulate public policy have been concerned about market abuse 
and  ways  in  which  this  can  be  controlled.  According  to  lecture  notes  acquired  from 
Professor  William  Forbes  (2008),  several  decades  ago,  William  George  Bryan  in  his 
infamous  “Cross  of  Gold”  speech  to  the  Democratic  convention  in  Chicago  in  1896 
condemning the proposed return to the gold standard stated: 
 
“On the one side stand the….moneyed interests, aggregated wealth and capital, imperious 
arrogant, compassionless. On the other side stand an unnumbered throng.”        
 
This theme was picked up by President Woodrow Wilson during the industrial conflicts of 
the 1920 where he stated that: 
 
“The great monopoly of this country is the money monopoly”   
                                                 
31 Prior research has investigated this in relation to the politicisation of accounting. In these studies, the 
primary interest has been to investigate the extent to which politics influence accounting practices. Most of 
these studies (e.g. Ball et al. 2000) classified countries according to their legal systems (whether code law 
with  high  political  influence  or  common  law  where  accounting  is  determined  by  the  private  sector)  to 
ascertain if the political system influences accounting practices.  
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  An early expression of alarm regarding the threat to the democratic process from 
monopoly  finance  was  the  Pujo  Committee  of  the  US  Senate  meeting  in  1912.  Here 
Ferdinand Pujo Counsel to the Senate Banking Committee concluded 
 
“The  terrific  concentration  of  power  in  banker’s  hands  from  many  sources  was 
threatening…. The bankers were neither just a national asset nor [just] a national danger 
– they were both.”    
 
Arthur  Levitt  (1998,  p1),  then  Chairman  of  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission 
stated in his famous “Numbers Game” speech that: 
 
   “Trading  based  on  privileged  access  to  information  can  demoralize 
investors and destabilize investment. It has utterly no place in any fair minded, law 
abiding economy. It’s a chronic danger. It’s all too evident in today’s marketplace. 
And it’s a crime. The American people see it, bluntly, as a form of cheating. They  – 
along with the SEC    have zero tolerance for the crime of insider trading. Let’s 
state clearly, and in the unambiguous terms it deserves. Insider dealing is legally 
forbidden. It’s morally wrong. And it’s economically dangerous”    
   
The current Head of Enforcement at the UK’s Financial Services Authority, as if not to be 
outdone, stated this in a speech to the American Bar Association in October 2007
32 
 
  “We do see market abuse –of which insider dealing is the highest profile aspect – 
as posing a risk to our statutory objectives. It is a financial crime – it may not attract the 
immediate moral outrage of a violent crime against a person, but it is, in our view, and in 
the view of the UK government a serious white collar crime with potential sentences of up 
to seven years imprisonment.” 
 
(http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/1004_mc.shtml) 
 
   
Institutions have been concerned about the degree of conflict of interest in the management 
of public corporations. Several individuals and institutional investors usually acquire price 
sensitive information that is not available to other investors. They normally trade on this 
information, thereby making profits at the expense of those without this information. In a 
                                                 
32 This quotation is taken from Bris (2005, p 268) and is from a speech given by Levitt in Washington on 27
th 
of February 1998 when the bull run in the US economy was in full swing.  
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bid to constrain the conflict of interest, significant amendments are usually being made to 
responsive new regulations. A case in point is the recent prescription of Section 16(a) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act, that requires a timely disclosure of all trades via an SEC 
Form 4, currently made available on the SEC’s Edgar public filings database.   
 
As  discussed  in  Roe,  (1994,  p  112),  at  the  inception  of  securities  regulation  and  the 
regulatory authority in the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission and its 
founding Chairman William O. Douglas crystallized the hawkish view of interventionist 
financial capital.  
Douglas argued that: 
 
“When Finance moves into the zone of exploitation whenever it becomes the master 
rather  than  the  loyal  servant  of  investors  and  business.    To  make  finance  the 
servant  rather  than  the  master  becomes  the  central  plank  of  any  public  policy 
reform.”  
 
He further argued that: 
 
           “People  who  dominate  financial  markets  have  tremendous  power.  Such  people    
become virtual governments in the power at their disposal. Sometimes it is the duty 
of government to police them, at times to break them up, to deter further growth.”      
 
Investors and other stakeholders are generally sensitive to stock price movements. The 
stock market forecast earnings for companies and these earnings are customarily utilized to 
value companies. When the reported earnings do exceed the forecast, the firms stock price 
increases. When the said earnings are lower than the forecast, the stock prices might drop. 
This encourages earnings management.  
 
Accounting  regulations  are  usually  intended  to  mitigate  earnings  management,  provide 
information  for  stakeholders,  and  improve  decision making  for  different  stakeholders 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). This has been supported by Lang et al. (2007), who argued that 
firms  from  countries  with  weaker  investor  protection  show  more  evidence  of  earnings 
management than US firms who have strong securities market regulations. In 1999, the 
SEC chairman Arthur Levitt spoke publicly against widespread earnings management and 
its impact on the integrity of the US financial market. Trust and integrity are essential for 
the functioning of most capitalist markets and without trust; most markets would be unable  
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to exist as they do (Glassman, 2003). Corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom 
habitually plunge the profile of previously high profile executives. 
 
2.10.1: What Gave Rise to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002? 
The origin of the SOX can be traced from the high profile scandals in the US involving 
many  public  corporations  like  Enron,  WorldCom,  Global  Crossing,  and  so  on.  These 
scandals  brought  enormous  wealth  loss  to  the  public  leading  to  a  lack  of  trust  and 
confidence  in  the  US  regulatory  and  financial  system.  Those  who  recommended  or 
completely embraced the swift enactment of the SOX were appeared to be swayed by the 
fact  that  neither  the  contracting  devices  that  were  supposed  to  control  managers,  nor 
efficient securities markets, worked to prevent or spot the problem before the failures of 
those  corporations  (Ribstein,  2002).  However,  before  this  act,  regulators  have  been 
concerned about the level of investor protection. Several of them were of the opinion that 
US investors and firms need to be assured that there are strong security market regulations. 
In 1999 for example, the SEC chairman Arthur Levitt spoke publicly against widespread 
insider  trading  and  earnings  management  practices  and  their  impact  on  the  trust  and 
integrity of the US financial system.  
 
One major concern that follows for the SEC was how to implement reforms that could 
effectively  produce  more  reliable  financial  reports.  After  the  failures  of  these  major 
corporations, the overriding concern was to look for ways of reducing fraud and conflicts 
of interests, thereby increasing financial transparency and improving the confidence and 
trusts  of  investors  in  financial  markets.  This  led  to  the  enactment  of  the  SOX.  All 
companies trading in the US, including their subsidiaries and private companies initiating 
initial public offerings were required to comply with its provisions. 
  
2.10.2: How Are the Regulation (SOX) Going to Affect Insider Trading and 
Earnings Management?  
Research on insider trading’s relationship to earnings management and firm performance 
has been enormous in volume. Additionally, the recent corporate scandals have spurred 
regulators to re examine the strength and implications of recent regulations. Prior policy 
discussions have sought to defend the suitability of financial market regulation (Fishman 
and Haggerty, 1992). This has led to the strengthening of regulations for insider trading  
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and earnings management as prescribed by the SOX of 2002 (See Section 2.9.1 for the new 
SOX regulations). 
 
One major line of argument that has not been discussed in different empirical findings is 
the  impact  of  the  disciplining  effects  on  the  insider  trading  and  earnings  management 
relationship. This has originated from the impact and influence of the threat of litigation as 
a result of potential wealth losses by those not privy to certain information that insiders 
might  be  entitled  to.    These  suggest  that  the  public/management  choice  for  stricter 
regulation is becoming increasingly a focus to regulators and all other stakeholders. In the 
“pump and dump” hypothesis, Bolton et al. (2002) provided evidence to suggest that the 
disciplining effects are not effective as managers are able to inflate stock prices through 
earnings management before selling shares. The “pump and dump” hypothesis is similar to 
the  findings  of  Beneish  (1999),  who,  in  his  study  of  64  cases  of  fraudulent  financial 
reporting,  reports  a  mechanism  where  managers  overstate  earnings  before  engaging  in 
massive insider selling. In another study by Park and Park (2004), the empirical evidence 
supported the assertion that insiders increase current discretionary accruals for firms whose 
managers sell their ownership stake out in the subsequent period than for other firms, 
indicating  that  managers  who  sell  out  deliberately  increased  current period  earnings 
through the use of positive discretionary accrual techniques. Furthermore, insiders buying 
(selling)  are  thought  of  as  frequently  following  stock  price  increases  (decreases)  (See 
Seyhun, 1987; Rozeff and Zaman 1988; Ke et al., 2003). These arguments suggest that the 
theory of financial services regulation has not been effective over the past periods. 
 
In contrast, Beneish et al. (2004) provided evidence that is contrary to this hypothesis in 
their  litigation  avoidance  hypothesis.  Prior  to  this,  Beneish  and  Vargus  (2002)  have 
provided evidence that managers engage in insider selling, before managing their shares 
upwards. Their findings indicate that trading by corporate insiders provides incentives to 
subsequently manage earnings to distance their trades from subsequent revelation of bad 
news, thereby reducing the potential likelihood for litigation and reputation concerns. The 
litigation  avoidance  hypothesis  has been  supported  by  a recent  study by  Piotroski  and 
Roulstone (2008), who argued that due to legal risks, insiders avoid trading on extreme 
earnings changes. The authors argue that it is more difficult to sell before bad news than to 
buy before good news, and insiders would be particularly reluctant to keep selling their  
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shares and exercising stock options if future earnings news contains exceptionally negative 
information. 
 
The  impact  of  regulation  has  also  been  discussed  from  the  information  hierarchy 
hypothesis.  According  to  Seyhun  (1986)  and  Lin  and  Howe  (1990),  the  information 
content of a director’s trade does depend on the type of director that executed the trade. 
Specifically, Seyhun (1986) documented that the average abnormal returns for trades by 
officers are significantly higher than those of other non executive directors, while Lin and 
Howe (1990) documented that trades of Directors, Chairmen and other company officers 
contain more information than those of institutional shareholders that are not involved in 
the day to day management of the firm. Other researchers have not found evidence to 
support  the  information  hierarchy  hypothesis  and  even  argue  that  insiders  cannot 
exclusively benefit from any informational advantage, except if they are subject to less 
scrutiny. They argue that, the Chief Executive might have better information than other 
insiders, but because he or she is heavily scrutinized by regulators and market participants, 
they may be more reluctant to trade on any information that might be price sensitive (Jeng 
et al., 1999, P 32).  
 
These theories suggests that strict regulatory regimes might influence the way insiders 
trade and employ discretionary accounting techniques to disguise information motivated 
trading. Quite recently, Graham et al. (2005) provided evidence that managers still manage 
earnings to influence future stock prices, and investors do extrapolate past trends from 
accounting  information  and  make  decisions  on  the  future.  However,  they  employ  real 
earnings management techniques as well as accruals management techniques to manage 
earnings. The effects of these two techniques upon earnings are discounted differently by 
investors in their valuation of companies (Chan et al., 2006). These suggest that regulators 
have  to  be  concerned  about  the  relationship  between  these  two  techniques  on  insider 
trading and future firm performance. In a recent study, Beneish, et al. (2001) stated that 
there is a negative relationship between capital expenditures and future stock returns for 
their sample of “extreme winners and loser” portfolio’s.  
 
The impact of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX) has been discussed in the literature.  
In a recent article by Cohen et al. (2007), the researchers found evidence suggesting that  
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firms switched from accrual based to real earnings management methods after the passage 
of SOX. Specifically, they documented that there has been a steady increase of accrual 
based earnings management from 1987 until the passage of SOX; this was followed by a 
significant decline after the passage of SOX. On the other hand, the level of real earnings 
management  declined  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  SOX  of  2002  and  increased 
significantly after the passage of the Act. In the light of the recent regulatory intervention 
as prescribed by SOX, managers might be willing to trade off the benefits of inflated stock 
prices  (through  accruals  and  real  earnings  management  techniques)  with  the  costs  of 
earnings management. Nonetheless, they might decide to employ techniques that are less 
susceptible to  regulatory detection.  This  might  involve trading  off  the  more  detectable 
accruals earnings management for real earning management. As suggested by Beneish and 
Nichols,  (2007)  the  high  costs  associated  with  fraudulent  financial  reporting,  makes  it 
necessary for investors to effectively exploit all information useful in assessing fraud, due 
to its influence on accounting earnings and subsequent stock returns. The recent thrust of 
US  earnings  management  regulations  has  been  to  encourage  companies  to  constantly 
provide relevant and timely informative disclosures. This has been supported by the recent 
SOX regulations, that 1) limits the timeframe which insiders have to disclose their trades to 
the public (see Section 403 of the SOX) and 2) provides for a more comprehensive and 
timely disclosure of annual report information (See Section 409 of the SOX). Despite the 
strict regulatory regimes to suppress earnings management, some investors are capable of 
unravelling manipulated financial statements and making investment decisions on the basis 
of  these  documents.  As  in  Shivakumar  (2000)  investors  are  not  misled  by  earnings 
manipulation. This is in contrast to Rangan (1998) who claimed that managers succeeded 
in  fooling  investors  due  to  their  inability  to  effectively  discount  manipulated  earnings 
reports. Managers too have the ability to switch techniques as a result of difficulties in 
managing earnings through discretionary accruals alone. It is therefore important to verify 
whether the stock market responds differently to the financial information of companies 
that have or have not managed earnings through either method.  
 
The evidence above does not suggest that insider trading and earnings management can be 
completely suppressed from the regulatory intervention. This is because prior disciplining 
effects  have  never  completely  achieved  their  desired  objectives.  While  they  can  be 
suppressed, they cannot be completely eliminated. This study therefore looks at the impact  
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of the current regulatory intervention (SOX of 2002). The study wishes to investigate if 
SOX  regulations  have  really  brought  any  substantial  benefits  to  the  US  stock  market, 
especially major corporations in the S & P 500 Index of companies?  
   
2.10.3: What has Changed After the Sarbanes Oxley Act? 
Firstly, the act has imposed significant financial and other penalties on those who violate 
security laws. Insider trading bans has also been imposed during pension fund blackouts. 
Furthermore, Insiders are also required to return to their corporation any capital gains made 
from the purchase or sale of their company’s stock if both transactions occur within a six 
month period (habitually termed short swings profits). The speed of reporting has also 
changed and this is likely to have major implications on the ability of insiders to earn 
abnormal returns at the expense of outside investors. Before the recommendation from the 
recent SOX legislation, the SEC granted until the 10th day of the month following the 
month in which the trade has been executed for insiders to report their transactions. This 
suggests that they had effectively up to 40 days to report their trades after the earnings 
announcement. After the Act, insiders were required to electronically report their trades 
after its execution within two business days.  
 
2.11: Conclusion. 
This chapter provides a summary of the written accumulation of knowledge on the areas of 
insider trading and earnings management. It is important to note that this section broadly 
discusses the literatures that are general to the overall thesis. A more subtle discussion of 
the literature that is specifically focused to the two independent essays is discussed in 
chapter 4 and 5. 
 
 The section has been organised as follows: section 2.2 has discussed the literature on 
insider trading; section 2.3 has discussed earnings management. This has been followed by 
a section on the classifications and motivations for earnings management. A final section 
discusses the penalties for earnings management, the regulation of earnings management 
and finally reasons for the enactment of SOX are addressed. Splitting the existing theories 
in this way assist in modelling the actual relationship between insider trading on the one 
hand and earnings management and firm performance on the other hand in light of the 
recent intervention as prescribed by SOX of 2002.   
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The chapter does show that in the theory on insider trading and earnings management, the 
findings so far has been inconclusive. Moreover, despite the literatures and the financial 
press being replete with articles on financial market regulation, no study has investigated 
the influence of financial market regulation on insider trading and earnings management. 
After splitting the theories, this thesis wishes to investigate how the SOX of 2002 has 
influenced the relationship between insider trading and earnings management on the one 
hand and earnings management and firm performance on the other hand. These issues are 
addressed in chapter 4 and 5 which are the main empirical essays.   
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3.0: Research Design. 
This section of my research looks at the general sources of data employed in the thesis and 
also presents the details of the samples used. Some basic descriptions and explanations 
necessary to understand the nature of the data common to both empirical essays are given. 
 
3.1: Introduction. 
The original sample is drawn from companies in the S&P 500 in March 2007 and includes 
the period 1997 2006
33. All of the firm’s in the S&P 500 index are large publicly held 
companies and their stocks trade on the New York Stock Exchange. The S&P 500 is the 
most widely watched index of large cap US stocks. These firms and their subsidiaries are 
obliged  to  comply  with  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  of  2002.  However,  there  have  been 
different data requirements to construct the sample for the two main essays of the research.  
 
The data that have been used for this research are: 
•  Insider trading data 
•  Accounting line items data, including various accruals information and total assets 
from the balance sheet, etc.  
•  Earnings per share (both forecasts and actual). 
•  Share Prices. 
 
Most of the required data are made available to the public as part of institutional and 
individual company’s corporate governance policies. 
 
3.1.1: Sample Construction. 
The empirical investigation for testing the relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management uses two separate samples. This has been developed in relation to the constructs 
in the hypothesis and the issues to be tested in the two essays. The first essay investigates 
insider trading relationship to earnings management in the light of the recent regulatory 
intervention  as  prescribed  by  the  SOX  legislation.  The  second  essay  investigates  the 
relationship between earnings quality and firm performance in light of the recent regulatory 
                                                 
33 Though the actual estimation period is 1997 2006, data has been collected from 1996 to be able to estimate 
changes for different items and until 2007 to be able to estimate one year ahead stock returns for the final 
sample year.  
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intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Though the different empirical essays 
of the thesis approach the issues from different constructs, both parts use the S&P 500 firms 
with a common underlying set of accounting, stock price and insider trading data as required. 
The original sample is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 for the period 1997 2006. This 
makes 10 consecutive years, giving a total of 5000 firm years. As discussed below, the 
metric employed to test similar issues like earnings surprises, discretionary accruals and net 
shares traded are the same for the two tests. However, the basic test has been conducted 
differently. Recall that, the first section of the thesis looks at the relationship between insider 
trading and earnings management post Sarbanes Oxley. Nonetheless, the two samples use 
different constructs to either include or eliminate a firm in a specific year as discussed in the 
empirical sections. There is an induced survivorship biased discussed in detail in section 
6.4.5 as part of the limitation of the study. The two empirical essays employ an unbalanced 
panel and have different final sample sizes specified in the different test. 
 
3.1.2: Data Sources. 
Insider trading data: This data has been collected from the National Archives of Electronic 
Records and from the Edgar filings compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). The file summarises insider trading transactions in all publicly held firms and is a 
summary of the ORS (ownership reporting system file) form 3, 4 and 5 compiled by the 
SEC. Both databases report details of the insider transactions including: 
·  Insider’s names. 
·  Title of the insider. 
·  The type of transaction (whether acquisition or dispositions). 
·  The specific transaction and reported dates. 
·  The amount of shares traded. 
·  The market values of these shares. 
·  The insider’s holdings. 
It  is  important  to  recognise  that  SEC  forms  3,  4  and  5  summarise  the  original  insider 
transactions. Accounting Data: this data have been collected from DATASTREAM, which 
has been made available by the University of Glasgow. Earnings Per Share: Forecasts and 
actual earnings per share data have been collected from the IBES.  
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3.2: Description of the Various Databases. 
This section describes the various databases that have been used to collect the data.  
  
 
3.2.1: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) was created in 1934. Before this 
period, individual government agencies were in charge of maintaining their own records and 
the records were not available in all circumstances for public consumption. Some took great 
care of the materials, but many did not. The online database carries insider trading data. 
These data can be assessed from the securities database of the Access to Archival Databases 
(AAD). Specifically, it contains data on two categories of private sector securities: Records 
About  the  Proposed  Sale  of  Unregistered  Securities  by  Individuals,  created,  1/4/1972    
9/29/2000,  documenting  the  period  1/4/1972     9/29/2000  containing  about  809,220  and 
Records on Trading of Securities by Corporate Insiders, created, 7/11/1978   3/12/2001, 
documenting the period 7/11/1978   3/12/2001 containing about 5,502,888. Details relating 
to this database can be assessed publicly at http://www.archives.gov/.  
 
3.2.2: Edgar. 
EDGAR, the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system, performs automated 
collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by companies 
and others for companies that are required by law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange  Commission  (SEC).  The  filings  by  companies  can  be  searched  through  the 
database and it allows you to retrieve real time filings for a specific company and to find key 
company information, including the company’s name, address, telephone number, state of 
incorporation, Central Index Key (CIK) number, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code, and fiscal year end. You simply need to type in the name of the company or its CIK 
number. A CIK is the unique number that the SEC's computer system assigns to individuals 
and corporations who file disclosure documents with the SEC. You do not need to know the 
number  to  be  able  to  conduct  your  search  but  searching  by  that  number  narrows  your 
search
34. I have used this database to collect most of the insider trading data. It is SEC forms 
3, 4 and 5 that contains insider trading data. It gives you a summary of the data for the 
companies, individuals and time period selected. Insider trading collected from the Edgar 
                                                 
34 This information has been summarised from the details of the SEC website that can be assessed at 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/quickedgar.htm and from other pages of the SEC website that describes the Edgar 
Database at www.sec.gov  
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database and from the national archives for electronic records has been used in chapter four 
as motivations for earnings management.  
 
 
3.2.3: Datastream. 
Thomson  DataStream
35  is  an  online  software  system  that  provides  data  for  over  175 
countries and 60 markets worldwide. It is an encyclopaedic database that covers over 25 
million time series and 400,000 global companies. The coverage varies over time depending 
on the series. Most market data has been made available on a daily basis and most economic 
data has been available monthly or quarterly. Most of the data available are historical and 
some of the data has been made available over a period of close to three decades. To use 
DataStream, the software is normally loaded on most University’s accounting researcher’s 
offices,  workstations  and  libraries,  or  in  the  computers  in  the  accounting  and  finance 
departmental libraries for use by its students.  
 
3.3: Measurement of Variables. 
This  section  explains  how  the  various  variables  employed  in  the  research  have  been 
measured, including the caveats employed and their technical advantages. This has been 
used in the main empirical chapters (4 and 5). The net insider trading estimates have been 
used to evaluate if insiders are net buyers (sellers) of their corporations stock in chapter 4. 
Estimates of real, discretionary and Beneish M Score have been used in chapter 4 to proxy 
for earnings management and for other robustness test. In chapter 5, they have been used to 
as a proxy for the quality of earnings.   
  
3.3.1: Estimation of Net Insider Trading. 
Following previous research net insider transactions (whether they are net buyers or sellers) 
are estimated in a predefined period. It is identified based on the following rules: Only 
transactions  by  the  senior  executives  of  firms  are  selected,  this  includes  the  top  five 
executives  (Chief  Executive  Officers  (CEO),  Chief  Financial  Officers  (CFO),  Chief 
Operating Officer (COO), The President and the Chairman of the board). This is because; 
                                                 
35 This information has been assessed from: 
http://www.thomson.com/content/financial/brand_overviews/Datastream_Advance  
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top level insiders possess more valuable information and earn abnormal returns from their 
trades (e.g. Seyhun (1986), (1998) Lin and Howe (1990), Beneish and Vargus, (2002).  
 
Many studies report that not all insider trades are equal in their predictive ability as some 
may  be  more  valuable  than  others  (Gelband,  2005);  thus  the  researcher  eliminated 
transactions of less than 100 shares. This is because previous research has questioned their 
predictive  abilities  (example  Penman  (1982),  (1985),  Givoly  and  Palmon,  (1985)  and 
Beneish and Vargus, (2002), Beneish et al. (2004)). Since the primary focus of this study is 
on open market transactions
36, it excludes derivatives transactions (stock bonuses, options 
exercised, transactions by trustees, etc) that are customarily not linked to the open market
37. 
Moreover, since insider sales after the exercise of options are likely to be related to the 
director’s remuneration packages and whether the options are likely to be in the money, their 
information content are likely expected to be low (Fidrmuc et al. 2006). Following Beneish 
et al. (2004), net insider trading is computed as follows for firm i in period t.  
 
NST it  =  S (S_P it  / O_S it) -  S(S_S it / O_S it )                                (3.1) 
 
Where; 
NST it  = Net shares traded for firm i in period t. 
S_P it = Shares purchased for firm i in period t. 
S_S it  = Shares sold for firm i in period t. 
O_S it = Outstanding shares for firm i in period t. 
                                                 
36 It is important to note that more than 99 percent of these trades of less than 100 were sale transactions. 
Insiders sell for many reasons – to purchase assets, to fund their children education, estate planning, etc. 
Liquidity needs might be reflected in the less than 100 shares. Open market insider trades are used because; 
they are made voluntarily by the insider and are not subject to any set of rules. They can thus be used to 
identify the investor’s sentiments. 
37 Insiders customarily exercise stock options at a significant discount to the market price of the company’s 
stock. They often exercise these options, because they expect it to expire very soon and not necessarily 
because this is a particular good time to buy their company stock. On the contrary, open market purchases 
represent a much higher risk to the insiders and are usually a bullish sign. Often, an insider buying on the 
open market is because they do not have exercisable options available, and yet they still want to buy the 
stock at that particular time due to their bullish expectation. These are some of the reasons why only open 
market transactions have been used.  Additionally, as discussed by Bergstresser and Phillipon (2004), some 
empirical research investigating the influence of executive compensation on firm performance takes 
executive exposure to the stock price as exogenous. The implications are that it does not have any direct 
influence on firm value.  
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As in Fidrmuc et al., (2006), the number of shares outstanding helps to estimate the relative 
size of each transaction. The values for the net shares traded are summed up over the firm for 
each particular day, and they are further accumulated for all days in the years 1997 2006. 
The net selling firms have been defined as firms with their net shares traded less than 0 (NST 
< 0). On the other hand, the net buying firms have been evaluated as firms with their net 
shares traded greater than 0 (NST >0). They are finally associated with fiscal years based on 
the transaction date reported at the SEC.   
 
3.3.2: Estimation of Earnings Management. 
Since  the  seminal  article  by  Healy  (1985)  earnings  management  has  been  measured  by 
discretionary  accruals.  Current  research  habitually  employs  two  methods  in  estimating 
earnings management. These are an earnings management proxy constructed by separating 
out the discretionary element in accruals, and changes in real operating items. Nonetheless, 
discretionary accruals have been suggested as capturing a larger portion of the earnings 
management (Dechow et al. 1995). The accrual benchmark definition applied in this research 
is based on the discretionary accruals model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate 
earnings management. The Dechow et al. (1995) model show that the modified Jones (1991) 
model tends to outperform other known models that have been developed to detect earnings 
manipulation.  Precedence  is  given  to  the  Dechow  et  al.  (1995)  model  which  is  a  cross 
sectional  version  of  the  Jones  (1991)  model  that  implies  that  receivable  changes  are 
discretionary  and  company  managers  are  able  to  exercise  some  discretion  over  revenue 
recognition and sales.  
 
Following prior research (Jones, 1991 and Dechow et al. 1995), the usual starting point in 
measuring  discretionary  accruals  is  the  computation  of  various  elements  of  the  total 
component of accruals. The non discretionary accrual component is then subtracted from 
total accruals to determine the discretionary accrual component. 
 
This is given as: 
 
DAP it = TA it   NDAP it                                (3.2) 
 
DAP it = Discretionary accruals proxy for firm i at period t.  
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TA it = Total accruals proxy for firm i at period t.  
NDAP it  = Non discretionary accruals proxy for firm i at period t. 
Or more simply discretionary accruals are simply the estimation error retrieved from the 
accruals benchmark model of Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) or whatever the chosen 
model is.   
 
3.3.2.1: Estimation of Total Accruals. 
Following previous studies on earnings management total accruals are computed as follows: 
 
TA it = (DCA it   DCL it   DCash it+ DSTD it   DEP it )/(A 1 - it )                      (3.3) 
 
Where: 
TA it =  Total accruals for firm i at period t. 
DCA it  = Change in current assets (Datastream datatype code wc02201) firm i at period t; 
DCL it = change in current liabilities (Datastream datatype code wc03101) firm i at period t; 
DCash it = Change in cash and cash equivalents (Datastream datatype code wc02001) firm i 
at period t; 
DSTD it = Change in debt included in current liabilities (Datastream datatype code wc03251) 
firm i at period t; 
DEP it = Depreciation and amortization expense (Datastream datatype code wc01151) firm i 
at period t and, 
A 1 - it = Total assets (Datastream datatype code wc02999) firm i at period t for the prior year. 
Where  changes  in  the  various  items  are  the  difference  between  current  period  values 
(denoted as period t) less the previous period (denoted as period t 1).  
 
3.3.2.2: Estimation of Non-Discretionary Accruals. 
The problem with most earnings management research is the difficulty in identifying the 
(unobservable)  discretionary  component  of  accruals.  Following  Healy  (1985),  non 
discretionary accruals are defined as the adjustments to the cash flows mandated by the 
accounting  standard setting  bodies,  while  discretionary  accruals  are  adjustments  to  cash  
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flows that are selected by the auditor under a manager’s watchful eyes. Non discretionary 
accruals estimation follows Dechow et al. (1995) and is given as: 
 
NDA  t = a1(1/A 1 - t ) + a 2 ((DREV t   DREC t)/ A 1 - t )) + a 3(PPE t /A 1 - t )               (3.4) 
 
Where NDA  t = Estimated non discretionary accruals at time t. 
 Where DREV t= Change in revenue at time t (datastream datatype code wc01001). 
DREC t= Change in receivables at time t (datastream datatype code wc02051). 
PPE t  = Property, plant and equipment at time t (datastream datatype code wc02501). 
A 1 - t = Total assets in the prior year.  
 
Estimates of the firm specific parameters a1, a 2 ,a 3, are generated using the following 
model in the estimation period:  
 
TA t= a1(1/ A 1 - t ) + a 2 (DREV t/ A 1 - t ) / + a 3(PPE t/ A 1 - t ) + n t,                     (3.5) 
 
Where: 
TA t= total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. a1, a 2 , and a 3 denote the OLS estimates of 
a1, a 2 ,a 3. 
 
The only adjustment relative to the Jones (1991) is the change in revenues, which is adjusted 
for the change in receivables in the estimation period. The original Jones (1991) model 
implicitly  assumes  that  discretion  is  not  exercised  over  revenue  in  either  the  estimation 
period or the event period. The modified version of the Jones (1991) model by Dechow et al. 
(1995) implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from 
earnings management. This is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than to manage earnings 
by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. 
 
The model assumes that the changes in revenues, receivables and gross property, plant and 
equipment are explanatory variables that control for the portion of accruals relating to less  
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discretionary changes in working capital accounts and  expenses relating to  depreciation. 
Following the Jones (1991) model, the modified model rests upon the presumption that non 
discretionary accruals are constant and it thus attempts to control for the effect of changes in 
the firms economics circumstances on non discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995). As 
in  prior  studies,  a  two  digit  SIC  industry  cross sectional  model  is  used  to  estimate 
discretionary accruals in our study. The use of the two digits SIC codes across industry helps 
to relate time and industry specific commonalities. The importance of the cross sectional 
model is that it can extract common industry factors applied to discretionary accruals. The 
implications are that the discretionary accruals in the model reflect management’s choice 
rather than an adjustment to industry factor. Also, since the model is estimated year by year, 
changes in industry condition are also factored in the model. 
 
3.3.2.3: The Jones 1991 Model. 
The Jones (1991) model is habitually used in studies of aggregate accruals. It is based on the 
postulation that non discretionary accruals are constant (Dechow et al. 1995). The model 
controls for the effect of changes in the firm’s economic characteristics on non discretionary 
accruals. The model for non discretionary accruals in the event year is: 
 
NDAt = a1(1/ A 1 - t ) + a 2 (DREVt )/ A 1 - t  + a 3(PPEt )/ A 1 - t ,............(3.6) 
 
Where NDAt =Estimated non discretionary accruals at time t. 
 DREVt = Revenues in year t less revenues in year t 1 scaled by total assets at t 1; 
PPEt  = Gross property, plant and equipment in year t scaled by total assets at t 1; 
A 1 - t  =Total assets at t 1. 
 
a1, a 2 ,a 3= Firm specific parameters. 
Estimates of the firm specific parameters a1, a 2 ,a 3, are generated using the following 
model in the estimation period:  
 
TA t/ A 1 - t = a1(1/ A 1 - t ) + a 2 (DREV t)/ A 1 - t  + a 3(PPE t)/ A 1 - t  + v t        (3.7) 
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Where: 
TA t= total accruals scaled by lagged total assets. a1, a 2 , and a 3 denote the OLS estimates of 
a1, a 2 ,a 3. As above, total accruals are regressed on the inverse of total assets, revenue 
scaled by lagged total assets and property plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets 
to generate the firm specific parameters because the researcher assumes their normal level 
depends on them. v t is the residual or error term of the regression.  
 
3.3.2.4: The Dechow et al. (1995) Modified Jones (1991) Model. 
An alternative version of the Jones (1991) model has been the Dechow et al. (1995) model 
that is frequently referred to as the modified Jones (1991) model. The model was developed 
as a result of researchers working to improve on its weaknesses. In the modified Jones 1991 
model by Dechow et al. (1995), non discretionary accruals are estimated as: 
 
NDAt = a1(1/A 1 - t ) + a 2 (DREVt    DRECt )/ A 1 - t  + a 3(PPEt )/ A 1 - t ,       (3.8) 
 
Where 
DRECt = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t 1 scaled by total assets at t 
1. 
The estimates a1, a 2 ,a 3 are non discretionary accruals during the estimation period (in 
which no systematic earnings management is hypothesized) are those obtained from the 
original Jones 1991 model. The only adjustment relative to the Jones 1991 is that the change 
in revenues is adjusted for the change in receivables in the period. As suggested in the 
modified Jones model, the regression coefficients are estimated on a cross sectional time 
series period over the sample period. The original Jones 1991 model implicitly assumes that 
discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the estimation period or the event period. 
The model implicitly assumes that all changes in credit sales in the event period result from 
earnings management. This is based on the reasoning that it is easier to manage earnings by 
exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on credit sales than it is to manage 
earnings by exercising discretion over the recognition of revenue on cash sales. The thesis 
gives precedence to the modified Jones (1991) model by Dechow et al., (1995) which has 
become popular in recent academic studies.   
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3.3.2.5: A Critique of the Use of Discretionary Accruals. 
The Jones model was the first to evaluate how to isolate discretionary accruals from total 
accruals.  In  the  seminal  article  by  Dechow  et  al.  (1995),  the  researchers  evaluated  the 
different models that detect earnings management. Their findings suggest that their modified 
version of the Jones’ model provides the most powerful way to detect earnings management.  
In Bergstresser and Phillipon (2004), the researcher used both the modified Jones model by 
Dechow et al., (1995) and the Jones model and found that, the discretionary accruals results 
were similar. After this model, other models have been developed that attempt to explain 
better methods for the estimation of discretionary accruals. Though most of the literature has 
employed the modified Jones model, the working capital accruals models by Peasnell et al. 
(2000) have also received some attention. Researchers using the working capital models 
have suggested that it is good for companies and industries with high working capital as 
modeling working capital for these companies increases the accuracy of the estimates. One 
novelty  of the  modified Jones  model by  Dechow et al. (1995) is that it provides better 
estimates  of  the  impact  of  estimating  discretionary  accruals  using  a  cross  section  of 
industries than time series models. 
 
Accruals are usually estimated with the formula above, or simply as the difference between 
the cash flow from operations and any estimated net income. A fundamental property of 
accruals  is  that  over  time,  they  are  mean  reverting,  causing  any  planned  or  unplanned 
earnings management to be ineffective when viewed at an aggregate level over time. In this 
regard, managers who habitually employ accrual manipulations alone to build up earnings 
may expect accruals to unwind over time leading to the suppression of earnings and lower 
future stock prices (Dharan, 2003). The reversing nature of accruals gives the possibility that 
firms that employ high accruals in a year may have to reverse it in the coming years.  
  
Despite the large number of studies that have adopted the version of the Jones (1991) and the 
modified  Jones  (1991)  model  as  a  proxy  for  earnings  management,  thereby  using 
discretionary  accruals  to  estimate  abnormal  accruals  in  a  cross country  setting,  recent 
literature  has  not  relied  upon  such  empirical  measures  and  has  instead  focused  on  the 
limitations of discretionary accruals models.  
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An important critique has been their failure to identify their benchmark on the underlying 
economic earnings that is being managed (Leuz et al., 2003). Leuz et al. (2003) proposed an 
alternative model that involves a scaling measure of absolute cash flow from operations 
while using absolute working capital accruals as a measure of earnings management. The 
assumptions is that the scaling factor controls for differences in firm size and performance, 
and  provides  a  direct  benchmark  for  the  absolute  magnitude  of  economic  earnings. 
Moreover, the scaling variable of total assets used is subject to the effect of cross country 
differences in asset recognition rules and choices (Peasnall et al. (2000)). 
 
Other  critiques  have  argued  that  there  exists  no  fundamental  rationale  in  including 
depreciation in the total accruals proxy. This is because a large body of literature (e.g. Healy 
and Wahlen) has suggested difficulties in managing depreciation over an extended period of 
time without the manipulation becoming obvious to investors. Moreover, the differences in 
depreciation rules across countries are difficult to comprehend and are unrealistically related 
to earnings management. The various models are usually estimated in time series firm by 
firm or in cross  sectional regression using all firms in a given two digit (or four digit) 
industry  and  year  period  by  different  researchers  based  on  different  caveats.  Yearly 
estimations  are  used  to  make  a  one year  forecast  of  expected  accruals,  which  when 
subtracted from the dependent variable yields unexpected accruals. 
 
3.3.2.6: Measurement of Real Earnings Management.  
Real earnings management is measured by employing a simple model that detects abnormal 
changes in a firm’s underlying operational activities as discussed by prior research (e.g., 
Roychowdhury,  2006,  Gunny,  2005,  Dechow  et  al.,  1998).  The  technique  assumes  the 
abnormal components reflecting real earnings management are measured as residuals in the 
corresponding cross sectional regressions as listed below.  
 
Production Costs (PROD) = Cost of Goods Sold + Change in Inventory  
Discretionary  expenses  (DISEXP)  =  R&D  +  Advertising  +  Selling,  General  and 
Administrative Expenses. 
Accruals = Income Before Extraordinary Items Cash Flow From Operations. 
Net Accounts Receivables are the Net Accounts Receivables. 
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Abnormal CFO = is the residual from the corresponding industry year regression given by 
 
CFO t/ A 1 - t  = α*(1/ A 1 - t ) + β1*(S t/A 1 - t ) + β 2 *( S/ A 1 - t ) + ε t,      (3.9) 
 
Where A t = assets at end of year t, A 1 - t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, S t = sales 
during year t,  S t = change in sales during year t.  
CFO tis the cash flow from operations for firm i at period t. 
Abnormal  production  costs:  is  the  residual  from  the  corresponding  industry year 
regression: 
 
PROD t/A 1 - t  = α *(1/ A 1 - t ) + β1*(S t/A 1 - t ) + β 2 *( S t/A 1 - t ) + εt,        (3.10)  
Where A t= assets at end of year t, A 1 - t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, S t= sales 
during year t,  S t = change in sales during year t.  
Abnormal discretionary expenses: are the residual from the corresponding industry year 
regression  
 
ADEXP t/ A 1 - t  = α*(1/ A 1 - t ) + β1 *(S t/ A 1 - t ) + β 2 *( S t/A 1 - t ) + ε t,      (3.11) 
 
Where A t = assets at end of year t, A 1 - t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, S t = sales 
during year t,  S t = change in sales during year t.  
Abnormal accruals: Abnormal accruals are captured by the deviation from the predicted 
values of the corresponding industry–year regressions. Accruals relate to the difference 
between income before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations. It is measured 
using the following cross sectional firm year regression:  
 
Accruals t/A 1 - t =  / 1 ( 1 a A 1 - t ) +  2 a (DS t/ A 1 - t ) +  3 a (PPE t/ A 1 - t ) + e t         (3.12) 
 
Where A t = total assets at end of year t, A 1 - t  is the assets at the end of the prior year,  S t 
= change in sales during year t and PPE t =property, plant and equipment at end of year t.  
Abnormal Receivables: is the residual from the corresponding industry year regression  
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∆NR t/ A 1 - t  = α*(1/ A 1 - t ) + β1*(∆S t/ A 1 - t ) + ε t,       (3.13) 
 
Where A t = is the total assets at end of year t,  S t is the change in sales during year t, 
∆NR t is the change in net receivables at the end of period t.  
Abnormal  Inventory:  is  the  residual  retrieved  from  the  corresponding  industry year 
regression  
 
∆INVEN t/ A 1 - t  = α*(1/ A 1 - t ) + β1*( S t/ A 1 - t ) + β 2 *( S 1 - t / A 1 - t ) + ε t   (3.14) 
 
Where A t = is the total assets at end of year t, A 1 - t  is the assets at the end of the prior year, 
 S t is the change in sales during year t, ∆INVEN t is the change in inventory at the end of 
period t. 
 
Real earnings management (RM) according to this research is assumed to be actions that 
managers undertake that deviate from the best practice to influence reported earnings and 
its accomplished by changing the firm’s underlying operations. Examples of RM include 
cutting prices towards the end of the year in an effort to accelerate sales from the next 
fiscal year into the current year, delaying desirable investment, and selling fixed assets to 
affect  gains  and  losses,  changing  R&D  investments  budgets,  all  in  an  effort  to  boost 
current period earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006, Gunny, 2005). As in Graham et al., (2005), 
due to the pervasive occurrence of earnings management through real activities and its 
effect on the recent corporate scandals including large major corporations as Enron and 
WorldCom, it is likely that the attention of regulators Post SOX and the media would turn 
to  this  type  of  earnings  management.  It  is  important  to  note  that,  on  the  contrary  the 
attention of regulators Pre SOX was on accruals earnings management. In chapter 4, real 
earnings management has been used for the robustness check on the results on insider 
trading relationship to earnings management and in chapter 5, the relationship between real 
earnings management and firm performance have been thoroughly examined.  
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3.3.2.7:  Detecting  the  Probability  of  Earnings  Manipulation  (Beneish  M-
Score). 
The  Beneish  (1997,  1999)  M Score  is  a  model  that  detects  the  probability  of  financial 
statements distortion. Though its approach is mathematical, it uses both total accruals and 
specific accruals to detect earnings management for firms with large discretionary accruals. 
The model can be estimated with eight or five variables based on data availability. When the 
5 or 8 variables are aggregated into what Beneish described as an M Score, they are used to 
proxy  the  degree  to  which  the  earnings  have  been  manipulated.  Though  Beneish  used 
different cut off points in different research, most researchers have employed the cut off 
point of  2.22.  An M Score of less than  2.22 suggests that the company will not  be a 
manipulator.  On  the  other  hand,  an  M Score  that  is  greater  than   2.22  signals  a  higher 
probability of financial statements manipulation.  
 
In constructing this model, Beneish relied on three sources of explanatory variables based on 
financial statements data. They include, the presumption that earnings manipulation is likely 
when a firm’s future prospects are poor (Kellogg and Kellogg (1991)), the impact of cash 
flow on accruals (Healy, (1985) Jones, 1991), contract based incentives exist on earnings 
management (1986)).  Four of the eight ratios suggest financial statements distortions (Day 
Sales in receivables Index (DSR), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Depreciation Index (DEPI), 
Accruals), with the other four indicating a predisposition to engage in the manipulation of 
financial statements (Gross Margin Index (GMI), Sales Growth Index (SGI), Sales, General 
and Administrative expenses index (SGAI) and leverage index (LEVI)). All variables are as 
defined below. 
 
Based on 8 variables the Beneish M Score is estimated as: 
 
M =  4.84 + .920*DSRI + .528*GMI + .404*AQI + .892*SGI + .115*DEPI  .172*SGAI + 
4.679*TATA   .327*LEVI     (3.15) 
 
In case of data availability becoming a problem, the M Score can be estimated based on 5 
variables as: 
 
M =  6.065 + .823*DSRI + .906*GMI + .593*AQI + .717*SGI + .107*DEPI    (3.16)  
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Prior research has also employed the Beneish (1999) model usually described as an M Score 
in  detecting  earnings  manipulation.  In  the  academic  literature,  Fridson  (2002)  has  long 
recognised the usefulness of the M Score in detecting earnings manipulation. Investment 
professional organisations like Merrill Lynch have also employed the M Score in predicting 
investments in client portfolios have the most suspect financial reports. 
 
The researcher discusses the various variables below and explains why according to Beneish, 
it can influence the likelihood of earnings manipulation.  
 
DSRI defined as Days' Sales in Receivable Index is the ratio of sales in receivable in year t to 
the corresponding year (t 1). It estimates whether receivables, inventories and revenues of a 
firm have been used to manipulate earnings. A large increase in days in receivable could be 
as  a  result  of  changes  in  credit  policies  to  increase  sales.  Unusual  accumulation  of 
receivables might also be associated with an increased likelihood that revenues and earnings 
have  been  inflated  to  improve  the  company’s  profits.  In  the  original  Beneish  model, 
companies that had not manipulated sales had a mean index of 1.031 while those that had 
manipulated sales had a mean of 1.465, which represents a 43 percent increase.  
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GMI defined as Gross Margin Index measures the ratio of gross margin at year t 1 to gross 
margin at year t. A value greater than 1 indicates that gross margin has deteriorated. A 
deterioration of gross margin provides a negative signal about the firm’s future prospects. 
The firm would be more likely or willing to engage in financial statement manipulation to 
either decrease the resulting losses through the drop of sales or create artificial profits for the 
corporation. According to the original Beneish model, non manipulators had a mean of 1.014 
and manipulators had a mean of 1.193, which represents an increase of 18 percent. It is 
important to recognise that, this index does not clearly tell whether a company is engaging in 
earnings manipulation or not. It only serves this purpose in the context of the other indicators  
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of poor earnings quality entering the Beneish M score.  It however measures the risk that a 
company when faced with some circumstances might be interested in earnings manipulation. 
However, when the index is relatively higher, the company can be thought of as already 
engaging in earnings manipulation.   
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AQI defined as Asset Quality Index is the ratio of non current assets except property, plant 
and equipment (PPE) to total assets. It measures the proportion of total assets whose future 
benefits are potentially less certain. More generally it is the ratio of asset quality in year t 
relative to asset quality in year t 1. If asset quality index is greater than 1, it is indicative that 
the firm has potentially increased its involvement in cost deferral. According to the Beneish 
model, non manipulators had a mean of 1.039 while manipulators had a mean of 1.254.  
AQI=        
 


 

 +
-
 


 

 +
-
-
- -
1
1 1 1
1
t
t t
t
t t
Assets Total
PPE Assets Current
Assets Total
PPE ets CurrentAss
 
 
SGI defined as Sales Growth Index is the ratio of sales in year t to sales in year t 1. The ratio 
assumes  that  growth  firms  have  greater  incentives  to  manipulate  earnings  in  order  to 
maintain the confidence of shareholders. It specifically assumes that a reduction in sales 
might have a negative impact on future share prices. Thus firms with sales decreases might 
manipulate earnings to influence future stock prices. An increase in the index reflects a rise 
in sales and a significant increase might be due to earnings manipulation. According to the 
Beneish model, the mean for non manipulators was 1.134 while those for manipulators were 
1.607 representing an increase of 42 percent.  
SGI =  
1
t
Sales
Sales
- t  
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DEPI defined as a Depreciation Index measures the change in depreciation. It is the ratio of 
depreciation in year t 1 versus the corresponding depreciation in year t. A depreciation index 
greater than 1 indicates that the rate at which assets are depreciated has slowed down. This 
suggests  that  the  company  might  have  employed  income increasing  methods  to  boast 
earnings.   
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SGAI defined as Sales and General and Administrative Expenses Index is the ratio of selling, 
general and administrative expenses in year t to the ratio at t 1. The index assumes that 
analysts would recognise disproportionate increases in sales as a negative signal of a firm’s 
future prospects and might indicate the likelihood that firms might be tempted to manipulate 
earnings to either decrease losses or report a profit.  
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LVGI defined as Leverage Index is the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t relative to 
the firms corresponding ratio in year t 1. It generally measures the change in leverage. A 
value greater than 1 indicates an increase in leverage. The index captures debt covenant 
incentives for earnings manipulation. 
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TATA is defined as Total Accruals to Total Assets. Total accruals or its residual has been 
used previously to assess the extent to which the company makes discretionary accounting 
decisions to influence reported earnings. This index measures the amount of accounting 
earnings that has a cash basis. An increase in accruals might reflect the fact that management  
98   
is struggling to manipulate earnings through discretionary influences on accruals. Following 
the Beneish model, the index for non manipulators was 0.018 and for manipulators it was 
0.031 representing an increase of 72 percent.  
 
TAT = (( Current D Assets t   DCash) – (DCurrent Liabilities) – (DCurrent Maturities of 
LTD t) – (DIncome Tax Payable t)   (Depreciation and Amortisation t))/Total Assets t      
 (3.17) 
The fraudulent manipulation of a company’s earnings can have far reaching repercussions 
on investors, analysts, regulators, government, the real economy and the company itself. 
All these stakeholders have used the M Score to determine which firms have been fudging 
their numbers. The importance of the M Score model is that it raises red flags of the 
potentials for financial statements fraud. It can also help companies take prompt actions 
before external stakeholders are aware of fraudulent actions. The M Score have been used 
in chapter 4 for the robustness test using alternative definitions of earnings management 
and in chapter 5 to determine the probability of financial statements fraud.  
 
3.3.3: Estimating Forecast Errors. 
Following Richardson et al. (2004) the researcher proxied for earnings surprises using the 
degree of analyst’s earnings forecast errors defined here as the difference between the actual 
and the forecast earnings per share (EPS) scaled by the share price of the company. The 
forecast  error  of  the  accounting  year end  is  used.  When  a  company  reports  their  actual 
earnings  per  share,  it  can  be  higher  than  the  consensus  forecast  estimate  prior  to  the 
announcement of earnings (positive surprise), lower than the consensus forecast (negative 
surprise) or meet expectations (zero surprise). The research model recognises differences 
between large and small earnings surprises due to the degree of discretion and changes in 
economic fundamentals that have affected the value of the company. This has been defined 
here as management earnings target. However, following Beneish (2004), because of recent 
accounting scandals and regulatory changes, theoretical papers may suggest large earnings 
surprises are a function of earnings manipulation.  
 
FE ) , ( t i  =
t) (i,
t) i, (f, t) i, (a,
P
EPS       EPS
                    (3.18)  
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Where FE= Forecast Errors. 
EPS = Earnings Per Share. 
P = Share Prices. 
a= actual 
f= forecast.  
The absolute surprise needs to be scaled since absolute changes in EPS will depend in an 
arbitrary way on the absolute size of the EPS (Bulkley and Krassas, 2006). I therefore scale 
the changes in the EPS by the stock prices in order to obtain a measure of the relative size of 
the earnings surprise. The forecast error specifies whether analysts’ forecast of earnings do 
exhibit systematic optimism or pessimism and is used as a proxy for future earnings. There 
are several reasons why forecast error is of interest: Analysts' forecasts influence market 
expectations and share prices, as reported by Fried and Givoly (1982). They documented that 
analyst’s forecasts are more associated with market returns than time series based forecasts. 
Secondly,  analysts'  forecasts  have  implications  for  disclosure  policy  as  discussed  in 
Crichfield et al. (1978). Forecast error is used in the thesis as a proxy for future earnings in 
chapter 4.  
       
3.3.4: Estimating Stock Returns. 
Stock returns are estimated as: 
Ret t = 
1
1
-
- -
t
t t
P
P P
                   (3.19) 
 
Where: 
Ret t is the current period stock returns. 
P t is the firm current stock price. 
P 1 - t is the stock price for the prior period. 
i.e. dividend payment contribution to return is ignored. This is because; the theories suggest 
valuations are not influenced by dividend policy (e.g. Marton, 1998, Krishnamurthy, 2005). 
In  addition,  Krishnamurthy  (2005)  argued  that  historically  dividends  have  not  been 
important. Even for strategies based on dividend yields, the contribution of dividends to total 
returns has not been significant.  
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Absolute prices are scaled because they customarily depend on the absolute sizes of the stock 
prices. The scaling helps obtain a measure of the relative sizes of the stock return. It is 
important  to  note  that  a  significant  amount  of  market  based  accounting  research  has 
commonly used firm returns (both adjusted
38 and unadjusted) as a stock market measure of 
firm performance. Some studies employ the use of trading volumes as a measure of a firm’s 
performance. In most of these studies, depending on the issues to be measured, various 
windows have been used pre and post earnings announcements, ranging from an hour after 
earnings announcements to up to 10 years (Marton, 1998). It is important to note that most 
event studies relate unexpected earnings to firm returns. Unlike the Ball and Brown (1968) 
study that employed an 18 months investigation window, most employ a shorter window.  
 
This study employs the Easton and Harris (1991) approach that measures returns on a 12 to 
15
th month window, based on US data. The windows either end on the balance sheet date or 
three  months  after  this  date.  The  12 Month  windows  are  normally  used  to  evaluate  the 
valuation perspective those measures and matches periods of accounting returns and stock 
returns. The 15
th month window is consistent with the information perspective, primarily 
because they encompass the time when accounting earnings have been known to different 
stakeholders in the stock market and are used to make investment decisions.  
 
This  research  follows  most  stock  market  research  (see  Watts  and  Zimmerman  (1986), 
Marton, (1998)), were returns measured on the 12
th and 15
th month windows are defined as 
one year ahead stock return. Prior research has recognised the difficulty in specifying which 
of the two window lengths is more theoretically correct (see Marton, 1998). The 12 Month 
return window covers both the period of the accounting return and the stock return. On the 
other  hand,  the  15
th  month  return  window  covers  three  months  after  the  accounting 
information has been released. The importance of the 15
th month window is that it covers the 
time  period  where  the  information  is  made  public.  In  this  regards,  the  effect  of  the 
information on the stock return is assumed to be included in the model.  
 
                                                 
38 Stock returns may be adjusted for taxes to give the after tax rate of return, for inflation to effectively 
indicate its true purchasing power value, for GAAP to account for differences between international financial 
reporting, for risk to isolate risk measures relating to each investment.  
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There are several technical advantages for using raw stock returns, as opposed to abnormal 
returns, that have become popular in market based accounting studies since the Ball and 
Brown  (1968)  seminal  paper.  The  measure  of  abnormal  returns  is  usually  the  absolute 
returns  less  the  movements  in  the  market  index.  However,  the  stock  market  index  is 
customarily dominated by a handful of companies in the US. Additionally, some companies 
customarily  experience  volatility  in  their  stock  prices  and  this  may  have  a  significant 
influence on the index thereby influencing the final measure of abnormal returns (Marton, 
1998). Raw returns are additive across assets, it is therefore reasonable to use raw returns 
when going from individual assets to a portfolio of stocks like the S&P 500
39.  Additionally, 
simple returns are also better understood by investors.  Estimates of forecast errors used as a 
proxy for firm earnings surprises.  
       
3.4: Summary. 
This section provides a detailed specification of what is actually done in the analysis and the 
various  constructs  and  stipulations  that  have  been  employed.  First,  the  section  starts  by 
presenting  the  main  issues  that  have  been  investigated  in  the  thesis.  It  is  important  to 
recognise that the main research issue has been discussed in two subsidiary sections to reflect 
the two main empirical essays that have been undertaken in the research. The second section 
presents an introduction of the sample construction, data sources including a description of 
the various databases that have been used for data collection. This is followed by a general 
discussion of the statistical analysis employed, which is largely defined by the models that 
have been used. Justifications are provided for the main variables employed in the thesis. 
The  statistical  analysis  involving  the  determination  of  net  insider  trading,  earnings 
management,  estimates  of  forecast  errors  and  stock  returns  have  been  inspired  by  core 
research traditions of market based accounting and empirical finance.  
 
As this research is focussed on two empirical essays, the models have been applied to suit 
the  research  issues  to  be  investigated  by  the  two  essays.  Net  shares  traded  have  been 
estimated using open market insider buy and sell trades. Open market stock transactions 
prior literature assumes managers can either manage earnings using real and discretionary 
                                                 
39 One other method that can be used is log returns. Its advantage is that it permit us to see the relative 
changes in the variable and compare directly with other variables whose values may have very different base 
values. However, it is additive over time, with shorter periods the distribution will be long tailed, but is often 
not far from symmetric.  
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accrual  techniques.  However,  academic,  practitioner  and  the  media  have  often  given 
precedence to discretionary accruals as a form of earnings management as opposed to real 
earnings management. This research investigates earnings management using real (Gunny, 
2005, Roychowdhury, 2006) and discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995) techniques 
Moreover, it is important to identify firms that are fudging their numbers so that correction 
actions can be taken. It is in such vein that this model employs the Beneish M Score that 
predicts financial statements distortions.  
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4.0: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Insider Trading and Earnings Management. 
4.1: Abstract. 
This Chapter examines the relationship between discretionary accruals and Insider trading 
and discusses how this relationship may have changed as a result of the introduction of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. This study investigates whether regulatory intervention 
through  the  Sarbanes Oxley  Act  has  influenced  the  quality  of  financial  reporting  (by 
reducing real and discretionary earnings management). Apart from examining if there have 
been changes in the quality of financial reporting pre and post the Sarbanes Oxley period, 
the researcher investigates whether incentives to manage earnings are reflected in insider 
trading and if this incentive changed after Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. The Chapter further 
addresses the informativeness of insider trading without the use of discretionary accruals. 
The researcher examines this relationship during the period 1997 to 2006 based on a sample 
of S&P 500 firms. The findings of this Chapter is important to regulators and other public 
and private bodies that are interested in evaluating improper conduct by corporate insiders in 
relation to price sensitive information.  
 
The results suggest that the quality of earnings has improved after the introduction of the 
SOX.  Overall,  insider  trading  predicts  future  returns  and  investors  employ  discretionary 
accruals to influence reported earnings. However, post SOX, investors discount the value of 
firms with abnormally high earnings management through negative stock price responses 
reflecting a sophisticated processing of accounting information. Additionally, even without 
the use of discretionary accruals, insiders do not trade based on the knowledge of future 
returns. Overall, the results suggest that market participants detect and react to insider trading 
and earnings management practices under an invigorated regulatory regime.  
 
4.2:Background. 
In  the  last  three  decades,  there  have  been  numerous  articles  evaluating  the  relationship 
between insider trading by managers in their corporation’s stock and company earnings. 
Most US studies have been focused on trading by top level executives defined by the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act as officers, directors, corporation’s vice presidents and owners  
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of more than 10 percent of the corporations stock
40. There has been no shortage of evidence 
that top level executives have the ability to influence reported earnings via implicit pressure 
placed  on  auditors  as  they  are  directly  involved  in  the  day to day  management  of  the 
company and its earnings. Prohibition against insider trading and earnings management may 
involve significant potential costs to managers that customarily lead to a negative reputation, 
criminal charges, or lawsuits from outside investors (Park and Park, 2004). As a response to 
the financial scandals of the late 1990’s and early 2000, current reforms have reflected the 
responsibility of managers to improve the integrity and credibility of financial reporting.  
 
In the US, the SEC has the mandate to regulate insider trading and earnings management. 
Specifically, the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and its amendments have consistently 
imposed different restrictions on insider trading and earnings management. After a series of 
consultative  meetings,  the  Sarbanes Oxley  Act  was  enacted  in  October  2002,  aimed  at 
improving the integrity of financial statements and to weaken insider trading motivated by 
foreknowledge of price sensitive information. Section 302 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 requires insiders to accept responsibility for the integrity of financial statements and 
they are obliged to certify that financial statements are not misleading and fairly represent 
the company’s operations. Additionally, Section 16b of the Securities and Exchange Act 
requires all insiders to return to their corporation any capital gains made from a purchase or 
sale of their company’s stock if both transactions occur within a six month period (habitually 
termed short swings profits). The short swing rule
41 was implemented to prevent insiders, 
who have greater access to material non public information, from taking advantage of such 
information for the purpose of making short term profits. Apart from institutional regulations 
by the SEC, a significant number of US firms do impose trading restrictions on insiders 
(Bettis et al., 2000). The increased penalties imposed under successive regulations including 
the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
                                                 
40 Though the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act defined a top level executive as either officers, directors, 
corporation’s vice presidents and owners of more than 10 percent of the corporations stock, extant research 
on insider trading and earnings management eliminates the 10 percent owners as they are not directly 
involved in the day to day management of the company. This is in line with current research in the UK 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2006) that suggests that, directors who are more familiar with the day to day operations of a 
company trade on more valuable information. In the US, Lin and Howe (1990) demonstrated that trades by 
chairmen, directors, officers directors, and officers do contain more information than those of large 
shareholders. 
41 The short swing rule is the purchase (sale) and a subsequent sale (purchase) of a corporation stock within a 
six month period.  
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Enforcement Act of 1988 justifies the importance of insider trading as a potential source of 
market manipulation. 
 
4.2.1: Related Literature and Hypothesis. 
This section of the research reviews prior literature that is specific to the first empirical 
chapter  of  the  research.  Specifically,  it  discusses  theory  relating  to  insider  trading  and 
earnings management in light of the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by SOX. 
Since the relationship between insider trading and earnings management is a very complex 
phenomenon,  preliminary  investigations  have  suggested  that  there  are  many  potential 
explanations of the relationship between insider trading and earnings management. These 
suggest the need for competing theories. A series of these competing theories are discussed 
below. Reading through the various theories will help the researcher to identify theories and 
variables that may improve the explanatory power of the model that will be developed. 
However, in choosing variables from the literature in this area, an assumption is made that 
there is a positive relationship between insider trading and earnings management and that in 
light of the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 
this  relationship  has  been  suppressed.    The  assertion  that  insider  trading  and  earnings 
management are positively related seems to be critical and has been supported by recent 
empirical investigations (See Park and Park, (2004), Ke et al., (2003), Beneish and Vargus 
(2002)). 
 
A  host  of  research  papers  have  discussed  insider  trading’s  relationship  to  earnings 
management. However, none of these papers have examined the policy implications. As 
earnings news and stock price changes are customarily positively related (Ball and Brown, 
1968) insiders with material information habitually act as informed traders. Their buying 
(selling) frequently preceeds stock price increases (decreases) (Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and 
Zaman (1998), Ke et al. (2003)). Insiders also sell shares after managing earnings (e.g., 
Bolton  et  al.,  2002),  and  trade  with  information  pertaining  to  a  break  in  a  string  of 
consecutive earnings increases (Ke et al., 2003).  
 
Since securities law forbids trades whose incentives may be based on private information, an 
insider trade that is followed closely by potentially value relevant earnings disclosures might 
give the appearance that the trade was based on foreknowledge of the soon to be disclosed  
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information  (Weber,  2005).  It  is  in  this  light  that  Beneish  et  al.,  (2004)  suggested  the 
litigation  avoidance  hypothesis  where  insiders  may  sell  shares  and  manage  earnings  to 
distance  themselves  from  the  trade.  Additionally,  Weber  (2005)  suggested  that  insiders 
manage earnings in order to distance their sales from negative earnings news hence avoiding 
the appearance of undertaking an illegal insider trade. Though these two hypotheses are 
different from standard economic theories, they suggest that the agency mechanisms and 
some insider trading laws restrict insiders from strategic, self serving trades. It is in this light 
that recent insider trading laws have been strengthened due to persistent high profile business 
failures that often appear to demonstrate a relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management. Since the SEC scrutiny is focused on evidence of active strategies (Elliot et al., 
1984), insiders might be adopting a passive strategy, where they may be trading several 
quarters  in  advance  to  distance  themselves  from  disciplinary  concerns.  As  Hope  (2003) 
suggested, strict insider trading laws may prevent managers from manipulating earnings for 
profit while trading in their corporation’s stock. 
 
Policy discussions of insider trading have sought to defend the suitability of regulation (see 
Fishman and Haggerty, 1992); the various strands of insider trading literatures have not 
provided clear evidence that such disciplinary actions do in reality deter insiders from trading 
in  advance  of  reporting  a  company’s  financial  performance.  Additionally,  the  level  of 
regulatory commitment to enforce the enacted legislation on insider trading and earnings 
management can profoundly influence the behaviour of the informed agents (Bhattacharya 
and Daouk, 2002). Thus given the mixed motivations for the relationship between insider 
trading  and  earnings  management  in  light  of  regulatory  interventions,  we  expect  the 
relationship  between  insider  trades  and  earnings  management  to  be  different  in  stricter 
regulatory environments than when the regulations are less strict. This study broadly tests if 
current regulations have suppressed earnings manipulations (thereby improving the quality 
of earnings) which are motivated by a desire to profit from insider trading. The next section 
(4.2.2) presents the background of the policy literature, while the following section (4.2.3) 
presents the hypothesis for this first empirical chapter. 
 
4.2.2: Policy Dynamics and the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
Over the years, the SEC has implemented rules to ensure investor protection. After the 1987 
stock market crash in the US, the SEC responded to the violation of its existing insider  
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trading regulation by imposing the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 
(ITSFEA) of 1988 that raised the penalty of illegal insider trading to 1 Million dollars and 10 
years imprisonment (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Due to the recent string of corporate scandals 
(Enron, WorldCom, Adelphi, etc), insider trading rules have been strengthened both at the 
federal and company level. One of the most prominent of such rules has been the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of September 2002. The Act introduced new rules and revised existing legislation 
to  facilitate  investor  protection.  Among  the  issues  legislated  against  is  the  controversial 
insider  trading  and  earnings  management  relationship  that  has  arguably  impaired  the 
integrity and trust of financial markets in financial statements. Since this study emphasises 
insider  trading’s  relationship  to  earnings  management  in  the  light  of  the  implication  of 
structural changes (specifically new insider trading and earnings management regulations), it 
is essential to elucidate these regulatory dynamics.  
 
In securities regulation, the legal prohibition of insider trading is somewhat new. Despite the 
fact that as far back as 1934, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 addressed several 
issues  relating  to  the  immoral  aspect  of  insider  trading,  the  regulatory  authorities  have 
infrequently penalised insiders in relation to illegal insider trading. Quite recently, the effects 
of different corporate scandals have influenced regulatory changes with insider trading and 
earnings management being a prime target for suppression. At the regulatory level, several 
structural changes have taken place that may have an impact on earnings management’s 
relationship with insider trading. The first structural change in recent times refers to the 
widely reported speech made on 9/28/1998 by the then SEC chairman, Arthur Levitt, and the 
second was the enactment of regulation FD on Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading 
which took effect from October 23, 2000 and finally, SOX of 2002.  
 
In his now familiar speech, “The Numbers Game” In 1998, at an address at New York 
University, Levitt recognised that there is; 
 
“A grey area where the accounting is being perverted; where managers are cutting corners; 
and, where earnings reports reflect the desires of management rather than the underlying 
financial performance of the company”. 
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His speech further expressed concern on selective disclosure and insider trading as he said 
that; 
 
“Seven months ago, I expressed concerns about selective disclosure.  Through conference 
calls  or  embargoed  press  releases,  analysts  and  institutional  investors  often  hear  about 
material news before it is made public.  In the interval, there is a great deal of unusual 
trading. The practice had been going on for a long time.  And, while everyone was aware of 
it, and most were extremely uncomfortable with it, few spoke out.  As the investor's advocate, 
the SEC did and we will continue to do so.” 
   
Following  concerns  raised  by  the  SEC  chairman  (Arthur  Levitt),  the  SEC  issued  Staff 
Accounting  Bulletin  (SAB)  no.  99  in  August  1999.  Its  main  function  was  to  provide 
guidance  for  preparers  and  independent  auditors  on  evaluating  the  materiality  of 
misstatements  in  the  financial  reporting  and  auditing  processes.  Furthermore,  it  aims  to 
influence summarize and put certain GAAP and federal securities laws in perspective as they 
are related to the concept of materiality. In this case, the auditor can be alerted of financial 
fraud.  
 
Recent  high  profile  business  scandals  and  executive  law  suits  involving  companies  like 
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Xerox, Qwest and so on have been based on 
the  insider  trading  relationship  to  earnings  management.  The  global  operations  of  these 
multinational  companies  affected  different  economies  and  in  effect  there  was  the 
expectations  that  there  will  be  direct  lose  not  only  for  US  investors  but  also  for  other 
international  investors.  These  scandals  involving  major  US  corporations  have  greatly 
exposed major weaknesses in the legal and regulatory framework of US and international 
institutions. In order to ensure that external investors are protected, securities law of not only 
the SEC but all major financial centres in the world were to ensure that the investing public 
had  access  to  some  agreed  levels  of  disclosure  in  corporate  accounts  about  financial 
performance.  
 
The second structural change is when the SEC further adopted new rules to solve problems 
relating  to  selective  disclosure  and  insider  trading
42.  The  new  rules  were  adopted  and 
                                                 
42 Details of the new rules is available on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33 7881.htm  
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amended principally to address problems relating to the selective disclosure of material non 
public information by issuers and to clarify two issues that arise under the law of insider 
trading. Specifically, the new rules were regulation FD, Rule 10b5 1, and Rule 10b5 2.  
 
Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) implemented in October 2000 is a new requirement that 
addresses selective disclosure. Selective disclosure occurs when issuers release material non 
public  information  about  a  company  to  a  selected  group  of  persons,  (such  as  securities 
analysts  or  institutional  investors),  who  may  well  trade  with  this  information  before 
disclosing the information to the general public.  
 
Paragraph 1 of the regulation proposes that; 
 
“When an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material non public information to 
certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the 
issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must make public 
disclosure of that information”.  
 
Rule 10b5 1 addresses the issue of when an insider trading liability arises in connection with 
a trader's "use" or "knowledge" of material non public information. The rule posits that a 
trader trades on material non public information when it purchases or sells securities when 
aware of that information. The rule further sets certain affirmative defences that protect 
individuals and entities in situations where material non public information was not a factor 
in the trading decision since the trade was presumably carried out pursuant of a pre existing 
contract, situation or a plan. Finally, rule 10b5 2 addresses the issue of when a breach of a 
family  or  other  non business  relationship  may  give  rise  to  a  liability  under  the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading. Researchers have suggested a need for significant 
changes  in  insider  trading  laws  and  the  strengthening  of  rules  on  earning  management.  
Consequently, the SEC further adopted important affirmative defences from insider trading 
liability, which established that an insider trading liability may not arise from transactions 
that were planned before the time when an insider came into possession of material non 
public information.  
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After several consultations, there was the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. The Act was 
signed into law on 30th July 2002, and introduced highly significant legislative changes to 
financial practice and corporate governance regulation. Based on its stringent new rules, its 
stated objective as in page 1 was: 
 
"to  protect  investors  by  improving  the  accuracy  and  reliability  of  corporate  disclosures 
made pursuant to the securities laws". 
 
Before the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act that came into effect from August 1
st 2002, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission granted until the 10
th of the month following the 
month in which insiders traded to report their transactions (See Fidrmuc et al., 2006). After 
the  Act,  insiders  were  required  to  electronically  report  their  trades  after  their  execution 
within two business days. Researchers who wish to decriminalise insider trading have argued 
that if the theory of market efficiency is to guide accurate pricing of securities, information 
about securities must circulate freely. In such a vein, profits from insider trading can be 
lower if the information about such dealings is quickly transmitted to the stock market. The 
limit of the time lag gives outsiders the possibility to mimic insider trades and also gain 
abnormal returns (Gelband, 2005). Section 302, of the Sarbanes Oxley Act further penalises 
earnings management where Chief Executive Officer(s) and the principal financial officer(s), 
or persons performing similar functions need to certify in each quarterly or annual report 
filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) that, the financial report does not 
contain any untrue statements of material facts, omissions, etc, under which such statements 
can be considered misleading and that they do fairly present the financial condition and 
results of operations for the reported periods; further, that financial reports do not contain 
material misrepresentations and are fairly represented, 
 
4.2.3: Formulation of Hypotheses. 
The  empirical  findings  on  the  current  Chapter  will  provide  some  evidence  on  the 
implications of SEC regulations and other securities laws for insider trading relationship to 
earnings management. From the theoretical review, the researcher found that responsive new 
regulations like the Sarbanes Oxley Act are geared towards countering deficiencies that have 
arguably impaired the integrity of financial markets.  
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As earnings news and stock prices are positively related (Ball and Brown, 1968), insiders 
ought  in  the  absence  of  regulatory  or  institutional  constraints  buy  (sell)  more  shares  in 
periods  where  they  expect  to  influence  reported  earnings  through  the  use  of  positive 
(negative) discretionary accruals. Strict insider trading rules may have an impact on the way 
managers  do  exercise  their  knowledge  of  private  information  about  future  prospects. 
Furthermore, strict insider trading laws may prevent managers from manipulating earnings 
for profit while trading in their corporation’s stock (Hope, 2003). In a recent article by Betzer 
and Theissen (2004), the authors investigated the market reaction to trades in German firms 
by executives and non executive directors. They concluded that the German market needs 
UK type regulation that prevents insiders from trading prior to earnings announcements. 
According to the authors, insider trading on inside information in Germany does benefit 
from informational advantages and so earn improved market returns as compared to trading 
by outsiders. The fact that insiders might employ discretionary accounting techniques to 
influence reported earnings after prior insider trading may raise serious concerns about the 
firm’s earnings quality. A string of recent articles have examined the impact of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 on earnings management
43, but to the best of my knowledge, none of 
these articles have linked earnings management to insider trading.  
 
To accommodate the influence of strict regulatory regimes and recent corporate scandals on 
relationship  between  insider  trading  and  earnings  management,  insiders  may  noticeably 
change the timing of their trades relative to the use of discretionary accrual techniques. This 
hypothesis can be tested empirically be examining the relationship between discretionary 
accruals  (a  discretionary  decision  by  management)  and  net  insider  trades,  to  regulatory 
changes (a public event that is not discretionary by management).  
 
Following these concerns, I broadly test two main hypothesis: 
 
H1: The regulatory intervention (Sarbanes Oxley Act) had an effect. 
1 To suppress earnings management thereby improving the quality of earnings. 
2 To suppress earnings management conditional on prior insider trades. 
 
                                                 
43 Cohen et al., (2004) find evidence that there is a decrease of earnings management after the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002.  
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The  term  suppression  in  this  thesis  specifically  means  reducing  earnings  management. 
Testing if the regulatory intervention had an effect would justify why there was a need for 
the  strengthening  of  financial  market  regulation  after  recent  corporate  scandals.  It  is 
important to recall that, most executives of firms that were alleged to have abused the market 
e.g.  Enron,  WorldCom,  Adelphi,  etc  were  accused  of  insider  trading  and  earnings 
management offences. This is because, the regulation was meant to reduce market abuse 
through insider trading and subsequent earnings manipulation.  
 
The incentive to either buy or sell shares may be remote and not necessarily related to the 
intention to manage earnings. As a result of changes in expectations about a firm’s future 
cash flows the signalling literature occasionally argues that if an insider believes that his 
shares  have  been  overvalued  (undervalued),  he  will  sell  (buy)  them,  and  so  signal  the 
overvaluation of others. If trading by corporate insiders is informative about future earnings 
(e.g.  on  firms  growth  and  future  prospects),  there  should  be  no  association  between 
discretionary  accruals  and  insider  trading  (Park  and  Park,  2004).  Insiders  might  have 
superior knowledge over other market participants; and their buying (selling) will be based 
on  the  expectations  of  a  positive  (negative)  earnings  outcome  without  the  use  of 
discretionary accruals. This has been supported in recent research by Ke et al. (2003), who 
reported that insider trading might be associated with post transaction stock returns without 
the use of discretionary accruals. I therefore examine if insider transactions influence post 
transactions  performance  as  measured  by  the  firm’s  stock  returns.  I  therefore  test  the 
additional hypothesis that links insider trading to future earnings performance as follows: 
 
H2: Trading by corporate insiders is informative to future earnings performance. 
 
This  section  has  presented  the  literature  that  is  specific  to  insider  trading  and  earnings 
management in light of the recent regulatory intervention. The main objective is to motivate 
and position this research, in relation to previous research on insider trading and the earnings 
management relationship. First, there is the review of the literature on insider trading and 
earnings  management  and  secondly,  there  has  been  a  review  of  the  policy  literature  on 
insider  trading  and  earnings  management  regulations  which  led  to  the  enactment  of  the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.This has guided the development of the hypothesis for the first 
empirical essay.   
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4.3: Sample and Research Design. 
This section presents research design issues for the first empirical chapter of the research.  
 
4.3.1: Sample Selection. 
The original sample is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 for the period 1997 2006. This 
makes  10  consecutive  years,  giving  a  total  of  5000  firm  years.  To  estimate  earnings 
management, the researcher collected different accounting and insider trading data for the 
respective firms from the period 1997 2006.  
 
Insider Trading data has been collected from two sources. Between the periods 1997 2000, 
the data has been collected from the US National Archives & Records Administration.  From 
2001 2006 the data has been collected from the Edgar filings compiled by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Nonetheless, all the data is a summary of filings in the SEC 
form 3, 4, and 5 by insiders to the Security and Exchange Commission and there are no 
differences in the data. The file summarises insider trading transactions in all publicly held 
firms. Accounting and stock price data have been collected from DATASTREAM to ensure 
data consistency.  
 
To  remain  in  the  sample  a  firm  has  to  satisfy  certain  conditions.  Firstly,  it  must  have 
sufficient data to estimate discretionary accruals and data to compute  net shares traded. 
Consistent with prior research (see Jenkins et al., 2006), financial institutions are excluded 
due to their complex reporting regime, leaving the sample with 411 firms and 4110 firm 
years. Firms with less than 7 observations in the 2 digit SIC codes are deleted
43, this leaves 
the sample with 364 firms and 3640 firm years. Firms with the necessary accounting data to 
estimate the discretionary accruals and real earnings management amounted to 3528 firm 
years and 358 firms. Since the analysis is restricted to open market transactions
44, firms must 
have disclosed open market insider trading information during the accounting periods that 
                                                 
43 This is a slight departure from the prior papers (Jenkins et al. 2006) as most researchers do employ at least 
10 observations. However, only one group of firm fell under this group and my sample size would have been 
greatly reduced if I did not limit my selection criteria to at least 7 observations. 
 
44 The information content of some transactions are habitually low and are customarily eliminated in research 
relating to the information content of open market insider trades. Sales after the exercise of options are likely 
to be related to the remuneration packages of directors rather than any sort of market information (Fidrmuc et 
al., 2006).  
114   
satisfy the definition for determining net insider trading. Insider trades are matched with 
fiscal years by the transaction date reported to the SEC. For every firm and on every fiscal 
year, the researcher computed the net number of insider transactions. The researcher further 
matches these net transactions to discretionary accruals, total accruals and other proxies like 
firm returns to address different research issues. To eliminate the effects of differences for 
firms that do not appear consistently over the period, I require a constant sample of firms that 
exists in the pre and post SOX period
45. The final sample involves an unbalanced sample of 
firm years covering the period of analysis. 
 
Several reasons do account for why the researcher aggregated the data for firm years (not 
firm quarters). Firstly, the sample would have been greatly reduced given the time series 
data requirements to estimate earnings management. Secondly, most firms do not disclose all 
accounting data in specific quarters. Thirdly, the researcher found that there was scarcity of 
disclosure of insider trading for most firms in most months in different accounting periods, 
and finally, the research aims to identify the impact of regulatory dynamics (SOX) on insider 
trading and earnings management.  
 
4.4: Measurement of variables. 
The  test  uses  estimates  of  net  shares  traded,  earnings  management  using  real  and 
discretionary  accounting  techniques,  earnings  management  based  on  the  probability  of 
financial statements manipulation as measured by the Beneish M Score, estimates of forecast 
errors and stock returns. This is covered in detail in Section 3.3. 
 
4.5: Empirical Results. 
I commence by reporting the descriptive evidence on each of my hypotheses after which I 
provide  formal  statistical  tests  of  my  predictions  using  regression  analysis.  After  the 
presentation  of  the  descriptive  evidence,  the  main  empirical  investigation  employing 
regression analysis commences by testing the relationship between discretionary accruals 
and prior insider trading. To specifically answer the research question, the researcher asks 
whether incentives to manage earnings are motivated by prior insider trading more in the 
                                                 
45 A similar technique was adopted by Jenkins et al., (2006), who argued that, the benefits of eliminating 
potential volatility of the data caused by the introduction of new firms and the introduction of survivorship 
bias outweighs the costs.  
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overall sample period or in the post SOX period, using interactive variables. The researcher 
then tests the relationship between insider trading and future stock returns. This is because 
the timing behaviour argues that managers might strategically choose when they trade to 
either benefit from prior insider trades or distance themselves from their trades. In the next 
sub section, the researcher investigates information motivated insider trading without the use 
of discretionary accruals and with the use of discretionary accruals post SOX. Since earnings 
management and insider trading are jointly determined, potential problems of endogeneity 
exist. This two way causality chain is resolved by employing the 2 stage least squares. As a 
robustness check, the researcher adjusts the model using alternative definitions of earnings 
management.  
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e
n
t
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
J
o
n
e
s
 
1
9
9
1
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
a
s
 
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
D
e
c
h
o
w
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
.
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
D
A
=
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
.
 
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
D
A
=
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
.
 
C
a
p
t
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
f
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
 
N
S
T
 
n
e
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
.
 
 
C
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
n
e
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
t
 
p
u
r
c
h
a
s
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
l
e
s
.
 
N
e
t
 
b
u
y
 
e
q
u
a
l
s
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
N
S
T
 
w
h
i
l
e
 
n
e
t
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
p
r
e
d
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
 
N
S
T
 
t
u
r
n
s
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
.
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
s
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
’
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
s
 
a
s
 
n
e
t
 
b
u
y
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
s
e
l
l
i
n
g
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
d
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
F
E
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
.
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
t
’
s
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
p
e
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
d
e
f
l
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
g
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
O
p
t
i
m
i
s
t
i
c
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
w
h
i
l
e
 
p
e
s
s
i
m
i
s
t
i
c
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
a
r
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
.
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
s
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
t
s
’
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
x
h
i
b
i
t
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
a
t
i
c
 
o
p
t
i
m
i
s
m
 
o
r
 
p
e
s
s
i
m
i
s
m
.
 
U
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
.
 
R
e
t
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
s
c
a
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
.
 
T
h
e
y
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
o
n
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
U
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
.
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F
r
e
t
 
F
u
t
u
r
e
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
F
u
t
u
r
e
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
o
n
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
s
c
a
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
p
r
i
c
e
.
 
A
n
o
t
h
e
r
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
(
m
o
s
t
l
y
 
p
o
s
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
)
.
 
S
O
X
 
S
a
r
b
a
n
e
s
 
O
x
l
e
y
 
A
c
t
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
a
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
s
e
t
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
 
y
e
a
r
’
s
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
 
(
a
f
t
e
r
 
2
0
0
2
)
 
a
n
d
 
z
e
r
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
 
A
i
m
 
t
o
 
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
 
N
S
T
*
S
O
X
–
 
N
S
T
 
a
n
d
 
S
O
X
 
a
r
e
 
a
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
n
e
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
S
O
X
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
O
b
j
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
i
s
 
t
o
 
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
.
 
D
A
*
S
O
X
 
D
A
 
a
n
d
 
S
O
X
 
a
r
e
 
a
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
S
O
X
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
A
i
m
 
t
o
 
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
.
 
F
R
E
T
*
S
O
X
 
F
R
E
T
 
a
n
d
 
S
O
X
 
a
r
e
 
a
s
 
d
e
f
i
n
e
d
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
S
O
X
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
A
i
m
 
t
o
 
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
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S
I
Z
E
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
 
i
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
s
i
z
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
.
 
T
h
e
 
a
i
m
 
i
s
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
s
i
z
e
 
o
n
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
r
m
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
s
.
 
M
T
B
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
t
o
 
b
o
o
k
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
b
o
o
k
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
g
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
.
 
T
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
o
p
p
o
r
t
u
n
i
t
i
e
s
 
T
A
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
c
u
s
t
o
m
a
r
i
l
y
 
u
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
 
i
t
s
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
,
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
 
(
D
A
)
 
a
r
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
m
o
r
e
 
o
f
t
e
n
.
 
 
N
I
 
N
e
t
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
n
e
t
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
n
o
r
m
a
l
l
y
 
u
s
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
e
a
r
n
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
.
 
 
T
o
 
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
.
 
L
E
V
 
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
T
h
i
s
 
i
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
.
 
L
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
i
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
.
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S
t
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S
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p
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F
i
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P
a
n
e
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.
 
O
v
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l
l
 
S
a
m
p
l
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P
e
r
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d
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
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v
e
 
S
t
a
t
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s
t
i
c
s
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Table 7 Panel A and B present’s descriptive statistics for the entire sample firm years, 
the pre SOX era and the Post SOX era respectively. As in table 7 panel A, the sample 
firms  mean  (median)  values  of  discretionary  and  total  accruals  are  respectively  –
01.2100 ( 0.41) and –5.3850 ( 4.7640) percent of lagged total assets. Consistent with 
previous  research  (Sloan,  1996  and  Bradshaw  et  al.,  2001),  this  establishes  that 
accounting  accruals  is  habitually  income  decreasing  primarily  due  to  non current 
accruals  for  depreciation  and  amortization.  I  document  that  analysts  are  optimistic 
judging from the realised mean forecast error of 2.45%. However, their median forecast 
error is negative ( 4.31%).  Results for the Pre and Post SOX periods are similar where 
accounting accruals are primarily income decreasing. Insiders in the overall sample 
period and the pre SOX period are mostly net sellers of the corporations stocks judging 
from realised mean net shares traded of  0.0012 and  0.0075. However, in the post SOX 
period, insiders are mostly net buyers of their stock judging from the mean net shares 
traded of 0.0022 (see table 7 Panel B). The difference in mean of the net shares traded 
between the Pre and Post SOX era is 0.0096 and the t stats is  4.18.  This might be as a 
result of the increasing confidence in the financial market after the recent corporate 
reforms for the US stock market.  
 
As in Figure 3, the highest amount of discretionary and total accruals was realised 
during  the  period  of  2000  and  2002.  Like  total  accruals,  the  magnitude  of  the 
discretionary accruals metric which proxies for the discretion managers use to achieve 
their financial reporting objectives systematically reduces after its peak of 2000 2002, 
the period of the intense corporate scandals. The effect of the period of the late 1990’s 
in  magnifying  earnings  management  cannot  be  underestimated.  In  fact,  it  might  be 
viewed a what led to the corporate scandals of the period 1999 2002. This is because, 
during this period as many firms were making significant profits, managers of rival 
firms  were  facing  huge  pressure  to  improve  their  own  performance.  When  this  is 
followed by systematic structural changes like the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
of 2002, they have the potential to mitigate earnings management. On average, I found 
that  discretionary  accruals  under  the  modified  Jones  Model  reduced  from  the  pre 
Sarbanes Oxley value of  2.2000 percent of total assets to the post Sarbanes Oxley 
value of  0.2200 percent of total assets. The difference of mean between these periods is 
statistically significant and is  0.0193 with t stats of  5.1000.  The Non Discretionary  
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estimates suggest that in the pre SOX era firms employ negative non discretionary 
accruals  of   0.0421  and  in  the  post  SOX  era  of   0.0401.  The  difference  of  mean 
between the Pre and Post SOX period is  0.0022 and t statistics of  0.8200. In the Pre 
(Post)  SOX  era,  the  M Score  is   3.0900  ( 3.2941)  suggesting  that  overall,  the 
probability of earnings manipulation is low.  The difference in mean is 0.2044 and the t 
stat is 4.19. The net income in the Pre (Post) SOX period is 0.0582 (0.0628) suggesting 
that firms are more likely to be profitable before the SOX era. The difference in mean is 
 0.0045 and the t stat are  0.90. The annual returns in the Pre (Post) SOX era is 0.2255 
(0.1414) suggesting that in both period, investments are more likely to be profitable. 
The differences in mean between the Post and Pre SOX period is 0.0842 and the t stats 
is 4.58. The net shares traded for the Pre SOX period is  0.0075 suggesting that insiders 
are more likely to be net sellers before the passage of the SOX Act, however, in the Post 
SOX  period,  the  net  shares  traded  is  0.0022  suggesting  that  after  the  SOX  period, 
insiders are more likely to be net buyers. The differences in mean between the Post and 
Pre SOX period is 0.0096 and the t stat is  4.18.  
 
Plot of Figure 2 support this assertion that in the Post SOX era, firms are less likely to 
use discretionary and total accruals to boast reported earnings. The observed earnings 
pattern suggests that there has been a reduction in the use of discretionary accruals after 
the period of intensive corporate scandals in the United States. The results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that earnings management has been suppressed in recent times, 
especially after the corporate scandals of 2001 and the enactment of the SOX. Finally, 
the sample firms have mean and median total assets averaging 30694583 (7138787), an 
average market to book ratio of 4.7940 (3.1000) and leverage of 1.0209 (0.9875) in the 
overall sample period. 
 
4.5.1: Correlation Between Variables. 
Table  8-Panel  A:  Correlation  for  the  Overall  Sample  Period  (Pearson 
Correlation  are  Shown  Above  the  Diagonal  with  Spearman  Below  the 
Diagonal). 
This is the correlation Table pooled for the entire sample over the period 1997 2006. 
Correlations that are significant at the 5 percent levels are marked in bold and variable 
descriptions are provided below. Each cell contains the Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
coefficients with the P Values in parenthesis. There are several technical reasons why  
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the  Pearson  and  Spearman  Rank  correlations  are  included.  Firstly,  it  helps  the 
researcher investigates if the data is normally distributed and secondly if there may be 
multicollinearity between the independent variables.  
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Table  8  Panel  A  presents  the  correlations  coefficients  (p value  in  parentheses)  of  the 
dependent and the independent variables. Consistent to Sloan (1996), discretionary accruals 
are positively correlated to net income and are significant at the 5 percent level (Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.073 (0.016) and p value of 0.0071 (0.005)). This is 
consistent  to  our  expectations  that  firms  that  employ  positive  (negative)  discretionary 
accruals to report favourable (unfavourable) earnings have high (low) accounting income at 
the end of the accounting period.  Annual returns are also highly correlated to the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.1190 (0.0210) and p 
value of 0.0000 (0.0041)). One interpretation of this might be that investors do not realise the 
impact of discretionary accruals sufficiently early to discount the stocks of the firm leading 
to lower returns.  
 
I also noted the positive correlation between discretionary accruals and prior year net shares 
traded (Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.077 (0.225) with a p value of 0.004 
(0.000)).  These  suggest  that  net  buying  (selling)  firms  usually  have  positive  (negative) 
discretionary accruals. Firm size is highly correlated with net income but the spearman rank 
correlation  result  is  slightly  insignificant  (Pearson  (Spearman)  correlation  coefficient  of 
0.060  (0.009)  and  p values  of  0.025  (0.100)).  The  market  to  book  ratio  is  negatively 
correlated to discretionary accruals however, the spearman rank values is positive (Pearson 
(Spearman)  correlation  coefficient  of   0.036  (0.028)  and  p values  of  0.051(0.183)).  The 
interpretation of the Pearson value suggest that firms with more growth prospects are more 
likely to manage earnings unlike firms without growth prospects.  The relationship between 
market and book ratio and net income is negative, suggesting that firms with more growth 
prospects  are  more  likely  to  invest  their  earnings  than  those  without  growth  prospects 
(Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 0.132 ( 0.004) and p values of 0.000 (0.000). 
The change in sign might be due to the effect of outliers. 
 
The correlation between market to book ratio and leverage is negative, which suggest that 
firms with more growth prospects are more likely  to have more debts than firms with less 
growth prospects (correlation coefficient of  0.050 ( 0.149) and p values of 0.016 (0.000). 
The relationship between leverage and annual returns is negative, which suggests that firms 
with more debts are more likely to have their stock prices discounted by investors unlike 
firms with less debts (Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of  0.142 ( 0.004) and p 
value of 0.000 (0.000).  
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The correlation coefficients for the pre and post SOX era are reported in panel b and c of 
Table 8. In the pre SOX era, the correlation results are very similar to those of the overall 
sample  period.  Specifically,  I  found  a  positive  and  significant  correlation  between 
discretionary  accruals  and  net  income,  discretionary  accruals  and  stock  returns,  and 
discretionary  and  net  shares  traded.  However,  in  the  post  SOX  period,  the  relationship 
between  discretionary  accruals  and  net  income  is  insignificant  (Pearson  (Spearman) 
correlation coefficient of 0.012 (0.032) and p value of 0.767 (0.148)). This suggests that 
discretionary accruals do not directly influence net income after the introduction of SOX. 
The correlation between market to book ratio and leverage in the pre (post) SOX period is 
negative  and  significant  (Pearson  (Spearman)  correlation  of  –0.009  (0.214)  and  the 
respective P values are significant at the 5 percent level. However, the Pearson (spearman) 
correlation of  0.008 ( 0.085) in the post SOX period is also negative but the relationship is 
insignificant at the 5 percent level for the Pearson correlation coefficient. The results overall 
suggests that in the pre and post SOX period, firms with more growth prospects are more 
likely to manage earnings. In the pre SOX period, the Pearson (Spearman) rank correlation 
of net shares traded and discretionary accruals is positive and is respectively 0.051 (0.223) 
and both results are significant at the 5 percent level. In the post SOX period, the relationship 
is also positive (Spearman and Pearson correlation is respectively 0.136 and 0.212) and 
significant at the 5 percent level.  The implications are that firms that are more likely to be 
net sellers (buyers) of their corporations stocks are more likely to use negative (positive) 
discretionary accruals to influence their results in both the pre and post SOX period. 
 
4.5.2: Evidence Based on Regression Analysis. 
In this section, I provide statistical tests of several predictions using regression analysis.  
 
4.5.2.1: Test of the Relationship Between Discretionary Accruals and Prior 
Insider Trading. 
My  main  hypothesis  investigates  if  the  regulatory  intervention  has  suppressed  earnings 
manipulation motivated by a desire to profit from prior insider trading. In this section, I 
examine  the  relationship  between  current  period  discretionary  accruals  and  prior  insider 
trading (as determined by the net shares traded) after controlling for other relevant factors 
that  might  influence  discretionary  accruals.  My  main  focus  is  to  investigate  whether 
incentives to manage earnings have declined following the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002. Drawing on prior literature, the relationship between discretionary management 
of earnings and prior insider trading can be explained in two ways. Firstly, managers actively  
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involved in trading might be deliberately manipulating future period earnings to benefit from 
prior insider trades
46. The second possibility is that they might be motivated to manage 
earnings  due  to  other  earnings  management  incentives.  In  an  effort  to  investigate  the 
relationship between discretionary accruals and prior insider trading, I regress discretionary 
accruals  on  prior  insider  trades  and  other  variables  based  on  the  following  regression 
equation:  
 
DA t i, =a 0 +b1*(NST t i, )+b 2 *(NST t i, *SOX t)+b 3*(SOX t)+b 4 *(FRET t i, )+b 5*(FRET* 
SOX t)+b 6*( SIZE t i, ) + b 7 *( LEV t i, )+  8 b *( MTB t i, )  + e t i, ....................(3.20). 
 
The variables NST t i, and NST t i, * SOX tmeasures respectively the impact of prior year net 
shares traded on current discretionary accruals and the impact of prior net shares traded in 
the post SOX period on current period discretionary accruals. To control for variables that 
have  been  identified  in  previous  studies  which  are  likely  to  affect  the  reporting  of 
discretionary accruals and therefore the observed earnings patterns, I include other variables 
in  the  regressions.  I  include  the  firm’s  book to market  ratios,  firm’s  size  and  leverage 
factors. Low book to market ratios corporations, for example, are particularly sensitive to 
fluctuations  in  earnings  (see  Skinner  and  Sloan,  2002)  while  size  and  leverage  are  also 
related to earnings management and are habitually related to debt contracting motivations for 
earnings management (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, Klein 2002). Due to manager’s 
interest in avoiding debt covenant violations, there may be a positive association between 
leverage  and  income  increasing  accounting  choices  (Young,  1999).  I  include  the  SOX 
variable  to  control  for  the  impact  of  the  Sarbanes Oxley  Act  of  2002  on  the  use  of 
discretionary  accruals  to  benefit  from  trading  in  their  corporations  stocks.  I  additionally 
examine whether executives with incentives to manage earnings do manage earnings more 
before SOX and whether those firms engage in less earnings management after the SOX. 
Cohen et al. (2004) examined earnings management pre and post the SOX period and found 
that  earnings  management  decreased  after  the  implementation  of  the  SOX.  However,  I 
examined if this change is due to firm specific insider trading incentives. I report the results 
in panel A table 9.   
 
                                                 
46 In a seminal article by Beneish et al., (2004), he argued that managers employ higher discretionary accruals 
to benefit from prior insider trading.  
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The results reported in table 9 Panel A suggest a negative and insignificant relationship 
between the interactive variable NST t i, *SOX tand DA (coefficient of  0.0426 and t stats of  
0.39) suggesting that in the post SOX period, insiders trade in their corporation’s stocks is 
negatively  but  insignificantly  related  to  future  discretionary  accruals.  However,  the 
interactive variable between future returns and SOX (FRET t i, * SOX t) is negative with a 
statistical significance (coefficient of  0.4525 and t statistics of  2.09) suggesting that when 
managers employ discretionary accruals to influence future returns, investors are quick to 
recognize this and discount the stocks of these companies leading to negative stock returns. 
The NST variable suggest that insiders trade and manage  earnings overall, however the 
result of statistically insignificant (coefficient of 0.0592 and t stats of 0.76). The coefficient 
for the size variable is  1.6730 and the t statistics is  2.09 which suggest that the larger the 
size of a firm, the less likely the firm is going to manage earnings. One reason for this is 
because larger firms are followed more by analysts and other stakeholders including the 
media than smaller firms as such; they are less likely to manage earnings as this can be easily 
picked up leading to stock price declines. The LEV variable has a coefficient of 0.0051 and a 
t stats of 2.85 which suggest that firms with more debts are likely to manage earnings overall 
than those with less debts. This is in line with the debt covenants motivations for earnings 
management (De Fond and Jiambalvo, 1991). The argument by De Fond and Jiambalvo is 
that firms that violate their debt covenant obligations might incur large re contracting cost, as 
such  are  motivated  to  overstate  earnings.    The  market  to  book  ratio  suggest  a  negative 
coefficient  that  is  statistically  significant    (coefficient  of   0.0007  and  t stats  of   4.06) 
suggesting that the more impressive the growth prospects a firm has, the less likely it is 
going to use discretionary accruals to report favorable earnings. This might be as a result of 
fear that the firm is more likely going to be discounted by the stock market.   
 
4.5.2.2:  Test  For  the  Relationship  Between  Insider  Trading  and  Future 
Discretionary Accruals/Stock Returns. 
Managers might actively employ a timing behavior where they strategically choose where 
and when they trade and manage earnings to either benefit from prior trades or distance 
themselves from their trades. Beneish et al. (2004) in their litigation avoidance hypothesis 
provide  evidence  that  managers  manage  earnings  upwards  after  they  have  engaged  in 
abnormally high levels of insider selling. If this is true, then insiders might be thought of as 
habitually  using  income  increasing  (decreasing)  discretionary  accruals  to  distance 
themselves  from  a  prior  net  buy  (sale)  of  their  corporation’s  stocks.  In  this  section,  I  
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investigate the relationship between current net shares traded and subsequent discretionary 
accruals. I also control for variables that have been found in prior studies to affect prior 
discretionary accruals. I report the results in panel B Table 9 with the tests based on the 
following regression:  
 
NST t i, =a 0 +b1*(DA 1 , + t i )+b 2 *( DA 1 , + t i * SOX t)+b 3*(FRET 1 , + t i )+ 
b 4 *(FRET 1 + it *SOX t)+b 5*(SOX t)+ 6 b *(SIZE i 1 - t )+ 7 b *(LEV i 1 - t )+ 8 b *(MTB i 1 - t )+e it ....
........(3.21). 
 
The coefficient on DA 1 , + t i  is supposed to be positive if manager’s prior insider purchases 
(sales) are followed by positive (negative) discretionary accruals to distance themselves from 
their prior insider trading. In the discretionary accruals equation (See table 9 Panel B), the 
coefficient  is  positive  and  significant  (coefficient  of  0.0182  and  t statistics  of  2.7051) 
indicating that managers time their trade and employ discretionary accruals in the subsequent 
periods to distance themselves from it. However, in the post SOX period, this relationship is 
insignificant though positive as captured by the coefficient on DA 1 , + t i *SOX t (coefficient of 
0.0039  and  t statistics  of  0.37).  I  additionally  investigated  the  timing  explanation  as 
discussed in prior studies (Ke et al., (2003), Rozeff and Zaman, (1998)) and found that in 
their overall sample period insiders time their trade to benefit from post transaction stock 
returns.  This  indication  is  from  the  fact  that  the  coefficient  on  FRET t  is  positive  and 
significant (coefficient of 0.0624 and t statistics of 2.53). However, I do not find that insider 
can  time  their  trades  in  the  post  SOX  period  to  benefit  from  prior  insider  trading.  The 
coefficient  on FRET 1 + it *SOX t  is  positive  and  insignificant  (coefficient  of  0.0543  and  t 
statistics of 0.74). The coefficient on SOX is positive and significant (coefficient 0.0046 and 
t stats of 3.67) suggesting that insiders are mostly net buyers of their stock in the post SOX 
period. The coefficient on size is positive but statistically weak and insignificant (coefficient 
of 0.0000 and t stats of 0.85), suggesting that insiders of large firms are more likely to buy 
shares. The coefficient on Leverage is positive and significant  (coefficient of 0.0038 and t 
stats of 2.12) which suggests that insiders of highly levered firms are more likely to buy 
shares. Though this is contrary to my expectation, the implication might be that such insiders 
are trading on the shares to give the impression that despite the firms debt, all is going on 
well with the company. The coefficient on market to book ratio suggest that insiders of firms 
that have more growht prospects are prone to selling their shares. However, this coefficient is 
weak and statistically insinificant (coefficient of  0.0038 and t statistics of  1.18).  
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4.5.2.3: Test for Information Motivated Insider Trading. 
In this section, I investigate information motivated insider trading: (1) without the use of 
discretionary  accruals,  assuming  insiders  are  mainly  employing  an  opportunistic  trading 
strategy (2) with the use of discretionary accruals assuming insiders manage earnings to 
benefit from future insider transactions. I report the results in Panel C table 9. As discussed 
in the literature, some insider trading might be information related and discretionary accruals 
might not be associated with prior net shares traded. Managers who have private information 
relating to their expectations of the firm’s future performance might trade on such a basis 
without necessarily manipulating earnings. Post transactions stock returns, used as a proxy 
for firm’s future prospects might be associated with prior insider trading (See, Ke et al., 
2003, Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). As discussed 
in Seyhun (1998), the stock price reactions after insider transactions might continue for up to 
12 months after the earnings announcements. In an effort to examine the strength of the 
returns/insider  trading  and  earnings  management  relationship,  I  regress  stock  returns  on 
insider trading, discretionary accruals and explanatory variables in the following model. The 
regression equation used is: 
 
FRET t i, =a 0 +b1*(DA i 1 - t )+b 2 *(DA i 1 - t * SOX t)+b 3*(SOX t)+b 4 *(NST t i, )+ 
b 5*( NST t i, * SOX t)+ 6 b *(SIZE 1 - t )+ 7 b *(LEV i 1 - t )+  8 b *(MTB i 1 - t ) + e.........(3.22). 
 
The results reported in Table 10 Panel C for the coefficient of DA isuggest a positive and 
significant relationship between prior year discretionary accruals and future stock returns 
(coefficient of 0.0241 and t statistics of 3.16) suggesting that discretionary accruals boost 
earnings and in the sample period, the stock market does not capture this in its valuation of 
companies. This is the same with the net shares traded that predicts future returns quite well 
(coefficient of 0.0585 and t stats of 3.19). However, when this relationship is evaluated in the 
post  SOX  period,  the  relationship  becomes  insignificant  as  both  discretionary  accruals 
(coefficient of  0.0033 and t stats of  0.41) and net shares traded (coefficient of  0.0405 and t 
stats  of   1.51)  are  negatively  and  insignificantly  related  to  future  stock  returns.  The 
coefficient on SOX is positive and significant suggesting that firm returns increases in the 
post SOX period. This might be due to increased confidence in the stock market after stricter 
regulations as a result of the corporate scandals involving Enron and WorldCom (coefficient 
of 0.0034 and t statistics of 3.60). The coefficient on size is weak, negative and statistically  
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insignificant (coefficient of  0.0000 and t stats of  0.20) suggesting that smaller firms are 
more  likely  to  have  a  positive  returns.  The  LEV  variables  suggested  that  the  higher  a 
company’s debt, the more likely its returns would increase (the coefficient of 0.0036 and t 
statistics of 2.62). This result is surprising and suggests that investors do not monitor the total 
amount of debt in a company’s balance. The coefficient on market to book is very weak and 
statistically insignificant (coefficient of  0.0000 and t statistics of  0.51) which suggest that 
firms with more growth prospects are likely to have negative returns.  
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4.5.2.4: Test for the Causal Relationship between insider trading and Earnings 
Management Using Two-Stage Least Square. 
Theoretical  arguments  suggest  that  the  relationship  between  insider  trading  and  earnings 
management might be jointly determined. One strand of literature suggests the pump and dump 
hypothesis, where managers might adjust current period discretionary accruals to benefit from 
insider sales (Park and Park, 2004) or manage earnings prior to insider sales (Bolton et al., 
2002). The other strand suggests that managers might manage earnings prior to insider trading, 
trading ahead based on earnings expectations (Ke et al., 2003) or to avoid litigation (Beneish et 
al., 2004). The joint determination between insider trading and earnings management suggests a 
simultaneous  equation  specification  and  that  they  are  endogenous  variables.  The  Hausman 
specification error tests can be used to test for simultaneity. It is important to note that, a test for 
simultaneity is essentially a test of whether an endogenous regressor is correlated with the error 
term (Gujarati, 1995). Following these, I regress DA on endogenous variables. I further regress 
net shares traded on estimated DA and the residuals generated from the previous regression. As 
suggested  by  Hausman  (1976),  since  the  error  term  is  statistically  significant  in  the  second 
regression  (coefficient  of   0.0318  and  t stats  of   2.8401)  I  do  not  reject  the  hypothesis  of 
simultaneity.  
 
As  a  result  of  the  correlation  between  the  stochastic  disturbance  term  and  the  endogenous 
variable, the OLS estimation might not be appropriate for the estimation of just one equation in a 
system of simultaneous equation. In the presence of simultaneity problems, the 2 stage least 
squares estimation will give estimators that are consistent and efficient (Gujarati, 1995). As 
discussed above and specified in equations 3.23 and 3.24, both DA it  and NST it  are endogenous 
variables. The variables SOX t, FRET t, SIZE t, LEV tand MTB t are endogenous variables. After 
having checked and confirmed the presence of simultaneity using the Hausman specification 
error  test  as  discussed  in  the  prior  paragraph,  we  implement  the  two  stage  least  squares 
technique. Theoretically, we can implement the OLS to equation 3.24, but the obtained estimates 
will be inconsistent as a result of the likely correlation between the explanatory variable DA it   
and the error term in the equation. In such vein, to purify the stochastic explanatory variable 
DA it of the perceived influence of the disturbance (or the error term), the test finds a proxy for 
the explanatory variable DA it  such that, although it resembles DA it , it is uncorrelated with the 
error term.  
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To find this proxy, I first regress DA it  on the endogenous variables specified above. This is 
mainly a reduced form coefficient of equation 3.23 as only the endogenous variables  appear on 
the right hand side of the equation
 24. Equation 3.23 can now be effectively expressed as: 
 
DA t i, =a 0
Ù
DA t i,  +
Ù
e t i, ..................(3.23 Sub). 
 
As in Gujarati (1995), the stochastic DA t i, consists of two parts, which are a linear combination 
of the non stochastic endogenous variables and random component 
Ù
e t i, . According to the OLS 
theory, 
Ù
DA t i,  and 
Ù
e t i, are uncorrelated.  
 
To  illustrate  further,  in  the  first  step,  we  regress  the  endogenous  variables  on  all  the 
predetermined variables in the system. In stage 2, we replace the endogenous variables in the 
original  equations  by  their  estimated  values  that  were  acquired  from  the  preceding  two 
regressions and run the OLS regression as in equations 3.23 and 3.24 discussed below.  
 
This study therefore employs the two stage least square approach of the form:   
 
DA t i, =a 0 +b1*(NST t i, )+b 2 *(NST t i, *SOX t i, )+b 3*(SOX t i, )+b 4 *(FRET t i, )+b 5*(FRET*SOX
t i, )+b 6*( SIZE t i, ) + b 7 *( LEV t i, )+  8 b *( MTB t i, )  + e t i, ..................(3.23). 
 
NST t i, =a 0 +b1*(DA i 1 - t )+b 2 *(DA i 1 - t *SOX t i, )+b 3*(FRET 1 + it )+ 
b 4 *(FRET 1 + it *SOX t i, )+b 5*(SOX)+ 6 b *(SIZE i 1 - t )+ 7 b *(LEV i 1 - t )+ 8 b *(MTB i 1 - t )+ 
e it................(3.24). 
 
DA it = firms i discretionary accruals at period t immediately after insider transactions in the prior 
period, NST it  is the net shares traded accumulated over the year, NST it*SOX it  is an interactive 
variable that captures the impact of post SOX net shares traded on future discretionary accruals, 
SOX it  is a variable set equal to 1 if the firm year is in the post Sarbanes Oxley period and zero 
otherwise, FRET it is the firm’s one year ahead stock returns after the period of insider trading or 
                                                 
24 DA t i, =a 0 +b1*(SOX)+b 2 *(FRET t i, )+b 3*(SIZE t i, )+b 4 *(LEV)+b 5*(MTB)+ + e t i, .  
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discretionary accruals, FRET it*SOX it  is an interactive variable that measures the influences of 
post SOX firms returns on the dependent variable, SIZE it is the firm’s total assets employed as a 
proxy for firm size, LEV it  which is leverage is the firm’s total liabilities over the total assets, 
MTB it  is the firm’s market to book ratios.  
 
The variable FRET it  is included because prior research has suggested that current period returns 
can be influenced by prior discretionary accruals and that insider trading is associated with the 
firm’s future prospects proxy for post transactions stock returns (Ke et al., 2003). The variable 
MTB it  controls for the impact of growth prospects on the use of discretionary accruals in table 
11 Panel A and on insider trading on table 11 Panel b, the variable LEV it  is leverage that 
controls for debt covenants influence to earnings management, and SIZE it  proxy with total assets 
control for the impact of size on earnings management practices and insider trading.  
 
Table 10 reports the regression results of the 2 stage least squares. As discussed above, the test 
here have look for a proxy for the explanatory variable DA it. After estimating this DA it proxy 
following the specifications above, I have trimmed the sample for outliers causing the sample to 
reduce slightly from 3212 firm years to 3204 firm years. Outliers here have been defined here 
following  the  Easton  and  Harris  (1991)  study  as  1.5  standard  deviations  to  the  mean.  This 
technique was adopted following Marton (1998) who argued that the test will help existing 
structures in the data to be easily discovered and picked out. In Panel A, the dependent variable 
is the discretionary accruals and in Panel B, the dependent variable is the net shares traded. The 
coefficient of NSTit in the discretionary accruals equation is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level (coefficient of 0.6800 and t stats of 2.89) suggesting that insiders manage earnings 
after insider transactions. However, the coefficient of NST it*SOX it which is another key variable 
of interest is negative and significant suggesting that, when insiders manage earnings in the post 
SOX period after prior insider trading, they do so to distance themselves from the trade. The 
coefficient on SIZE it  is positive and significant (coefficient of 0.0391 and t stats of 2.08). The 
coefficient on LEV it is positive and significant suggesting that firms with large debts are more 
likely  to  manage  earnings  to  meet  debt  covenant  obligations  than  firms  with  fewer  debts 
(coefficient of 0.3120 and t statistics of 3.58). In the net shares traded equation reported in panel 
b, Table 5 below, the coefficient of DA is positive and significant. This suggests that firms that 
have net buying (selling) firm employ positive (negative) discretionary accruals. However, the  
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coefficient on DA it*SOX it  is positive but insignificant suggesting that managers do not time 
their trades and employ discretionary accruals to benefit from it in the post SOX period. The 
coefficient on FRET it is positive and significant suggesting that prior insider trading is relating 
to future firm performance as proxy by stock returns (coefficient of 0.1040 and t statistics 8.02). 
The  coefficient  of  FRET it*SOX it  is  negative  and  significant  suggesting  that  managers  are 
unable  to  time  their  trades  in  the  post  SOX  period  to  benefit  from  prior  insider  trading 
(coefficient of  0.0610 and t statistics of  6.64).  
 
Overall, the results using the 2 stage least square follows a similar pattern to that observed in the 
main hypothesis. Specifically, results for the Post SOX era suggest that insider trades does not 
significantly relate to firm performance. Also, discretionary accruals are not employed to boost 
firms earnings post SOX after insider trading. Combining the findings of the main hypothesis 
and  the  2  stage  least  squares,  the  testable  implications  are  that  greater  control  of  financial 
markets through stricter regulations will lead to controlled market behavior and less market 
abuse.  The result for the Post SOX era also amplify the result of previously documented trading 
strategies using samples only in a normal business climate without substantial market abuse and 
changes in regulations (e.g. Ke et al., 2003, Beneish and Vargus, 2002, 2004, Park and Park, 
2004) that investors can exploit knowledge earnings management and insider trading and make 
significant profit. In fact, Beneish and Vargus (2002) show that during periods when accruals are 
high, insiders are more likely to sell unusually high amounts of their shares and that period of 
high accruals accompanied by high insider sales are customarily following by low stock returns. 
However, when the regulations are tightened, this might not be possible as managers would be 
less  likely  to  influence  the  quality  of  earnings.  
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4.5.2.5:  Robustness  Tests:  Using  Alternative  Definition  of  Earnings 
Management. 
Although the modified Jones model has been quite popular in previous earnings management 
research, the model also has problems separating earnings management from the effects of 
real  financial  decision  and  changing  economic  conditions  (e.g.  inventory  build  up). 
Additionally,  few  firms  have  sufficiently  long  time  series  of  data  to  permit  reliable 
estimation  of  the  discretionary  component  of  accruals.  In  contrast  to  accruals  earnings 
management, real earnings management can be achieved by changing the firms underlying 
operations (cut in prices to improve sales, asset sales to improve profits, reduction in R&D 
expenditures, etc). The implications are that there can be erroneous interpretation of the 
results and due to the interaction of real and discretionary accruals variables used in the 
modified Jones (1991) model, without separation, the results might be of low power. 
 
To check the robustness of my empirical results, I conduct additional tests using alternative 
definitions  of  earnings  management.  They  include  real  earnings  management  through 
changes  in  discretionary expenses  as  discussed  by  Roychowdhury,  (2006),  and  the  rank 
variable model using the M Score (Beneish, 1997, 1999). The use of the M Score as a proxy 
for earnings management is a slight departure from previous studies. The M Score (a Rank 
Variable)  focuses on  financial statement distortions and conditions that suggest earnings 
management. Using these alternative definitions of earnings management facilitates a more 
effective comparison of the results of this study with alternative models that employ other 
earnings management proxies. It also helps the researcher see if the results reported earlier 
are  changed  using  these  different  definitions  of  earnings  management.  Following  the 
discussion above, the empirical model is given by:  
 
X t i, =a 0 +b1*(NST t i, )+b 2 *(NST t i, * SOX t)+b 3*(SOX t)+b 4 *(FRET t i, )+ 
b 5*( FRET t i, * SOX t)+b 6*(SIZE t i, )+b 7 *(LEV t i, )+ 8 b *(MTB t i, )+e t i, ............(3.25). 
 
Where  X t i, are  alternative  proxies  for  earnings  management  including  the  M_SCORE, 
Abnormal discretionary expenses (ADEXP) and abnormal production cost (APROC). Based 
on 8 variables the M Score is estimated as:  
 
M =  4.84 + .920*DSRI + .528*GMI + .404*AQI + .892*SGI + .115*DEPI  .172*SGAI + 
4.679*TATA   .327     (3.26)  
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For details of the estimation of M Score, see section 3.3.2.7.  
  
Table 11 report the results using these alternative real earnings management proxies in the 
OLS regressions. Panel A shows the results for the M_SCORE as the dependent variable; 
Panel B shows the results for abnormal discretionary expenses, while Panel C shows the 
results for abnormal production costs. As the result in Panel A suggest, the intercept for the 
M Score ( 2.9831) and the t statistics ( 2.81) suggests that based on the M Score results, less 
firms  are  less  likely  to  manage  earnings.  The  coefficient  on  NST  suggests  a  negative 
relationship  between  NST  and  M Score  though  the  result  is  statistically  insignificant 
(coefficient of  1.2570 and t statistics of  0.94). The variable SOX suggest that in the post 
SOX period, firms are more likely to have a negative M Score (coefficient of  0.2111 and t 
statistics of  3.04) while the variable NST*SOX suggest that firms the relationship between 
insider trading and M Score in the post SOX period is more likely to be positive, though 
statistically insignificant (coefficient of 0.2917 and t statistics of 1.05). The coefficient on 
FRET is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that when firms employ negative 
discretionary accruals to influence reported earnings as prescribed by the M Score, investors 
are  quick  to  discount  it  in  the  valuation  of  the  companies,  while  the  coefficient  on 
FRET*SOX is positive, suggesting that when firms use discretionary accruals to influence 
reported earnings in the post SOX period, investors are not quick to discount this in the 
valuation of the companies, however, the result is statistically insignificant (coefficient of 
2.4394  and  t  statistics  of  0.61).  The  coefficient  on  SIZE  is  statistically  very  weak  and 
insignificant suggesting no apparent relationship on SIZE and the M Score (coefficient of 
0.000 and t statistics of 0.00) and this is the same with the coefficient on LEV implying that 
debt obligations does not have any clear relationship with the M Score.  
 
The intercept of abnormal discretionary expenses in panel B table 11 though weak suggest 
that firms are more likely to increase discretionary expenses (coefficient of 0.0088 and t 
statistics of 2.72). The result for the NST suggests a negative relationship between earnings 
management using abnormal discretionary expenses and net shares traded. This implies that, 
when insiders buy (sell) shares, they reduce (increase) discretionary earnings to increase 
(decrease) future earnings. However, this result is statistically insignificant (coefficient of  
0.1689 and t statistics of  1.14). In the Post SOX era, insider trades are positively related to 
abnormal discretionary expenses, though the result is statistically insignificant (coefficient of 
0.2244 and t statistics of 1.03). The result for SOX suggests that firms are more likely to 
increase discretionary expenses (coefficient of 0.0057 and t statistics of 0.74). the result for  
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FRET is negative which suggest that firms that increase discretionary expenses are more 
likely to have a negative future returns in the future (coefficient of  0.2725 and t statistics of  
2.19), additionally, in the post SOX period, when firms increase discretionary expenses they 
are more likely to have negative stock returns, but the result if statistically insignificant 
(coefficient of  0.1326 and t statistics of  0.29). the variable SIZE suggest that the larger the 
firm SIZE, the lower the amount of abnormal discretionary expenses that the firm is likely to 
employ (coefficient of  0.0001 and t statistics of  2.30) and the variable leverage suggest that 
a firms debt do not have any clear relationship with the amount of discretionary expenses the 
firm is likely to use (coefficient of 0.00269 and t statistics of 0.26). the coefficient on Market 
to book (MTB) suggests that firms with more growth prospects are less likely to engaged in 
abnormal changes in discretionary expenses (coefficient of 0.0009 and t statistics of 4.47).  
 
The intercept for panel C for abnormal production cost is  0.0271 and the t statistics is  2.12 
which suggest that firms are more likely to reduce production cost. However, a firms trading 
is  positively  related  to  its  abnormal  production  cost,  though  the  result  is  statistically 
insignificant (coefficient of  0.0271 and t statistics of  2.12). However, in the Post SOX 
period, when firms manage earnings using positive (negative) abnormal production cost, 
they are likely to engage in  insider sales (purchases) (coefficient of  0.0025 and t statistics of 
 1.07). The result on abnormal production cost suggest that in the Post SOX period, firms are 
more likely to have a positive abnormal production cost (coefficient of 0.0084 and t statistics 
of 0.89). the coefficient on FRET suggest that production cost is positively related to future 
returns (coefficient of 0.41334 and t statistics of 2.25), however, in the post SOX period, 
though  production  cost  is  positively  related  to  future  returns,  the  result  if  statistically 
insignificant (coefficient of 0.5382 and t statistics of 0.99), suggesting that increased cost of 
production is viewed as a positive signal by investors, though the result if meaningless. The 
coefficient on SIZE (coefficient of  0.0001 and t statistics of  0.37) and LEV (coefficient of 
0.0121 and t statistics of 0.92) produced statistically insignificant results, which imply that 
debt covenant obligations or firm SIZE does not have a clear relationship to the changes in 
production cost. The coefficient on Market to book value (MTB) suggest that the higher the 
growth prospect of a firm, the less likely the firm will employ abnormal production cost to 
influence reported earnings (coefficient of  0.0013 and t statistics of  5.21).  
 
The  results  of  these  three  earnings  management  proxies  suggest  that  the  statistical 
significance disappears when we repeat the test using other earnings management proxies. 
Thus investors are more vigilant when earnings are managed using discretionary accruals as 
supported by the results of FRET and FRET*SOX in the discretionary accruals model and  
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that  insider  trade  and  manage  earnings  using  discretionary  accruals  is  a  more  likely 
occurrence  than  insider  trades  and  subsequent  earnings  management  using  real  earnings 
management  techniques.  These  suggest  that  there  have  been  no  changes  on  earnings 
management relationship to insider trading as a result of the effect of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 
2002 (coefficient of NST *SOX are 0.2917, 0.2224 and  0.0025 and t stats are respectively 
1.15, 1.02 and  1.07). The results overall are not qualitatively affected by other measures of 
earnings management as supported by either the insignificant coefficients or the reduced 
frequency of the observations. Although in retrospect, these results might be partly due to the 
fact  that  real  earnings  management  variable  are  customarily  captured  in  discretionary 
earnings management (Roychowdhury, 2006), I am otherwise unable to fully explain this 
feature from this research. Additionally, I cannot definitely rule out the possibility that each 
real earnings management technique might capture different issues linked to market abuse 
(e.g. seasoned equity offerings, Initial public offerings) and not necessarily insider trading in 
both the Pre and Post SOX era. However, this can be investigated later.  
 
X t i, =a 0 +b1*(NST t i, )+b 2 *(NST t i, * SOX t)+b 3*(SOX t)+b 4 *(FRET t i, )+ 
b 5*( FRET t i, * SOX t)+b 6*(SIZE t i, )+b 7 *(LEV t i, )+ 8 b *(MTB t i, )+e t i, ............(3.25). 
  
1
5
2
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
1
:
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
R
o
b
u
s
t
n
e
s
s
 
T
e
s
t
 
U
s
i
n
g
 
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
 
D
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
.
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
.
 
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
.
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
C
.
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
M
 
S
c
o
r
e
.
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
 
A
D
E
X
P
.
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
A
P
R
O
C
.
 
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
(
t
 
s
t
a
t
s
)
.
 
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
(
t
 
s
t
a
t
s
)
.
 
 
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
(
t
 
s
t
a
t
s
)
.
 
I
n
t
e
r
c
e
p
t
 
 
2
.
9
8
3
0
 
(
 
2
.
8
1
)
 
I
n
t
e
r
c
e
p
t
 
0
.
0
0
8
8
 
(
2
.
7
1
)
 
I
n
t
e
r
c
e
p
t
 
 
0
.
0
2
7
1
 
(
 
2
.
1
2
)
 
N
S
T
t
i
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
.
2
5
7
0
 
(
 
0
.
9
4
)
 
D
A
1
,
+
t
i
 
 
0
.
1
6
8
9
 
(
 
1
.
1
4
)
 
D
A
i
1
-
t
 
0
.
0
2
7
5
 
(
0
.
1
5
)
 
N
S
T
t
i
,
*
S
O
X
t
 
0
.
2
9
1
7
 
(
1
.
1
5
)
 
D
A
1
,
+
t
i
*
 
S
O
X
t
 
0
.
2
2
2
4
 
(
1
.
0
2
)
 
D
A
i
1
-
t
*
 
S
O
X
t
 
 
0
.
0
0
2
5
 
 
(
 
1
.
0
7
)
 
S
O
X
t
 
 
0
.
2
1
1
0
 
(
 
3
.
0
4
)
 
F
R
E
T
1
,
+
t
i
 
0
.
0
0
5
7
 
(
0
.
7
3
)
 
S
O
X
t
 
0
.
0
0
8
4
 
(
0
.
8
9
)
 
F
R
E
T
t
i
,
 
 
3
.
3
8
4
8
 
(
 
2
.
4
8
)
 
F
R
E
T
1
+
i
t
*
S
O
X
t
 
 
0
.
2
7
2
5
 
(
 
2
.
1
9
)
 
N
S
T
t
i
,
 
0
.
4
1
3
3
 
(
2
.
2
5
)
 
F
R
E
T
*
 
S
O
X
t
 
2
.
4
3
9
8
 
(
0
.
6
1
)
 
S
O
X
t
 
 
0
.
1
3
2
6
 
(
 
0
.
2
9
)
 
N
S
T
t
i
,
*
 
S
O
X
t
 
0
.
5
3
8
2
 
(
0
.
9
9
)
 
S
I
Z
E
t
i
,
 
0
.
0
0
0
1
 
(
0
.
0
0
)
 
S
I
Z
E
i
1
-
t
 
 
0
.
0
0
0
1
(
 
2
.
0
3
)
 
S
I
Z
E
1
-
t
 
 
0
.
0
0
0
1
 
(
 
0
.
3
7
)
 
L
E
V
t
i
,
 
 
0
.
0
0
5
5
 
(
 
0
.
0
5
)
 
L
E
V
i
1
-
t
 
0
.
0
0
2
6
 
(
0
.
2
5
)
 
L
E
V
i
1
-
t
 
0
.
0
1
1
7
 
(
0
.
9
2
)
 
M
T
B
t
i
,
 
0
.
0
0
4
2
 
(
2
.
2
3
)
 
M
T
B
i
1
-
t
 
0
.
0
0
0
9
 
(
4
.
4
7
)
 
M
T
B
i
1
-
t
 
 
0
.
0
0
1
3
 
(
 
5
.
2
1
)
 
A
d
j
 
R
 
s
q
.
 
0
.
0
0
5
1
 
A
d
j
 
R
 
s
q
.
 
0
.
0
0
7
1
 
A
d
j
 
R
 
s
q
.
 
0
.
0
0
9
5
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
 
Y
e
a
r
s
.
 
3
2
1
2
 
(
N
)
 
3
2
1
2
 
(
N
)
 
3
2
1
2
  
1
5
3
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
1
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
O
L
S
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
A
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
M
_
S
C
O
R
E
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
B
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
A
D
E
X
P
 
(
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
)
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
P
a
n
e
l
 
C
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
A
P
R
O
C
 
(
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
)
 
o
n
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
o
r
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
M
 
S
c
o
r
e
 
i
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
B
e
n
e
i
s
h
 
(
1
9
9
7
,
 
1
9
9
9
)
 
m
o
d
e
l
.
 
A
n
 
M
 
S
c
o
r
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
h
i
g
h
e
s
t
 
d
e
c
i
l
e
 
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
s
 
a
c
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
 
f
i
r
m
 
y
e
a
r
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
t
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
l
i
k
e
l
y
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
 
d
i
s
t
o
r
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
B
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
8
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
M
 
S
c
o
r
e
 
i
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
 
 
M
 
=
 
 
4
.
8
4
 
+
 
.
9
2
0
*
D
S
R
I
 
+
 
.
5
2
8
*
G
M
I
 
+
 
.
4
0
4
*
A
Q
I
 
+
 
.
8
9
2
*
S
G
I
 
+
 
.
1
1
5
*
D
E
P
I
 
 
.
1
7
2
*
S
G
A
I
 
+
 
4
.
6
7
9
*
T
A
T
A
 
 
 
.
3
2
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
7
)
 
 
I
n
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
d
a
t
a
 
u
n
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
M
 
S
c
o
r
e
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
5
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
s
:
 
 
M
 
=
 
 
6
.
0
6
5
 
+
 
.
8
2
3
*
D
S
R
I
 
+
 
.
9
0
6
*
G
M
I
 
+
 
.
5
9
3
*
A
Q
I
 
+
 
.
7
1
7
*
S
G
I
 
+
 
.
1
0
7
*
D
E
P
I
.
 
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
:
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
 
 
D
I
S
E
X
P
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
 
*
(
S
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
3
)
 
 
W
h
e
r
e
 
A
t
 
=
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
S
t
 
=
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
 
S
t
 
=
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
.
 
 
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
:
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
 
 
P
R
O
D
t
/
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
 
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
*
(
S
t
/
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
2
*
(
 
S
t
/
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
3
*
(
 
S
t
/
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
2
)
  
1
5
4
 
 
 
W
h
e
r
e
 
A
t
 
=
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
S
t
=
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
 
S
t
 
=
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
.
 
 
N
S
T
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
n
e
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
 
a
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
N
S
T
*
S
O
X
i
t
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
v
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
 
n
e
t
 
s
h
a
r
e
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
,
 
S
O
X
i
t
 
i
s
 
a
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
s
e
t
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
y
e
a
r
 
i
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
a
r
b
a
n
e
s
 
O
x
l
e
y
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
z
e
r
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
,
 
F
R
E
T
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
o
n
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
,
 
F
R
E
T
i
t
*
S
O
X
i
t
 
i
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
v
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
,
 
S
I
Z
E
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
 
s
i
z
e
,
 
L
E
V
i
t
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
,
 
M
T
B
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
t
o
 
b
o
o
k
 
r
a
t
i
o
s  155 
155   
   
4.6: Conclusion. 
This study has broadly examined the relationship between discretionary accruals and Insider 
trading activity and discusses how this relationship has changed as a result of the introduction of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Additionally, based on prior literature, it robustly tests the 
relationship between insider trading and future earnings realisations post SOX. In order to avoid 
a contamination of the signals conveyed by different kinds of relationship and other earnings 
management proxies, the analysis is conducted using other earnings management proxies. This 
is evaluated with a sample of S&P 500 firms over the period of 1997 2006. Prior literature 
(Trueman, (1990), Beneish and Vargus (2004)) provides a theoretical basis for some empirical 
investigation on  whether insider trading is associated to  future earnings. In addition, recent 
empirical findings have provided evidence to support the fact that strict insider trading rules may 
have an impact on the way managers do exercise their knowledge of private information about a 
firm’s  future  prospect.  Furthermore,  Hope  (2003)  provided  evidence  ascertaining  that  strict 
insider trading laws may prevent managers from manipulating earnings for profit while trading 
in their corporation’s stock. Additional research has examined the impact of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002 on earnings management
47, but to the best of my knowledge, none of these articles 
have investigated the relationship between earnings management and insider trading in light of 
the recent regulatory intervention. It is in such a context that this empirical essay examines the 
relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light of the recent regulatory 
intervention as prescribed by the SOX of 2002.  
 
After controlling for important factors such as size, growth opportunities, leverage (or debt 
covenant  obligations),  on  insider  trading  and  earnings  management  relationship,  several 
important conclusions emerge. First, consistent with many US studies, the findings show that on 
average companies employ negative discretionary accruals to manage earnings and are also net 
sellers of their stock. After the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the quality of earnings 
have  improved  as  companies  use  less  discretionary  accruals  to  manage  reported  earnings. 
Contrary  to  prior  studies  (See  Beneish,  1999),  the  results  do  not  support  the  assertion  that 
managers  employ  discretionary  accruals  to  influence  reported  earnings  after  prior  insider 
trading. As in prior literature (See Park and Park (2004) and Beneish and Vargus (2002)), the 
                                                 
47 Cohen et al., (2004) find evidence that there is a decrease of earnings management after the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act of 2002.   156 
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results suggest that in the overall sample period, there is a positive relationship between prior 
year discretionary accruals and one year ahead stock returns. This suggests that discretionary 
accruals are customarily used to boost reported earnings leading to a positive stock returns. 
However, in the post SOX period, investors do not fixate on the earnings figure.  
 
When managers employ discretionary accounting techniques to improve reported earnings post 
SOX,  investors  discount  the  stocks  of  these  companies  leading  to  negative  stock  returns. 
Another way to interpret this is, due to stricter regulations post SOX, when managers employ 
discretionary accruals to influence reported earnings, this triggers immediate market reactions as 
investors discount this through negative stock returns. Another plausible explanation for this 
result that is consistent to the litigation avoidance hypothesis by Beneish et al., (2004), is that 
other stakeholders might follow insider transactions more cautiously post SOX, which causes 
insiders to trade more cautiously and to distance from information related trading. 
 
It is important to distinguish between insider trades that are linked to future reported earnings 
without the use of discretionary accruals and those that are not. With respect to insider trading 
relationship to post transactions stock returns (without necessarily using discretionary accruals 
to influence reported earnings), this relationship is tested between current period insider trading 
and future returns. Due to stricter market regulations post SOX, it is less likely insider trades 
might  motivate  earnings  management.  Ideally,  investors  with  private  information  about  the 
economy, the firm’s future prospects and its effects on its cash flow and earnings might form 
expectations and trade on that basis without necessarily employing discretionary accruals to 
influence the public information (reported earnings). As in prior literature (See Ke et al. 2003, 
Park and Park, 2006), the findings suggest that in the overall sample period, insider trading is 
positively related to post transaction stock returns.  However, in the post SOX period, managers 
are less likely to time their trade based on overall market and economic fundamentals even when 
they  are  not  interested  in  influencing  reported  earnings.  The  result  does  not  support  the 
assumption that insiders might switch from real to discretionary earnings management and trade 
to benefit at the expense of other investors.  
 
All in all, the results suggest that SOX has improved the integrity of the US financial market and 
strict insider trading regulations makes it risky for managers to trade and manage earnings to 
benefit from prior insider trading. In normal business conditions, insider’s private information   157 
157   
(as  disclosed  by  their  trades)  plays  an  important  role  in  forming  expectations  about  their 
earnings projections. However, when regulations are enforced, insiders are less likely to use 
their superior information to distinguish themselves from the “crowd” of other investors.  
 
As an added robustness test, I test for possible simultaneous equation as the literature supposes 
that insider trading might influence earnings management and vice versa. Once this is confirmed 
through the Haussmann specification error test, the causal relationship between insider trading 
and earnings management is investigated using the 2 stage least squares. The results reported in 
section 4.5.2.4 are consistent to those already reported. I additionally test the robustness of the 
results  using  alternative  definitions  of  earnings  management  and  the  results  overall  are  not 
qualitatively affected by other measures of earnings management as supported by either the 
insignificant coefficients or the reduced frequency of the observations. Although in retrospect, 
these  results  might  be  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  real  earnings  management  variable  are 
customarily  captured  in  discretionary  earnings  management  (Roychowdhury,  2006),  I  am 
otherwise unable to fully explain this feature from this research. Additionally, I cannot definitely 
rule out the possibility that each real earnings management technique might capture different 
issues linked to market abuse (e.g. seasoned equity offerings, Initial public offerings) and not 
necessarily directly related to insider trading in both the Pre and Post SOX era. This can be 
investigated in any future research.  
  
5.0:  Earnings  Quality  and  Firm  Performance:  Examining  the  Changes  in  the 
Post Sarbanes- Oxley Era. 
 
5.1: Abstract. 
This Chapter examines the relationship between earnings management and firm performance 
and evaluates how this relationship has changed as a result of the introduction of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002. The Chapter employs three measures of earnings quality that has been 
employed in the accounting literature using financial statements data: (1) the Beneish (1999) 
M Score that ranks firms according to their probability of financial statements manipulations 
(Beneish 1997, 1999), (2) the discretionary accruals model by Dechow et al. (1995) (See 
Balsam et al., (2003)) (3) and estimates of real earnings management involving abnormal 
changes in discretionary expenses, abnormal changes in production costs, abnormal changes in   158 
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receivables,  abnormal  changes  in  inventory,  and  abnormal  operating  accruals.  The  result 
suggests  that  firms  are  less  likely  to  employ  discretionary  and  real  earnings  management 
techniques to influence reported earnings after the introduction of SOX. In the post SOX 
period,  investors  discount  earnings  management  practices  through  marking  down  stock 
returns. Finally, the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to real 
earnings  management  when  tighter  regulatory  scrutiny  restrict  earnings  management  via 
accrual manipulations. 
 
5.2: Background. 
The  enactment  of  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  of  2002  after  the  high  profile  business  scandals 
brought enormous expectations to the US capital market. This was as a result of the implicit 
assumption in most policy oriented discussions that the failures of these companies were as a 
result of the ineffectiveness of current regulations relating to earnings management practices. 
The Acts primary objective was to improve the quality of financial reporting. Before this Act, 
news of financial fraud at Enron, WorldCom, Cendant, etc had changed the perception of the 
regulatory  environment  and  has  seemingly  favoured  stricter  regulatory  control  on  earnings 
management and  other  corporate  governance practices. This is because the scandals caused 
systemic financial distress and a decline in the stock values in the US and other stock markets. 
According  to  Section  302  of  the  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  of  2002  (henceforth  SOX),  principal 
executives of public firms (primarily the CEO and CFO) have to certify that their company’s 
financial statements do not contain material misstatements or omissions and reflects the firm’s 
financial  conditions.  The  implications  were  that  such  executives  are  to  be  accountable  for 
material misstatements in financial reports.  
 
Graham et al. (2005) argue that managers manage earnings to influence future stock prices. 
Investors extrapolate past trends from accounting information and make decisions on the future 
(Zhang, 2003). These suggest that future performance as measured by the future stock returns is 
important  for  managers.  Due  to  the  cost  associated  with  fraudulent  financial  reporting, 
heightened  attention  was  needed  by  investors,  analysts  and  other  users  of  accounting 
information  in  regard  to  earnings  management  practices.  They  also  need  to  exploit  all 
information useful in assessing fraud due to its influence on accounting earnings and subsequent 
stock returns (Beneish and Nichols, 2007). Apart from the strict regulatory attention to penalize   159 
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companies  that  manipulate  earnings,  some  investors are  capable  of  unravelling  manipulated 
financial statements and undertake investment decisions on this basis.  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to empirically assess the relationship between a comprehensive 
set of earnings management signals and future firm performance. Its prime purpose is to verify 
whether there have been substantial benefits to investors as a result of the enactment of the 
SOX  through  (i)  improvements  in  earnings  quality  as  a  result  of  the  SOX  (ii)  if  as  a 
consequence  of  this,  investors  price  the  level  of  earnings  management  in  the  financial 
statements.  
 
The primary motivation for this Chapter is derived from the recent regulation of financial 
reporting  practices  as  prescribed  by  SOX.  The  second  motivation  originates  from  the 
inconclusive  evidence  presented  in  recent  research  regarding  whether  investors  fixate  on 
accounting information (Chan et al., 2006) or are more sophisticated in processing accounting 
information. Public discussions and efforts made by regulators have been aimed at regulating 
earnings  management.  Considering  price  declines  after  public  revelations  of  earnings 
management practices, the presumption is that investors do consider the extent of earnings 
management  practices  when  making  investment  decisions  (Spohr,  2005).  As  already 
discussed, the Sarbanes Oxley Act is meant to improve the quality of financial reporting. A 
key issue for researchers has been how earnings management influences the performance of 
companies. Since SOX in principle reduces the information uncertainty through the provision 
of high quality financial reports, we expect the stock price reaction to earnings announcement 
post SOX to be positive leading to positive returns. If firms still adopt earnings management 
practices and the stock market is able to discount its negative impact as a result of its low 
earnings quality, then SOX should have brought in substantial benefits to the overall market. 
My prediction is that firms with high earnings management should have negative stock returns 
in the subsequent period.  
 
This chapter differs from the numerous findings that have documented a relationship between 
accounting information and future returns on several dimensions: First, it investigates the policy 
influences  on  the  relationship  between  managed  financial  reporting  practices  and  firm 
performance. Second, apart from examining a single predictive earnings management variable, I 
examined a comprehensive set of variables that have been found in the literature to influence   160 
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reported earnings and future performance. Though more attention has been placed on accounting 
accruals,  in  the  absence of  possibilities  to  manage  earnings  through  accruals,  managers  are 
exposed to real earnings management techniques. Since the bulk of predictive power of accruals 
originates  from  changes  in  inventory,  I  separate  the  various  components  of  accruals  (like 
accounts receivables, accounts payables and inventories) and real earnings management and 
study their impact on firm performance. This is because, a broader set of financial statement 
information post SOX with strict regulation might enhance predictive power for stock returns 
((see Chan et al., 2007).   
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two discusses prior academic literature 
and  explains  the  motivations  for  this  research.  In  the  process,  the  research  hypothesis  is 
developed  and  explained.  Section  3  discusses  the  research  design;  section  4  contains  the 
descriptive and empirical evidences. Section 5 summarizes the main results of the Chapter, the 
research implications and finally provides suggestions for future research.  
 
5.3.0:Review of the Literature, Test Motivation and Hypothesis Development. 
This section reviews the literature that is specific to the second empirical essay. Specifically, it 
evaluates theory relating to earnings quality relationship to firms performance in light of the 
recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Prior literature 
discussed in detail below provides a theoretical basis to investigate whether a firm’s earnings 
quality is related to its future stock returns. Guay et al. (1996) documented that discretionary 
accruals  are  positively  associated  with  future  stock  returns.    Other  literature  (See 
Roychowdhury, 2006, Gunny, 2006) have provided evidence that other forms of real earnings 
management  are  positively  related  to  future  firm  performance.  Quite  recently,  Beneish  and 
McNichols  (2008)  suggested  a  strong  relationship  between  the  probability  of  earnings 
manipulation and future returns. Additionally, in light of recent regulations, as prescribed by 
SOX,  managers  might  still  manage  earnings  using  less  detectable  earnings  management 
techniques (see Cohen et al., (2006)).  
 
Three measures of earnings quality are employed, including (1) the Beneish (1999) M Score 
(Beneish  1997,  1999),  (2)  the  discretionary  accruals  models  by  Dechow  et  al.  (1995)  (See 
Balsam  et  al.,  (2003))  (3)  and  estimates  of  real  earnings  management  involving  abnormal 
changes in discretionary expenses, abnormal changes in production costs, abnormal changes in   161 
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receivables, abnormal changes in inventory, and abnormal operating accruals (Roychowdhury, 
(2006)).  Post  transaction  stock  returns  are  also  employed  as  a  proxy  for  future  firm 
performance
48 (see Beneish and Vargus 2002 and Ke et al., 2003).  
 
5.3.1: SOX Relationship to Earnings Management. 
It can be argued that when firms are subject to regulatory scrutiny, they might employ measures 
that cannot be easily detected by the regulators. In contrast to accrual earnings management, 
earnings  management  through  real  operating  decisions  such  as  reductions  in  discretionary 
expenses (primarily R&D, advertisement, selling, general and administrative expenses), asset 
sales,  price  discounts  to  improve  sales  mostly  occur  during  the  course  of  the  year 
(Roychowdhury, (2006)). These actions are costly, in relation to their impact on the cash flow of 
the  company.  Even  though  accruals  are  less  costly,  they  customarily  mean revert  and 
overstatements in the current period must be offset by an understatement in the future. The 
indirect and often easily detectable nature of accruals subject firms that report high accruals are 
likely to face SEC enforcement actions (see Dechow et al., (1996), Bradshaw et al. 2001) than 
those that directly employ real earnings management. Moreover, the business judgement rule 
gives  firms  the  flexibility  to  manage  earnings  without  facing  regulatory  scrutiny.  SEC 
enforcements and prior year accruals might thus limit a firm’s ability to manage earnings using 
discretionary accrual techniques alone.  
 
Since regulators habitually focus on the easy to detect discretionary accruals technique (e.g. 
Cohen et al., 2006, Roychowdhury, 2006), unlike real earning management, accrual based 
earnings management is expected to reduce as a result of the passage of regulations aimed at 
improving earnings quality.  Cohen et al., (2006) documented that after the passage of SOX, 
accruals  earnings  management  was  reduced  giving  way  to  an  increase  in  real  earnings 
management.  In a recent study by Chang and Sun (2008), the researchers found that SOX 
regulations on audit committee independence and other corporate governance have improved 
the quality of accounting earnings. Using sample firms' earnings informativeness and earnings 
management to measure the quality of accounting earnings, they found significantly positive 
(negative)  relations  between  earnings  informativeness  (earnings  management),  audit 
committee independence and financial experts on audit committee in the post SOX period and 
no  significant  relations  in  the  pre SOX  period.  Also,  the  researchers  documented  that  a 
                                                 
48 Details of how post transaction stock returns have been estimated are discussed in section 3.3.3.   162 
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independent audit committee and a majority independent board are found to complement each 
other in increasing (decreasing) earnings informativeness (earnings management) in the post 
SOX period. Overall, the researchers argue that the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
monitoring managerial behaviours on earnings management has improved after SOX. The 
importance of examining changes in earnings management in the post Sarbanes Oxley era is 
grounded in the cost and benefits of employing the different methods. Since most market 
participants fixate on discretionary earnings management (e.g. Cohen et al., 2006, Graham et 
al., 2006) that might be subject to regulatory scrutiny, it might negatively influence long term 
stock prices.  
 
5.3.2: Earnings Quality and Stock Returns.  
The reasons for investigating the influence of earnings quality on future stock returns are two 
fold. First, large bodies of accounting and finance research discussed below have suggested that 
accounting information predicts contemporaneous stock returns. Secondly, managers manage 
earnings to influence future stock returns and post earnings stock returns is a good proxy for a 
firm’s future prospects (Beneish and Vargus, 2002 and Ke et al., 2003). Chan et al. (2001) 
argued that firm accruals are negatively related to stock returns. Sloan (1996) offered another 
explanation similar to the hypothesis above through a behavioural explanation that, investors 
habitually  overprice  accruals  as  a  result  of  their  failure  to  recognize  their  low  persistence. 
Similar to the Sloan’s (1996) behavioural explanation, Xie (2001) suggested that the market 
overprices  the  portion  of  discretionary  accruals  that  originates  from  managerial  discretion. 
Additionally, a company’s financing and expenditure patterns influence future stock returns. As 
in the prior literature, R&D, advertising expenditures, income generated from asset sales are 
positively related to the stock returns. Beneish and Nichols (2005) suggested a strong relation 
between the probability of manipulation and future returns. They documented that firms with a 
high probability of financial statement manipulation have lower future returns relative to firms 
with a low probability of manipulation and suggested that investors and other users of financial 
statements need to be sceptical when using financial statements. Therefore analyzing the stock 
price  behaviour  based  on  different  earnings  management  techniques  might  be  useful  in  re 
enforcing the empirical results especially post SOX.    163 
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5.3.4: Hypothesis Development. 
Some events like regulatory changes that do not involve discretionary action by management 
might influence the use of discretionary accruals and future firm performance. For instance, 
SOX might influence the way managers manage earnings. But since investors normally focus on 
earnings management through discretionary accruals (Bradshaw et al., 2001) and this can result 
in discounted share prices for such companies, managers might still be managing using other 
less detectable techniques. Some techniques like real earnings management that is not easily 
detected  by  auditors  and  regulators  might  become  more  popular  especially  after  the  recent 
corporate scandals. As predicted by Zhang (2003), when firms manage earnings to an egregious 
level in prior periods, they are more likely to engage in real earnings management relative to 
accruals in the future. Under normal circumstances, stakeholders might fixate on some form of 
earnings management rather than the others. Even the reversing nature of accruals makes it 
impossible to sometimes manage its shortfall and if they have to rely on discretionary techniques 
alone,  they  might  sometimes  be  forced  to  miss  earnings  target.  This  is  such  that  income 
increasing  (decreasing)  choices  made  in  one  period  will  inevitably  lead  to  understated 
(overstated) income in some future periods. It is thus possible managers might focus attention on 
real earnings management to cover the residual shortfall in cases where they are limited by their 
inability to utilize accruals techniques. Legislative actions might also have an influence on the 
techniques they apply. Cohen et al. (2006) provides evidence in support of the suggestion above 
by documenting that after the passage of the SOX, accruals earnings management was reduced, 
on the contrary, there was an increase in earnings management through real operating decisions.  
   
There has been abundant literature (e.g. Chan et al., 2006, Beneish et al., 2004) suggesting that 
investors normally fixate on reporting accounting earnings to evaluate future performance. 
Recent studies have suggested that a majority of investors can unravel earnings management 
especially earnings managed to an egregious level leading to potential damages to shareholder 
value through share price declines (Rajgopal et al., 2007). Operating performance has been 
associated  with  aspects  of  real  earnings  management  like  discretionary  changes  in  R&D, 
selling, general and administrative expense, overproduction to improve sales through improve 
credit  terms,  selling  of  fixed  assets    and  firms  with  high  accruals  in  the  current  period 
customarily experiences future earnings problems (Gunny, 2006). Investors are however not 
customarily fooled by earnings management practices. They look for warning signs from the   164 
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financial statements and discount the stocks of firms that manage earnings
49. If more firms 
manage earnings, there might be market wide effects through a spiky decline in the value of 
several companies
50. Expectations for regulatory control leading to higher earnings quality 
would therefore be a rational response to investor demands for favourable financial reporting. 
One way of examining the benefit of legislative control on firm performance is to investigate 
stock price responses following the SOX Act. If the Act actually improves earnings quality, 
the information might be more certain and investors can respond to it by trading on the stocks 
of those companies more conveniently.  
 
Although the above arguments have suggested that the capital market can unravel the extent of 
earnings management, the predictive ability of the different techniques on firm’s performance 
has not been thoroughly investigated. The various components of accruals (notably accounts 
receivables, accounts payable and changes in inventory) have different predictive powers and 
investors  might  discount  their  impact  on  future  returns  differently.  These  components  of 
accruals are the most popular tools that can be improperly used to fraudulently
51 improve the 
company’s revenues and earnings
52. Most forced restatements and enforcement actions have 
resulted from abuse of reporting of these key variables. Accounts receivable is one component 
of accruals that is customarily employed to overstate the earnings of most corporations. But 
firms might genuinely offer sales discounts leading to sales growth in a bid to avoid product 
obsolence in periods where they might have mistakenly overproduced. Customers can also be 
genuinely experiencing financial distress leading to rising accounts receivables. Increases in 
accounts payable too can still be connected to managerial intent in lowering current accruals, 
thereby shifting current earnings to the future. Investors can either interpret it as a current 
shock in earnings (bad news) or recognize its impact on future earnings. In this case, despite a 
reduction in earnings through accounts payable increases, future stock price performance can 
still be higher.  
 
                                                 
49 Studies that have examined whether or not market participants identify and react to earnings management 
either through fraudulent accounting or accruals management include the Dechow et al. 1996; 
50 After several high profile business scandals like the Enron, WorldCom cases, there have always been spiky 
declines in the stocks of several companies that have not managed earnings. 
51 It is important to note that my sample cases are not restricted to cases of fraud. It includes estimates of all 
forms of earnings management, whether legal or not. 
52 Chan et al. (2006) discussed the importance of looking at a comprehensive set of earnings management signals 
as they can have different predictive abilities.   165 
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Another accounting component whose predictive power is uncertain is changes in inventory. 
Managers might manage earnings through the reporting of inventory changes by not writing 
off  obsolete  items  completely  or  they  might  be  allocating  more  overheads  expenses  to 
inventory than to cost of goods sold. Overproduction can also reflect an intention to improve 
sales through the provision of favourable credit terms and or to reduce cost of goods sold. 
When firms overproduce, they might technically spread fixed overhead cost leading to an 
overall reduction in per unit production cost as long as inventory holding cost is not increased 
over the period (Gunny, 2006). As supported by Chan et al., (2006), some items might be 
more susceptible to earnings manipulation than others and changes might influence future 
returns different since investors would have competing interpretations of their effect. Stock 
return evidence also suggests that investors discount “abnormal” accruals relative to “normal” 
accruals,  which  suggests  that  investors  view  abnormal  accruals  as  more  likely  to  reflect 
earnings  management  (Healy  and  Whalen,  1999).  There  is  further  evidence  of  significant 
negative stock market responses to allegations of earnings management by the financial press 
or the SEC which is an indication that investors do not always investigate financial reporting 
impropriety.  According  to  Dechow,  Sloan,  and  Sweeney  (1996),  firms  subject  to  SEC 
investigation for earnings management show an average stock price decline of 9% at the day 
of the announcement of the earnings management.  Assuming there was a large decline in 
earnings quality before the enactment of the SOX, one significant question might relates to 
how SOX can constrain earnings management practices and how investors can avoid huge 
losses if earnings management is uncovered.  
 
In light of the discussions above, I investigate the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  After  Sarbanes  Oxley,  stocks  of  suspect  firms  (firms  with  low  earnings  quality  as 
measured by the probability of manipulation, abnormal changes in the various accruals and 
real earnings management items) will exhibit negative stock price performance while those of 
non-suspect  firms  (firms  with  high  earnings  quality)  will  exhibit  positive  stock  price 
performance. 
 
Section 5.4 specifies the models and variables to be used in the test.    166 
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5.4: Research design. 
5.4.1: Data and Sample Selection. 
The original sample for this study is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 and covers data from 
the period of 1996 to 2006. The choice of the S&P 500 Companies is because they are closely 
followed by analysts, actively traded and are the most widely used benchmark employed by 
researchers  to  investigate  different  performance  related  issues.  Additionally,  it  has  a 
diversified market weighting and most reports have suggested that it comprises more than 70 
percent of the US market capitalization. Furthermore, these firms are most likely the group of 
companies  the  US  congress  had  in  mind  when  they  debated  the  SOX  legislation.  This  is 
because they were the largest firms and had many international operations. 
 
As is standard in the literature, financial institutions are eliminated from the sample (SIC 
codes 6000 6999) due to their complex financial reporting practices, leaving the sample with 
411 firms and 4110 firm years. Firms with missing data to estimate the various accounting and 
other  performance  metrics  are  also  excluded.  The  final  sample  reports  results  for  an 
unbalanced  sample  of  3528  firm  years  from  1997  to  2006  giving  five  consecutive  years 
relating to the pre and post SOX era. It is important to note that, though the two empirical 
essays uses the S&P 500 firms as the main sample, the final sample in this test is larger than 
the unbalanced sample in the prior test. This is because only accounting and stock price data 
which are highly available have been utilised in the analysis. The final sample which in this 
test is an unbalanced sample of 3528 firm years requires the firms to have the necessary data 
to  calculate  the  different  earnings  management  metric  and  matching  data  to  estimate  the 
various  proxies  for  firm  performance.  Total  accruals,  discretionary  accruals,  abnormal 
production cost, abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal accruals, abnormal receivables, 
and abnormal inventory, are estimated for the corresponding industry year regression. In all, 
industrial classification is based on the four digit SIC codes requiring at least 10 observations 
in  each  sample  year  (Jenkins  et  al,  (2006)).  To  control  for  outliers,  variables  have  been 
winsorized  at  the  first  and  ninety ninth  percentiles.  All  the  data  for  this  study  have  been 
collected from DATASTREAM. Firms analysed were therefore required to have annual data 
and stock prices for the overall period of the study from the Datastream files. Lastly, firms 
that finally remain in the sample must have the same number of firm year presence in the pre 
and post SOX era to assist comparison of my results for the pre and post SOX period. 
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5.4.2: Measuring Earnings Quality. 
My  proxies  for  earnings  quality  information  are  three  measures  of  “earnings  management” 
employed in the accounting literature to explain how managers can manage reported earnings. 
They  are  earnings  management  through  discretionary  accruals  (see  section  3.3.2.1,  3.3.2.2, 
3.3.2.3 and 3.3.2.4), real earnings management (see section 3.3.2.6) and the Beneish M Score 
(see section 3.3.2.7). The discretionary accruals model is a variant based model that separates 
accruals into its normal and total component. The normal portion is the portion that can be 
explained by past accounting transactions and the discretionary component originates from the 
use  of  discretionary  accounting  techniques  to  report  favorable  earnings.  The  real  earnings 
management model primarily examines operating decisions that might deviate from standard 
expectations.  Though  most  prior  models  have  examined  popular  variables  disclosed  in  the 
financial statements that might influence future cash flows like fixed asset (Bartov (1993), Black 
et al., (1998)), R&D expenditures (Bushee (1998), Bange and DeBondt, (1998) Guay et al., 
(1996)), managers might still manage earnings using other operating techniques like abnormal 
changes  in  receivables  through  price  discounts,  overproduction  to  spread  unit  inventory 
production cost, etc. in a bid to investigate several items that can be used to manage earnings 
using real operating decisions, I focus on key variables captured by Roychowdhury, (2006)) in 
detecting earnings management using real operating decisions. The model in my opinion, relates 
to a combination of variables that have been employed by prior research to predict real earnings 
management.  These  proxies  include  estimates  of  abnormal  discretionary  expenses  (R&D, 
advertising, selling, general and administrative expenses and capital expenditures), abnormal 
accruals, abnormal production costs, and abnormal change in inventory and abnormal changes in 
net  receivables.  The  M Score  developed  by  Beneish  (1997,  1999)  is  another  earnings 
management model that combines a firm’s operational and financial characteristics to determine 
the probability of manipulation.  
 
5.4.3: Categorising Suspect Versus Non Suspect Firms.  
As discussed above, the research employs three distinct measures that have been employed in 
the accounting literature to measure earnings management. Firms are also categorised as more 
likely to manipulate earnings (Suspect firms) and less likely to manipulate earnings (Non 
Suspect firms) based on a rank scale of their level of earnings management. In an effort to 
correctly identify firms, I used different assumptions that are consistent with prior research.   168 
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For the M Score, the model sorts the firms according to their probability of manipulation and 
assumes that firms in the highest decile are more likely to manipulate earnings. This is a 
simpler version from the Beneish (1997, 1999) model that employs specific cut off points to 
differentiate likely and unlikely manipulators. Beneish and Nichols (2004) recognised that 
though the Beneish model can realistically identify earnings manipulators, there are always 
likely classification errors based on the cut off points. The model was able to flag only 12 of 
the 20 major companies that manipulated earnings in early 2000 as likely manipulators. For 
the discretionary accruals model, I classify suspect firms as firms in the highest decile of 
discretionary accruals. However, I redo the analysis classifying firms based on their absolute 
values  of  discretionary  accruals  (Balsam  et  al.,  2002)  and  negative  discretionary  accruals 
(Jenkins  et  al.,  2006).  For  the  real  earnings  management  variables,  I  employ  different 
assumptions  to  classify  firms  based  on  prior  assumptions  that  are  linked  to  earnings 
management  using  real  operating  decisions.  Firms  in  the  lowest  abnormal  discretionary 
expenses decile are classified as suspect firms as these firms might have reduced expenses to 
improve current earnings. For the production cost and changes in inventory, I assume that 
abnormal  levels  of  production  cost  might  indicate  current  over  production  to  reduce  the 
resulting  cost  of  goods  sold  (Dechow  et  al.,  1996).  Firms  thus  in  the  highest  decile  of 
production cost and changes in inventory are classified as suspect firms that have attempted to 
decrease current period cost of goods sold, thereby improving earnings. Since receivables are 
customarily employed to improve current period earnings, I assume that firms in the highest 
decile engaged in earnings manipulation (suspect firms). The classifications based on these 
three models increases the power of my tests and provides a basis of testing the predictability 
of stock returns drawing upon a broader set of financial statements information and earnings 
management models.  
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5.5: Descriptive and Empirical Evidences. 
This section begins by presenting the descriptive evidence, which is followed by formal 
statistical tests of my predictions using regression analysis. The research investigates the 
returns/earnings relationship, using stock returns as a measure of firm performance and 
contrasts the influence of stock returns on different measures of earnings management. The 
research extends prior models by categorising different levels of earnings management as 
suspect versus non suspect firm years.  
 
 
5.5.1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Between Variables. 
Table 12 presents descriptive statistics for variables of interest. The full sample consists of the 
S&P 500 firms over the period 1997 to 2006. The Table presents results for the pre and post 
Sarbanes  Oxley  era.  Mean  results  are  reported  for  the  overall  sample,  the  non suspect  and 
suspect firm years. Suspect firm years are classified as the firm years with an M Score that is in 
the highest decile of the probability of financial statements manipulation. This is 2.9 standard 
deviations from the mean. According to Beneish (1997, 1999), there is a high probability of 
financial  statements  manipulation  by  firms  with  a  probability  of  financial  statement 
manipulation that is greater than  2.22. Suspect firms years are generally thought of as firm 
years with low earnings quality. See below for variables descriptions.  
 
Across all companies and across all years, the results of the descriptive statistics of the main 
sample suggest that it is less likely that a firm distorts its financial statements. This is as a result 
of the mean M Score that stands at –3.07 (less and –2.22). As in prior literatures, more firms 
manage earning using negative discretionary and total accruals with a mean respectively of –
0.01 and –0.05. The descriptive statistics for the net income suggest that for the main sample, the 
average profitability for the S&P 500 firms is around 6 percent of total assets. It is important to 
note that, this ratio is much higher than in prior research (see Gupta et al. 2005), report an 
average profitability of firms in their sample (that included all COMPUSTAT firms from 1975 
to 2003) of around 2 percent.  
 
On a general note, it is less likely that firms are distorting their financial statements as the mean 
M Scores  in  both  the  pre  and  post  SOX  periods  are  –2.95  and  –3.18  respectively.  For  the 
suspect firms, the mean M Score is respectively 0.96 and –0.59 in the pre and post SOX period.   170 
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The Sales growth index is 1.15 for non suspect firms and 2.59 for suspect firms in the pre SOX 
period indicating an increase of more than 100 percent. However, in the post SOX period, there 
are no significant changes in sales growth for suspect and non suspect firms as the ratio is 1.10 
and 1.36 respectively. However, it is important to recall that suspect firms have a marginally 
greater increase in sales growth. No significant changes are also recognized for debt contracting 
obligations of the firms in the respective periods, as the leverage index ratio is significantly 
similar in most classifications.  
 
As in prior research, discretionary and total accruals are primarily income decreasing. The total 
accruals for the overall pre SOX period are –6 percent of total assets. The Non suspect firms 
have a total accruals decrease of 5 percent of total assets while suspect firms have total accruals 
decrease of 7 percent of total assets in the pre SOX period. However, in the post SOX period, 
the total accruals are –4 percent of total assets. The Non Suspect firms realized a total accruals 
decrease of 3 percent while the suspect firms realized a decrease of 5 percent. Additionally, 
discretionary accruals for non suspect firms are –1 percent of total assets while for suspect firms 
it is –5 percent of total assets in the pre SOX period. In the post SOX period, the ratio is –0.5 
percent for non suspect firms while for suspect firms, the ratio is –3 percent. Returns estimated 
on an annual basis suggest that in the pre SOX period, firms have overall returns of 24 percent 
while in the post SOX period, returns drop to 14 percent. However, in the Pre SOX period, non 
suspect firms have realized returns of about 22 percent while suspect firms have returns of about 
53 percent. However, in the post SOX period, non suspect and suspect firms have returns of 
approximately 14  percent. Taken together, the  descriptive results suggest that suspect firms 
manage earnings extensively to influence reported earnings and that trend is mitigated in the 
post  SOX  period.  This  suggests  improvement  in  earnings  quality  in  the  post  SOX  period. 
Additionally, the drop in returns in the pre and post period for suspect and non suspect firms and 
the similarities between returns of suspect and non suspect firms in the post SOX period can be 
thought of as being influenced by financial analysts and investors suspecting earnings quality 
decreases  in  specific  periods  and  discounting  it  in  their  judgment  of  such  companies. 
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r
u
a
l
s
 
i
s
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
J
o
n
e
s
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
b
y
 
D
e
c
h
o
w
 
e
t
 
a
l
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
a
s
 
 
 
N
D
A
 
t
=
  a
1
(
1
/
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
  a
2
(
( D
R
E
V
t
 
 
  D
R
E
C
t
)
/
A
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
  a
3
(
P
P
E
t
/
A
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
 
 
W
h
e
r
e
 
N
D
A t
=
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
n
o
n
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
 
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
,
 
D
R
E
V
 
=
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
 
(
D
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
 
d
a
t
a
t
y
p
e
 
c
o
d
e
 
w
c
0
1
0
0
1
)
,
 
D
R
E
C
 
=
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
 
(
D
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
 
d
a
t
a
t
y
p
e
 
c
o
d
e
 
w
c
0
2
0
5
1
)
,
 
P
P
E
 
 
=
 
P
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
,
 
p
l
a
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
t
i
m
e
 
t
 
(
D
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
 
d
a
t
a
t
y
p
e
 
c
o
d
e
 
w
c
0
2
5
0
1
)
.
 
  
1
7
6
 
1
7
6
 
 
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
 
a
1
,
 
a
2
,
a
3
,
 
a
r
e
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
:
 
 
 
 
T
A
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
=
 
a
1
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
a
2
( D
R
E
V
t
)
/
 
A
1
-
t
 
+
 
a
3
(
P
P
E
t
)
/
 
A
1
-
t
 
+
  n
t
,
 
 
 
F
E
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
r
r
o
r
s
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
m
i
n
u
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
p
e
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
s
c
a
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
,
 
N
I
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
n
e
t
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
,
 
r
e
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
s
c
a
l
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
y
e
a
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
.
 
r
e
t
 
(
a
n
n
)
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
t
 
(
f
u
t
)
 
a
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
(
3
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
s
)
 
a
n
d
 
o
n
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
n
o
u
n
c
e
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
L
e
v
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
l
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
 
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
,
 
M
T
B
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
t
o
 
b
o
o
k
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
y
e
a
r
,
 
s
i
z
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
p
r
o
x
y
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
.
 
 
 
D
_
E
X
P
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
,
 
A
_
D
E
X
P
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
,
 
A
_
P
R
O
C
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
,
 
A
_
I
N
V
E
N
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
i
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
y
,
 
A
_
R
E
C
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
a
b
l
e
s
,
 
A
_
O
A
C
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
,
 
D
_
E
X
P
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
r
m
’
s
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
,
 
T
A
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
,
 
P
R
O
D
_
C
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
,
 
S
O
X
_
D
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
S
O
X
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
t
h
a
t
 
i
s
 
s
e
t
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
t
o
 
1
 
f
o
r
 
f
i
r
m
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
s
t
 
S
O
X
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
a
n
d
 
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
 
D
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
J
o
n
e
s
 
M
o
d
e
l
;
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
c
a
s
h
 
f
l
o
w
 
f
r
o
m
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
:
 
 
 
C
F
O
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
*
(
S
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
2
*
(
S
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
1
)
 
 
W
h
e
r
e
 
A
t
 
=
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
S
t
 
=
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
 
S
t
 
=
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
.
 
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
s
t
s
:
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
 
 
P
R
O
D
t
/
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
 
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
*
(
S
t
/
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
2
*
(
 
S
t
/
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
3
*
(
 
S
t
/
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
2
)
 
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
A
t
 
=
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
S
t
=
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
 
S
t
 
=
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
.
 
  
1
7
7
 
1
7
7
 
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
:
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
 
 
D
I
S
E
X
P
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
 
*
(
S
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
3
)
 
 
W
h
e
r
e
 
A
t
 
=
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
S
t
 
=
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
 
S
t
 
=
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
.
 
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
:
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
 
 
A
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
t
/
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
*
(
 
S
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
2
*
(
P
P
E
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
4
)
 
 
W
h
e
r
e
 
A
t
 
=
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
,
 
 
S
t
 
=
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
s
a
l
e
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
 
a
n
d
 
P
P
E
t
 
=
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
,
 
p
l
a
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
 
a
t
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
 
t
.
 
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
R
e
c
e
i
v
a
b
l
e
s
:
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
:
 
 
∆
N
R
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
*
(
∆
S
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
5
)
 
 
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
 
I
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
y
:
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
y
e
a
r
 
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
 
 
∆
I
N
V
E
N
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
 
=
 
α
*
(
1
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
1
*
(
 
S
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
β
2
*
(
 
 
S
1
-
t
/
 
A
1
-
t
)
 
+
 
ε
t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
5
.
6
)
  
1
7
8
 
1
7
8
 
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
3
:
 
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
B
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
E
s
s
a
y
 
2
(
P
e
a
r
s
o
n
 
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
r
e
 
S
h
o
w
n
 
A
b
o
v
e
 
t
h
e
 
D
i
a
g
o
n
a
l
 
w
i
t
h
 
S
p
e
a
r
m
a
n
 
B
e
l
o
w
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R
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r
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_
P
R
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Table  14  presents  the  Pearson  (spearman)  correlation  coefficients  with  the  p  values  in 
parenthesis for the sample between the periods 1997 to 2006. The correlations are pooled for 
the entire sample (Pearson Correlation are Shown above the diagonal with Spearman below). 
Correlations significant at the 5 percent levels are marked in bold. This gives a balanced 
sample of five years before and after the SOX period. The intervening year is the year 2002 
when SOX was enacted. Lagged total assets are used to scale several variables, as specified 
and total assets are a proxy for size. Correlations that are significant have been marked in bold. 
The most significant correlation is the correlation between production cost and sales. They 
have a Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 90 (71) percent. This suggests that firms 
with higher production costs also have a high amount of total sales. This is however true as 
most often, firms increase their production cost when they think the demand for their products 
are high and they also attempt to reduce unit production cost when they have contrary market 
expectations. We also observe marginally positive but significant correlations between net 
income and variables that drives income. Sales and net income are positively correlated and 
significant at the 5 percent level, with a Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 17 (13) 
percent respectively. Likewise discretionary expenses, abnormal operating accruals and total 
accruals are positively correlated with net income respectively for both Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation at 14 (14) percent, 11 (22) and 13 (31) percent. All the reported results are all 
significant. This  is  consistent  with  prior research (Sloan 1996,  Roychowdhury,  2007)  that 
found a positively correlated relationship between accruals and sales with net income.  
 
As in Roychowdhury (2007), the correlations between the total and abnormal levels of various 
items are positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
between operating accruals and total accruals is the highest at 57 (72) percent. Discretionary 
expenses  and  abnormal  discretionary  expenses  are  correlated  positively  for  both  Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation at 33 (4) percent, and production cost and abnormal production cost 
are positively correlated for both the Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient at 17 (2) 
percent.  Recall  that,  actual  production  costs  refer  to  cost  for  real  transactions  while 
discretionary costs are generic to management’s intent. A reason for the positive correlation 
might be as a result of manager simultaneously increasing the discretionary items as they 
disburse for these items. Abnormal inventory and production costs are positively correlated 
with a Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of 26 (27) percent. One reason for this   184 
184   
might be as a result of the relationship between inventory production and related expenses. 
Abnormal inventory build ups are possibly as a result of earnings manipulation. Prior research 
(e.g. Gunny, 2006, Chan et al., 1996) has argued that most managers build up inventory and 
when they realize that sales are not matching the amounts of goods produced; they provide 
price discounts to dispose of their unwanted inventory. Their cost needs to be discretionary by 
management, as the normal inventory levels cannot account for them.  
 
Consistent with prior research, there is a marginally negative correlation between abnormal 
inventory and stock returns. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation is –3 ( 7) percent and is 
significant at the 5 percent level. Recall that abnormal inventory level reflects excess annual 
inventory  growth  whose  production  is  customarily  discretionary  by  management  (e.g. 
Roychowdhury,  2003).  One  reason  for  the  negative  correlation  might  relate  to  the  stock 
market’s perception on abnormal inventory levels. In most cases, they are viewed as signals of 
problems  with  overproduction  leading  to  high  costs,  turnover  problems  and  inventory 
obsolescence.  This  has  been  supported  by  Abarbanell  and  Bushee  (1997)  who  provided 
evidence of a negative relationship between excess inventory growth and future earnings. 
 
It is important to recognize the highly negative Pearson (Spearman) correlation with abnormal 
production cost and abnormal discretionary expenses of about –63 ( 74) percent. I interpret the 
reason for this as discussed in Roychowdhury, (2003). When firms normally provide price 
discounts that lead to an increase in sales volume, discretionary expenses would appear low 
relative to sales. Normally, price discounts increase a unit cost of production relative to sale 
price. Such price discounts can also be engineered by over production to reduce unit cost of 
goods  sold,  as  long  as  inventory  pile up  does  not  lead  to  excess  unit  holding  cost.  One 
therefore  has  to  expect  a  negative  relationship  between  abnormal  production  cost  and 
abnormal  discretionary  expenses.  The  marginal,  but  significantly  negative  relationship 
(Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient of –5 ( 4) percent) between abnormal production 
cost and net income is a signal that overproduction by firms increases the cost of production 
thereby reducing end of period net income. 
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5.5.2:Returns/Earnings Quality Relationships. 
The main regression model for the second main research hypothesis, (defined as earnings 
quality and firm performance hypothesis) postulates that investors discount those firms that 
manage  earnings  highly  through  a  negative  stock  return.  Our  empirical  investigation 
distinguishes  between  five  main  categories  of  earnings  management:  the  probability  of 
financial statements distortions as measured by the Beneish M Score (Beneish 1997,1999), 
earnings  management  through  discretionary  accruals,  real  earnings  management  through 
abnormal  changes  in  discretionary  expenses,  earnings  management  through  abnormal 
changes  in  receivables,  and  finally  earnings  management  through  abnormal  changes  in 
receivables. However, the first three categories are the main earnings management models, 
with respect to their superiority to the degree of information linked to earnings management 
that they are supposed to possess.  
 
In the main regression models, the returns/earnings management relationship is examined. 
Stock returns (3.3.4) is used as a proxy for firm performance and is controlled for other 
variables that are likely to affect firm performance like firm size (Collins and Kothari, 1989, 
Collins  et  al.,  1997),  growth  opportunities  (Collins  and  Kothari,  1989),  Leverage 
(Subramanyam,  1996,  Reynolds  and  Francis,  2000).  The  observed  relationship  between 
stock  returns  and  prior  earnings  management  can  be  explained  by  the  argument  that, 
managers  may  have  employed  earnings  management  techniques  to  influence  reported 
earnings. This would either increase stock prices in the future if investors are passive and 
cannot differentiate managed from unmanaged earnings or might have negative effect on 
future stock prices if investors discount earnings management practices in the valuation of 
companies.  As  discussed  above,  during  strict  regulatory  regimes  as  prescribed  by  the 
Sarbanes  Oxley  Act  of  2002,  managers  might  still  be  managing  earnings  using  less 
scrutinised techniques. (Details of the relationship between earnings quality and stock returns 
are discussed in section 5.4.2). 
 
The  relationship  between  the  firm’s  earnings  quality  and  their  future  performance  as 
measured by their future returns is therefore examined using the following regression model: 
 
FRET t i, =a 0 +b1*(X i 1 - t )+b 2 *(SOX t i, )+b 3*(X i 1 - t *SOX)+b 4 *(Lev)+b 5*(MTB 1 - t )+
6 b *(SIZE 1 - t )+ 7 b *(SUS_FIRM i 1 - t )+ 8 b *(SUS_FIRM*SOX i 1 - t )+ ................(5.13). 
Where FRET it  is the 12 month stock return that ends 3 months after the fiscal year in year 
t (see 3.3.4).  
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X iis the proxy for earnings quality (see 3.3.2). 
SOX is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 for firm years in the SOX period and zero 
otherwise.  
X i*SOX is an interaction variable between the earnings management proxy and the SOX 
period. 
SUS_FIRM*SOXi is an interaction variable of the relationship between suspect firm years 
(years where the firm is judged to have most likely manipulated their earnings) and the 
SOX period. 
Lev it  is the proxy for leverage measured as the total liabilities over the total assets. 
MTB it  is the market to book value. 
SIZE it  is the total assets used as a proxy for firm size 
SUS_FIRM  is  a  dummy  set  equal  to  1  if the  firm  year  is at  the  highest decile  of  the 
Probability  of  manipulation,  and  at  the  highest  decile  for  the  absolute  values  for  the 
estimated real earnings management and discretionary accruals values.  
Table  16  below  discuss  the  relationship  between  the  independent  variable  and  the 
dependent variable.  
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Table 17 below presents the results of the model 5.13 above for the returns earnings quality 
relationship. Panels a, b, c, d and e provide the results for the different proxies for earnings 
quality. The coefficient on b1 is to pick out the effect of earnings management as measured 
by the probability of financial statements distortion on firms performance. In panel A the 
relationship  is  positive  and  significant  indicating  that  firms  with  a  high  probability  of 
manipulation as measured by the Beneish M Score performed better as documented by 
their positive stock returns. However, in the post SOX period, when firms have a high 
probability of  financial statements distortions, they are less likely to perform better as 
supported by the insignificant results of the interaction variable between the probability of 
manipulation and the Sarbanes Oxley period (b 3 coefficient is 0.0008 and t stats is 0.75). 
Also the coefficient of  7 b is positive but insignificant suggesting that firms that manage 
earnings overall based on the probability of manipulation as measured by the M Score, are 
less likely to influence stock returns. In the post SOX period, firms that are more likely to 
manage earnings have a negative stock returns (coefficient of  0.004 and t stats of  1.87).  
 
The results reported in panel b aims to capture the impact of earnings management using 
discretionary accruals techniques on firm performance. The findings as in Panel b suggest 
that  when  firms  manage  earnings  using  discretionary  accruals,  the  market  reaction  is 
always  positive  (coefficient  of  b1  0.0067  and  t stats  of  2.29).  Nonetheless,  when 
discretionary accruals are employed to manage earnings in the post SOX period, there is a 
negative market reaction as reported by the coefficient of  –0.003 and t stats of –2.39. 
Firms  that  are  more  likely  to  manage  earnings  have  negative  returns;  however,  the 
relationship is insignificant (coefficient of  0.0016 and t stats of  0.83). In the post SOX 
era, firms that are more likely to manage earnings have a marginally positive stock returns 
though the relationship is insignificant (coefficient of 0.0009 and t stats of 0.31). The 
implication  of  the  result  above  is  that  during  periods  of  greater  market  regulations, 
investors are also very vigilant and discount stocks of firms that employ the more visible 
discretionary  accruals  technique  to  manage  earnings.  This  is  an  indication  that  SOX 
influence greater monitoring of earnings management by investors.  
 
Another  key  variable  of  interest  is  the  discretionary  expenses  variable.  This  is  a  key 
variable  of  interest  because  it  captures  the  impact  of  real  earnings  management.  The 
indication is that an increase in discretionary expenses to reduce reported earnings leads to 
a reduction of stock returns (coefficient of  0.006 and t stats of  2.974).  However, when 
firms manage earnings in the post SOX period using discretionary expenses, the results are  
196   
statistically insignificant (coefficient of 0.0044 and t stats of 1.03). Suspect firms (defined 
as those that are most likely to manage earnings using discretionary expenses) are more 
likely  to  have  positive  returns,  though  the  relationship  is  insignificant  (coefficient  of 
0.0008 and t stats of 0.45). However, suspect firms in the post SOX period have a negative 
but significant coefficient (coefficient is  0.0001 and t stats of  3.23) which suggests that 
firms that attempt to manage earnings have negative stock returns.  
 
Since accruals involve a combination of other accounting constructs and they might be 
influenced by other items like changes in receivables, payables and inventory, I investigate 
the predictive power of other items like changes in inventory and receivables. The results 
suggest  that  firms  that  manage  earnings  through  increases  in  abnormal  changes  in 
receivables normally have positive returns (coefficient of 0.0076 and t stats of 2.67). But in 
the post SOX era, the relationship is insignificant (coefficient of  0.014 and t stats of  
0.54).  While  firms  that  are  more  likely  to  manage  earnings  as  measured  by  abnormal 
changes in receivables have a negative returns (coefficient of  0.004 and t states of  2.12), 
in the Post SOX era, this relationship is positive and insignificant (coefficient of 0.00522 
and  t  stats  of  1.31).  When  firms  stockpile  inventory,  there  is  always  negative  returns 
(coefficient of  0.013 and t stats of  2.44). When firms are more likely to manage earnings 
in the overall sample period, they are more likely to have positive returns (coefficient of 
0.0021 and t stats of 2.14). In the post SOX Era firms that are more likely to manage 
earnings using abnormal changes in inventory always have disappointing future returns 
(coefficient of  0.002and t stats of  2.74).  
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5.6: Conclusion. 
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate if investors discount earnings management 
practices (especially after the post SOX era). The major contribution of this study to the 
broader  literature  is  to  investigate  the  influence  of  earnings  management  on  firm 
performance post SOX using a wider set of earnings management proxies. Giving that the 
objective  of  the  SOX  was  to  improve  the  quality  of  financial  reporting  after  the  high 
profile  business  failures  that  led  to  significant  losses  by  investors,  one  would  expect 
investors post SOX to scrutinise a wider set of financial statement information, to be able 
to discount earnings management practices.  
 
The proxies for earnings quality employed are three measures of earnings management that 
have been employed in the accounting literature to investigate how managers can manage 
reported earnings. This includes the discretionary accruals model by Dechow et al., (1995), 
earnings management using real operating decisions (See Roychowdhury, 2006, Gunny, 
2006, Graham et al. 2006) and the Beneish M Score (Beneish 1997, 1999) model that 
estimates the probability of financial statement distortions. These different measures of 
earnings  management  have  been  employed  in  order  to  avoid  a  contamination  of  the 
research results on the influence of earnings management on firm performance. As in Chan 
et  al.,  (2006),  post  transaction  stock  returns  are  employed  as  a  measure  of  firm 
performance. 
 
Overall, the results support my prediction of the main hypothesis and provide evidence of 
greater monitoring of financial statements in the post SOX era. On average, when firm’s 
attempt to manage earnings post SOX, investors discount this through poor stock returns. 
One  major  contribution  of  this  study  to  the  literature  on  earnings  quality  and  firm 
performance in light of the recent regulatory intervention relates to the investigation of a 
comprehensive  set  of  earnings  management  signals.  Accrual  components  customarily 
include accounts receivables, accounts payables, changes in inventory, and so on. One 
interesting result relates to the greater predictive power of abnormal changes in inventory. 
Increases in inventory are negatively related to future stock returns both in the overall 
sample period and in the post SOX period. This suggests that investors discount firms that 
stockpile inventory even before the greater monitoring of financial statements. Consistent 
to Guay et al., (1996), in the overall sample period, discretionary accruals are positively 
related  to  firm  returns.  However,  in  the  post  SOX  period,  the  relationship  between 
discretionary accruals and firm returns is negative.   
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All in all, the results provides strong evidence that there need to be a broad based approach 
in analysing financial statement information’s through an evaluation of different sets of 
information.  It  is  important  to  note  that,  different  earnings  management  metrics  are 
employed to investigate the influence of earnings management in the post SOX period. 
Further, investigations embrace the policy implications which constitute a stronger signal 
to the financial markets. That is, in periods of strict regulation of financial markets, firms 
are less likely to manipulate earnings to influence their performance. Even when firms 
manage  earnings,  investors  quickly  discount  earnings  management  practices  in  their 
valuation of these companies. From an investor’s point of view, there have been greater 
benefits to the public as a result of the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
through  increased  accountability  and  monitoring  by  the  investing  community  and 
presumably other stakeholders like the media. One important motive for this research was 
to investigate whether managers substitute real versus accrual management techniques in 
period of stricter financial statement regulations. What follows is that there is no clear 
evidence to support this assertion.  
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6.0:Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations. 
6.1: Introduction. 
The first section is a summary of the two key empirical chapters that forms the main results 
of the study; a second section where the main contributions and limitations of the essays 
are discussed follows this. The third sections addresses the implications of the results for 
policy makers, investors, corporate managers and academics, and a final section, section 
four presents the recommendations for future research.  
 
6.2: Summary of the Chapters. 
The notes below summarises the two main empirical essays around several characteristics 
that include: 1) aim of the essays 2) dependent variables in focus, independent variables 
and control variables, 3) research design issues 4) main empirical results. The reason for 
summarising  the  essays  in  this  way  was  to  assist  in  structuring  the  findings  of  the 
individual essays and provides an overview of the overall objective of the dissertation.  
  
6.2.1: Empirical Essay 1. 
The objective of Chapter 1 is to examine the relationship between discretionary accruals 
and  Insider  trading  and discusses  how  this relationship has  changed  as  a result  of  the 
introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The research specifically aims to 
provide answers to the following research questions:  
1 Has the regulatory intervention (Sarbanes Oxley Act), provided the desired effects which 
are: 
·  To suppress earnings manipulation thereby improving the quality of earnings? 
·  To suppress earnings manipulation motivated by prior insider trades. 
2   Does  insiders  trading  in  their  corporations  stocks  provide  information  about  future 
earnings performance? 
 
The original sample is the S&P 500 firms as of March 2007 and includes all firms in the 
sample from the period 1997 to 2007. Results are reported for an unbalanced sample of 
firms covering the period of analysis. As discussed, there are two key dependent variables, 
which are the discretionary accruals, and the net shares traded that define whether a firm’s 
insiders are net buyers or sellers of their corporations stock. From the theoretical constructs 
underlying research in the area, several independent variables are included in the thesis that  
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includes forecast errors (FE), future returns (FRET), a dummy to capture the inception of 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX). Additional independent variables to incorporate the impact 
of  the  Sarbanes Oxley  Act  of  2002  include  NST*SOX,  DA*SOX,  FRET*SOX.  The 
analysis also controls for size (Park and Park, 2006), growth opportunities (see Skinner and 
Sloan, 2002), debt covenant obligations (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, Klein 2002), 
firm performances ((see Skinner and Sloan, 2002) using respectively the variable SIZE, 
MTB, LEV, NI as independent variables in the regression analysis.  
 
Since  theoretical  arguments  suggest  that  the  relationship  between  insider  trading  and 
earnings management might be jointly determined, I provide additional tests for the Causal 
Relationship between insider trading and Earnings Management Using Two Stage Least 
Squares. To test the robustness of my empirical results, I conduct additional tests using 
other  earnings  management  proxies  that  have  become  popular  in  the  literature.  They 
include real earnings management through changes in discretionary expenses as discussed 
by Roychowdhury, (2006), and the rank variable model using the M Score (Beneish, 1997, 
1999). The use of the M Score as a proxy for earnings management is a slight departure 
from previous studies. The M Score (a Rank Variable) focuses on financial statements 
distortions  and  conditions  that  suggest  earnings  Manipulations.  Using  these  alternative 
definitions of earnings management facilitates a more effective comparison of the results 
of this study and other alternative models that employ other earnings management proxies. 
It  also  helps  the  researcher  see  if  the  results  reported  earlier  are  changed  using  these 
different earnings management proxies. 
 
I document that on average, companies employ negative discretionary accruals to manage 
earnings and are also net sellers of their stock. After the introduction of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, the quality of earnings have improved as companies use less discretionary 
accruals to manage reported earnings. In the overall sample period, there is a positive 
relationship between prior year discretionary accruals and one year ahead stock returns.   
This suggests that discretionary accruals are customarily used to boost reported earnings 
leading to a positive stock return. However, in the post SOX period, investors do not fixate 
on  the earnings  figure. When  managers  employ discretionary  accounting  techniques  to 
improve reported earnings post SOX, investors discount the stocks of these companies 
leading to negative stock returns. I also test the relationship between current period insider 
trading and future returns. Ideally, insiders with private information about the economy, 
the  firm’s  future  prospects  and  its  effects  on  its  cash  flow  and  earnings,  might  form 
expectations and trade on that basis without necessarily employing discretionary accruals  
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to influence the public information (reported earnings). The findings suggest that in the 
overall sample period, insider trading is positively related to post transaction stock returns.  
However, in the post SOX period, managers are less likely to time their trade based on 
overall  market  and  economic  fundamentals  even  when  they  are  not  interested  in 
influencing reported earnings. These suggest that SOX has improved the integrity of the 
US financial market. Overall, the results suggest that market participants detect and react 
to  insider  trading  and  earnings  management  practices  under  conditions  of  stricter 
regulations. 
   
6.2.2: Empirical Essay 2. 
The  purpose  of  this  essay  is  to  empirically  assess  the  relationship  between  a 
comprehensive  set  of  earnings  management  signals  and  future  firm  performance.  Its 
primary purpose is to verify whether there have been substantial benefits to the public as a 
result of the enactment of the SOX through (i) improvements in earnings quality as a result 
of the SOX (ii) if investors price the level of earnings management present in the financial 
statements.  The  research  aims  to  answer  the  following  question  as  to  whether:  After 
Sarbanes Oxley, stocks of suspect firms (firms with low earnings quality as measured by 
the Probability of manipulation, abnormal changes in the various accruals and real earnings 
management items) exhibit negative stock price performance while those of non suspect 
firms (firms with high earnings quality) exhibit positive stock price performance? 
 
The original sample for this study is the S&P 500 firms as at March 2007 and covers data 
from the period of 1997 to 2006. Results are reported for an unbalanced sample of firms 
from 1997 to 2006 giving five consecutive years for analysis of the pre and post SOX 
studies. The Beneish (1997, 1999) M Score is to used to detect probability of financial 
statements fraud, the Modified Jones (1995) model by Dechow et al., (1995) is used to 
measure  discretionary  accruals  and  finally  the  Roychowdhury,  (2007)  model  used  to 
measure  real  earnings  management  as  defined  by  abnormal  changes  in  discretionary 
expenses, abnormal production cost, abnormal changes in inventory, abnormal changes in 
receivables,  abnormal  accruals  as  measures  of  earnings  quality.  In  the  main 
returns/earnings relationship that forms the basis of these tests, the dependent variable is 
the FRET that is used as a proxy for firm performance.  Independent variables includes X 
which  is  the  proxy  for  earnings  quality,  as  employed  by  the  researcher,  SOX  is  a 
dichotomous variable set equal to 1 for firm years in the SOX period and zero otherwise. 
Other independent variables included as control variables that have been found to influence 
firm performance include LEV measures debt covenant obligations (Reynolds and Francis,  
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2000), SIZE (Collins and Kothari, 1989, Collins et al., 1997) growth opportunities as in 
MTB (Collins and Kothari, 1989). Other variables included are SUS_FIRM which is a 
dummy  set  equal  to  1  if  the  firm  year  is  at  the  highest  decile  of  the  Probability  of 
manipulation,  and  at  the  highest  decile  for  the  absolute  values  for  the  estimated  real 
earnings management and discretionary accruals values. To capture the impact of the SOX, 
two interactive variables are included in the regression like X*SOX (which captures the 
impact of the earnings management proxy in the post SOX era) and SUS_FIRM*SOX 
(captures the impact of high earnings management in the post SOX era). 
 
Overall, the test provides evidence of greater monitoring of financial statements in the post 
SOX  era.  On  average,  when  firm’s  attempt  to  manage  earnings  post  SOX,  investors 
discount  this  through  disappointing  stock  returns.  One  interesting  result  relates  to  the 
greater  predictive  power  of  abnormal  changes  in  inventory.  Increases  in  inventory  are 
negatively related to future stock returns both in the overall sample period and in the post 
SOX  period.  This  suggests  that  investors  discount  firms  that  stockpile  inventory  even 
before the greater monitoring of financial statements. Overall, the results suggest a broad 
based approach in analysing financial statement information’s through an evaluation of 
different sets of financial information. The implications point to the fact that there have 
been greater benefits to the public as a result of the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
of 2002 through increased accountability and monitoring of financial statements. However, 
the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to real earnings 
management when tighter regulatory control restrict accrual earnings management.  
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6.3: Contributions and Limitations.  
6.3.1: Research Contributions. 
6.3.1.1: New Research Focus:  
Empirical Essay 1  Prior research has provided evidence in support of large market value 
losses  in  the  event  of  a  revelation  of  regulatory  violation  involving  accounting  fraud 
(Karpoff  et  al.,  2007).  In  such  vein,  the  avoidance  of  such  losses  should  become  the 
primary  responsibility  of  the  regulators  and  investors  alike.  However,  there  is  little 
evidence in the literature to suggest that regulators and investors can conveniently see 
through earnings management practices for regulatory purposes (Healy and Whalen, 1999). 
This research provides a new focus in that; it introduces a new variable that embraces the 
policy implications, in the context of research relating to the relationship between insider 
trading and earnings management on the one hand and earnings management and firm 
performance  on  the  other  hand.  The  SOX  variable  is  used  in  Essay  1  specifically  to 
evaluate the impact of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 on the use of discretionary accruals to 
benefit from insider trading in their corporations stocks. In essay 2, the SOX variable is 
used  to  analyse  the  stock  price  behaviour  base  on  different  earnings  management 
techniques in the post Sarbanes Oxley Era. 
   
Essay 2  In essay 2, the researcher examines the relationship between earnings quality and 
firm performance in the light of the regulatory intervention (SOX). This is because due the 
effect of financial market regulations, different forms of earnings management might be 
discounted differently by investors. Although prior research has addressed the issues of 
earnings quality and stock returns (proxy for firm performance) using a comprehensive set 
of earnings management proxy, this is the literature to discuss this issues in the light of the 
regulatory intervention.  
 
The thesis aim is to analyse and test the presumption that the stock market is sensitive to 
specific earnings management proxies that have become popular in the academic literature 
(discretionary accruals) and that a wider set of information from financial statements might 
have rich predictive power. This is specifically true when stringent measures are put in 
place  like  the  Sarbanes Oxley  Act  of  2002.  The  researcher  therefore  examines  the 
relationship between earnings management (using different proxies) and firm performance 
and  evaluates  how  this  relationship  has  changed  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  the 
Sarbanes Oxley  Act  of  2002.  Specifically,  the  researcher  employed  three  measures  of  
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earnings quality that is popular in the accounting literature using financial statements data: 
(1) the Beneish (1999) M Score that rank firms according to their probability of financial 
statements manipulations (2) the discretionary accruals models by Dechow et al. (1995) (3) 
and estimates of real earnings management involving abnormal changes in discretionary 
expenses,  abnormal  changes  in  production  costs,  abnormal  changes  in  receivables, 
abnormal changes in inventory, and abnormal operating accruals. Results point to the fact 
that firms are less likely to employ discretionary and real earnings management techniques 
to  influence  reported  earnings  after  the  introduction  of  SOX.  In  the post  SOX  period, 
investors  discount  myopic  earnings  management  practices  through  disappointing  stock 
returns. Finally, the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to 
real earnings management when tighter regulatory scrutiny restrict earnings management 
via accrual manipulations. 
 
6.3.1.2: Refinement of Statistical Technique.  
Essay 1 The literature suggests a causal relationship between insider trading and earnings 
management hence problems with endogeneity. The Hausman (1976) specification error 
tests can be used to test for simultaneity. It is important to note that, a test for simultaneity 
is essentially a test of whether an endogenous regressor is correlated with the error term 
(Gujarati, 1995). As a result of the correlation between the stochastic disturbance term and 
the endogenous variable, the OLS estimation might not be appropriate for the estimation of 
an  equation  in  a  system  of  simultaneous  equation.  In  the  presence  of  simultaneity 
problems, the 2 stage least squares will give estimators that are consistent and efficient 
(Gujarati, 1995).  To obtain consistent estimates on the relationship between discretionary 
accruals  and  insider  trading,  the  Thesis  employs  a  2 stage  least  squares  to  solve  the 
implicit endogeneity problem.  
Essay 1  in essay 1, there is a robustness check carried out with different types of earnings 
management proxy. For example, there is not a single research that has controlled for the 
impact  of  real  earnings  management  or  used  the  rank  variable  model  to  examine  the 
relationship between insider trading and earnings management. It has been documented 
that strong regulatory regimes influences the use of real earnings management techniques 
at the expense of the more visible discretionary accruals techniques (Cohen et al., 2004). 
More  recent  models  like  the  Rank  variable  model  are  more  sophisticated,  combining 
operating and financial characteristics to assess the likelihood of a firm’s probability of 
manipulation (Beneish and Nichols, 2005). It is likely that the use of these different models 
provides an opportunity to test their strengths and weaknesses. This might help different  
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stakeholders interested in earnings management information to evaluate whether egregious 
levels of earnings management lead to significant losses to the market like Enron. 
 
6.4.: Limitations of the Research. 
This section discusses a number of general limitations of the study. 
 
6.4.1: US Study. 
The Thesis is limited in terms of the scope of the countries that its results can be applicable 
to. The Thesis samples only US companies thus care need to be taken in generalising its 
results to other markets.  
 
6.4.2: Time Period of Study. 
The time period of the study is the period after the recent corporate scandals that brought 
enormous wealth loss to the US capital market. These failures preceded the stock market 
bubble with significant changes in corporate structures like mergers and acquisitions of 
major US companies. Like previous corporate scandals, the SOX were greatly needed to 
the US market to ease the pressure on regulators and promote the integrity of our capital 
markets. It is normal that several stakeholders including investors, regulators and managers 
ought to restructure their beliefs and values to avoid causing another embarrassment to the 
entire market. It may not be possible to generalise the results to other time periods. 
 
6.4.3: Industry Analysis. 
Though  the  research  employed  a  cross  sectional  and  time  series  analysis  to  calculate 
several metrics, the results reported are generalised for the entire sample. They are not 
reported on a cross sectional basis. This suggests that, they might reflect the entire S&P 
500 companies and not specific industries. 
 
6.4.4: Limitation of Scope. 
The statistical studies employed measures the relationship between a selected numbers of 
variables  for  the  S&P  500  firms  over  a  specified  period.  As  in  most  market  based 
accounting and finance research, all the variables employed have been well defined and 
quantified with mostly averages used. However, in order to quantify the variables above, 
the  researcher  must  make  simplifying  assumptions  linked  to  practical  realities  and  to 
formalize the empirical reality that is to be studied. This suggests that what is being proven 
must somewhat be limited in scope. Moreover, many valued logic has been employed  
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based on the researchers own investigation of what prior research has found. Though the 
fundamental differences with prior research have been made explicit, to make clear the 
thesis’ contribution, it is important to investigate this same research using other techniques.  
 
6.4.5: Survivorship Bias.  
The study compares firms in the pre and post SOX period. The implications are that there 
is need for an automatic requirement for a constant sample of firms for the entire 10 year 
period of the study in order to eliminate the effect of differences in firms that initially 
appear in the latter period. As in Jenkins et al., (2006), the research believes while this 
sample restriction technique may somewhat induce a survivorship bias, the believe is that 
any resulting detrimental effect has been eclipsed by the benefit of eliminating potential 
volatility in the data that may be caused by the introduction of certain firms in specific 
periods. 
 
 
6.5: Implications of the Results. 
This  section  presents  the  implications  of  the  results  of  the  essays  for  policy  makers, 
investors, corporate managers and academics.   
       
6.5.1: Implications for Policy Makers. 
Since  many  executives  are  customarily  fascinated  by  reported  earnings  figure  and  this 
affects stock prices, managers might be concerned about their inability to manage earnings 
as a result of responsive new and stringent regulations. In Essay 1, the result suggests that 
market participants detect and react to insider trading and earnings management practices 
under conditions of stricter regulations. As documented by Cohen (2007), firms  might 
switch from accrual based to real earnings management as a result of the introduction of 
the SOX. My point of departure with regards to the implications for policy makers are 
based on the assumptions that mandatory regulations might influence the trade off between 
real and discretionary earnings management and their impact on firm performances and 
insider trading still needs to be investigated. Policy makers should focus their attention on 
a comprehensive set of earnings management signals and not just discretionary accruals. 
Tests in Essay 2 provide evidence of greater monitoring of financial statements in the post 
SOX  era.  On  average,  when  firm’s  attempt  to  manage  earnings  post  SOX,  investors 
discount this through disappointing stock returns. The results point to the fact that there 
have been greater benefits to the public as a result of the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley  
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Act of 2002 through increased accountability and monitoring as a result of SEC decisions. 
However, the results does not provide any clear evidence that managers substitute to real 
earnings  management  when  tighter  regulatory  controls  restrict  accruals  earnings 
management. 
 
6.5.2: Implications for Investors. 
The empirical results in both essays reveal that a broader set of information from financial 
statements might guide investors about the types of ways firms manage earnings and warn 
that they should not just fixate on reported earnings alone and accruals techniques alone. It 
further suggests that investors should not rely only on annual report disclosures alone, but 
should  monitor  and  evaluate  the  firms’  report  to  be  able  to  ascertain  if  the  firm  has 
managed its earnings or not. In Essay 1, the evidence point to the importance of stricter 
regulations. The results suggest that, overall market participants detect and react to insider 
trading  and  earnings  management  practices  under  conditions  of  stricter  regulations.  In 
Essay 2 for example, the results points to the fact that, when firm’s attempt to manage 
earnings post SOX, investors readily unravel their valuation effects as envisaged through 
disappointing stock returns. One interesting result relates to the greater predictive power of 
abnormal changes in inventory. Increases in inventory are negatively related to future stock 
returns both in the overall sample period and in the post SOX period. This suggests that 
investors discount firms that stockpile inventory even before the greater monitoring of 
financial statements following SOX. Overall, the results suggest a broad based approach in 
analysing  financial  statement  information’s  through  an  evaluation  of  different  sets  of 
financial  information’s.  Furthermore,  insider  trading  is  positively  related  to  post 
transaction stock returns.  However, in the post SOX period, managers are ideally less 
likely to time their trade based on overall market and economic fundamentals even when 
they are not interested in influencing reported earnings. 
       
6.5.3: Implications for Corporate Managers. 
The implications for corporate manager’s point to the fact that there have been greater 
monitoring  of  financial  reports  of  recent  and  that  a  comprehensive  set  of  earnings 
management  practices  have  recently  gained  attention.  There  is  no  need  to  consider 
switching techniques under stricter regulations as suggested by Cohen et al., (2007), as this 
can  still  be  unravelled  by  all  stakeholders  leading  to  large  wealth  losses  by  external 
investors and resulting criminal penalties to the managers. The conclusion in essay one 
points to the fact that SOX has improved the integrity of the US financial market and that  
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market participants detect and react to insider trading and earnings management practices 
under conditions of stricter regulations. In Essay 2, the results argue that, when firm’s 
attempt  to  manage  earnings  post  SOX,  investors  discount  their  stocks  through 
disappointing stock returns. This suggests greater vigilance of financial reports as investors 
strive to gain a clearer picture of financial statements. 
 
6.6: Suggestions for Future Research. 
This section proposes a number of suggestions for future research arising from the two 
independent essays. 
       
6.6.1: Studies of International Influences of SOX. 
The  author  believes  that  future  research  should  investigate  the  impact  of  SOX 
internationally.  The  scandals  affected  not  only  US  companies  but  were  spread 
internationally.  In  such  vein,  even  non US  companies  might  be  affected  by  the  SOX 
regulations and researchers need to investigate how other capital markets are reacting to 
SOX regulations. Moreover, other countries followed the US to impose responsive new 
regulations to their capital markets. Additional work need to be done to ascertain if these 
regulations have been cost efficient to their respective capital markets.  
 
6.6.2: Research on Earnings Management. 
The results of the two essays clearly demonstrate the usefulness of distinguishing between 
real and discretionary earnings management by academic research. The traditional starting 
point in the measuring of earnings management in the popular accounting literature has 
been the use of discretionary accruals. The author believes that it is important for future 
academic research to continue the refinement of the statistical properties involved and the 
techniques used to measure these two strands of earnings management practices. In a bid to 
avoid erroneous interpretation and see if results reported earlier are changed, the author 
suggests that when researchers utilize one technique, they should robustly test for the other 
to  avoid  confusing  a  reduction  in  earnings  management  for  a  change  in  the  style  of 
earnings management.  T
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